Craig Zeeh

The appellant, Christian Masci, sought leave to appeal the total five-year sentence imposed following his convictions for pointing a firearm, possessing a firearm, and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences for the separate events, particularly the firearm possession offences, emphasizing that such decisions are entitled to deference and that the total sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: improper reliance on the absence of exaggeration, improper use of prior consistent statements, and improper reliance on neutral aspects of evidence to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also challenged the s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order as overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's reasoning on credibility or confirmatory evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing the s. 161(1)(c) order, as it was not retroactively applicable to an offence committed prior to its amendment in August 2012.

The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence, arguing the application judge erred by not allowing cross-examination of an affiant regarding omitted information about the appellant's residence and the reliability of a confidential informant (CI#1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision.

The court held that the omitted information about the appellant's residence was not sufficiently cogent to warrant cross-examination, and the affiant's omission of CI#1's general comment about lying was not an attempt to mislead, nor did it detract from the specific, corroborated information provided by CI#1 for the search warrant.

This is an appeal from convictions for drug and firearm offences and the imposed sentence.

The appellant challenged the validity of search warrants, the warrantless "pinging" of his cell phone, and the calculation of pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the warrants and the admissibility of evidence, including the "judge-shopping" issue.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant additional pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on the dismissal of a mid-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of case management powers in dismissing the late application, nor any basis for the application to have succeeded on its merits.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the eight-year sentence imposed was entirely fit in the circumstances, despite some mitigating factors not being specifically mentioned by the trial judge.

The accused was charged with ten offences arising from a series of events over three days, including a home invasion, gas station robberies, vehicle thefts, and a police pursuit.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on clothing, stolen property, fingerprints, and tracking data.

The court applied the standard for circumstantial evidence, finding the accused guilty of the home invasion, vehicle thefts, license plate thefts, and failing to stop for police, as his guilt was the only rational conclusion.

However, the court found the accused not guilty of the gas station robbery and an attempted robbery, as the evidence left a reasonable doubt regarding his specific identity among multiple individuals present.

The applicants, arrested in a large-scale police investigation, brought an abuse of process motion seeking a stay of proceedings due to systemic delays in holding their special bail hearings.

They argued that their section 11(e) Charter rights were violated, similar to the applicants in a previous case where a stay was granted.

The court found that while the applicants' rights were violated by the delays, the systemic problem in the jurisdiction had been largely rectified following the previous decision.

As the ongoing systemic delay had been addressed, a stay of proceedings was no longer necessary to protect the integrity of the justice system.

The application was dismissed, though the court noted the Charter violations could warrant a sentence reduction if the applicants are convicted.

The accused were charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences after police executed a search warrant at their residence and seized cocaine, a loaded handgun, and cash.

The accused brought a Charter application arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant was deliberately misleading and lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that the ITO contained numerous inaccurate, exaggerated, and unsupported statements by the affiant officer, which were excised.

After excising the misleading information, the court concluded that the remaining evidence from a confidential informant was insufficiently corroborated, resulting in breaches of the accused's rights under ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the seized evidence under s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the police conduct in drafting a deliberately misleading ITO.

As the Crown called no further evidence, all charges were dismissed.

The appellant, Mohammed Hakimzadah, sought leave to appeal a nine-year sentence for multiple counselling offences, including the murder of his wife and her family law lawyer.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario rejected arguments that the sentencing judge failed to provide sufficient notice of a higher sentence or adequately explain reasons.

The court found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, considering the egregious nature of the offences, which put multiple persons, including a justice system participant, at risk.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, upholding the original sentence.

The appellant, P.D.C., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, criminal harassment, and breach of recognizance.

He raised five grounds of appeal, primarily concerning the trial judge's refusal to grant a mistrial or appoint amicus curiae after he discharged his counsel mid-trial, and the adequacy of the trial judge's guidance as a self-represented accused.

He also challenged the similar fact evidence ruling and the jury instructions on consent for the sexual assault charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decisions regarding the mistrial and amicus appointment, noting the appellant's voluntary decision to discharge counsel at an advanced stage of the trial.

The court also found that the trial judge provided sufficient guidance to the self-represented accused and that the jury instructions on consent were adequate given the evidence and theory of the case.

The applicants brought a motion to exclude wiretap evidence obtained during a police investigation into the manufacturing and trafficking of converted firearms.

They argued that the police failed to demonstrate the existence of a criminal organization, failed to establish investigative necessity, and engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation that subverted the pre-authorization process.

The court found that while there were insufficient grounds to establish a criminal organization and some misrepresentations existed in the affidavits, the investigative necessity requirement was met for the firearms offences.

After excising the misleading information, the court concluded that the authorizing judge could still have granted the authorizations.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the evidence, finding no deliberate attempt to subvert the prior authorization process.

The application was dismissed.

This is a detention review application under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, previously detained on tertiary grounds, sought release arguing errors of law by the Justice of the Peace and material changes in circumstances, including a new electronic monitoring plan and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found no error of law but agreed that the new monitoring system and the pandemic constituted material changes.

Applying s. 515(10) criteria, the court found detention was not required on secondary grounds due to the applicant's lack of criminal record and stable employment, and that the proposed restrictive conditions and electronic monitoring would manage public safety risks.

While the tertiary grounds initially weighed heavily for detention given the serious charges and strong Crown case, the court balanced these with the improved release plan, the general vulnerability of inmates to COVID-19, and trial delays.

Ultimately, the court concluded that detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice and ordered the applicant's release on a substantial recognizance with strict conditions.

The appellant, Thanh Tung Phan, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The appeal raised two main grounds: an alleged error in the disposition of a Garofoli application concerning the judicial authorization for surveillance and tracking, and an error in admitting evidence of a history of violence between rival gangs (Chin Pac and Asian Assassinz) to establish motive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Garofoli ruling, concluding that the authorizing justice had reasonable and probable grounds even after excising inaccurate information from the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court also found no error in admitting the gang evidence, determining its probative value for narrative, animus, and motive outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially given the trial judge's careful instructions and the manner of admission.

Lalendra Desilva was sentenced for possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the large quantity and variety of drugs, the commercial nature of the operation, and bail non-compliance.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age, lack of prior criminal record, strong support, education, employment history, and genuine remorse.

Enhanced credit for harsh pre-trial custody conditions was also applied.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3½ years' imprisonment, aligning with the defence's request, along with ancillary orders.

The defendant pled guilty to assault using an imitation weapon, uttering death threats, and failure to comply.

The court considered the aggravating factor of using an imitation firearm in broad daylight and the mitigating factors of a guilty plea, rehabilitation efforts, and a difficult childhood.

The court imposed a 12-month sentence, which was reduced to a suspended sentence after applying pre-sentence custody and Duncan credits for lockdown conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre, followed by two years of probation.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a surviving victim of a shooting to testify behind a screen pursuant to s. 486.2 of the Criminal Code.

The witness suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and experienced significant anxiety about facing the accused.

The court granted the application, finding that the witness's mental disorder would make testifying difficult and that a screen would facilitate a full and candid account without interfering with the proper administration of justice.

At a preliminary inquiry into the deaths of Tyler McLean and Zemarai Khan Mohammed, who were shot outside the Rebel nightclub on October 1, 2017, the Crown sought committal of both accused on murder charges.

Tanade Mohamed conceded committal on two counts of second-degree murder as the alleged shooter.

Abdirisaq Ali, who drove the vehicle from which the shots were fired, contested committal and sought to be committed only as an accessory after the fact.

The court found that while the accessory provisions captured Ali's involvement, there was a reasonable inference that Ali knew Mohamed had a gun and intended to assist in the murders, based on Ali's conduct in positioning the vehicle, waiting in the parking lot, and fleeing the scene.

The court committed both accused to stand trial on two counts of second-degree murder.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder and indignity to a dead body, brought a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence seized from his apartment during warranted searches, alleging multiple Charter breaches.

The police had initially made a warrantless entry into the accused's apartment under exigent circumstances after discovering a dismembered body nearby.

The court found that while looking through the mail slot and failing to provide the right to counsel upon initial detention violated the Charter, the warrantless entry itself was justified under s. 487.11 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the cumulative effect of the Charter breaches did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under s. 24(2), as the police acted in good faith, the impact on protected interests was minimal due to discoverability, and society's interest in adjudicating the serious charges on the merits was high.

The application was dismissed.

In a pre-trial ruling for a first-degree murder trial, the accused applied to exclude security video surveillance recordings obtained by police from the common areas of his apartment building.

The accused argued the warrantless seizure violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the 246-unit building.

The court further held that even if a breach occurred, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the case.

This pre-trial ruling addressed the admissibility of the defendant's statement to the police.

The court found the statement to be voluntary, rejecting arguments of exhaustion, physical discomfort, mental state, or police trickery.

However, the court determined that the defendant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated in two ways: first, when the defendant expressed confusion about whether he had spoken to a lawyer, triggering a duty for police to offer a second consultation; and second, when the police questioning shifted to a significantly more serious offense (murder) without re-advising the defendant of his right to counsel.

Applying the R. v. Grant factors, the court concluded that the Charter-infringing state conduct, despite not being in bad faith, was serious and had a significant impact on the defendant's Charter-protected interests.

On balance, the admission of the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, leading to its exclusion under s. 24(2) of the Charter.