Craig Zeeh

Following a non-jury trial, the defendant, Mark Taylor, was found guilty of 18 Criminal Code offences, including human trafficking, financially benefitting from human trafficking, receiving material benefit from human trafficking, advertising, exercising influence, sexual assault, obtaining sexual services for consideration, and breaching recognizance.

The court considered the legal parameters, positions of the Crown and Defence, the Kienapple principle, the nature of the offences, the offender's background, victim impact statements, and sentencing principles, including the Lopez factors for human trafficking.

The Crown sought a 23-year sentence, while the Defence sought 9 years.

The court imposed a global custodial term of 15 years, deducting pre-sentence custody and a Duncan credit for harsh COVID-19 conditions.

Ancillary orders were issued, but restitution orders were dismissed due to lack of quantifiable pecuniary damages and evidence of the offender's ability to pay, directing complainants to civil avenues.

This decision addresses the admissibility of a photograph in a criminal trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault.

The Crown sought to admit a photograph alleged to depict the accused at the scene of a shooting, despite the defence's argument that it lacked authentication due to informer privilege and the absence of a direct authenticating witness.

The court ruled that the photograph was admissible, finding it had been authenticated by circumstantial evidence through comparison with other reliable video and photographic evidence.

Concerns regarding the photo's origin or potential tampering were deemed matters of weight for the trier of fact, not admissibility.

The accused, Kevin George, was sentenced for discharging a firearm with intent and failing to comply with a release order, stemming from a shooting at his child's birthday party where he fired six rounds, injuring two children and another man.

The court stayed aggravated assault convictions under the Kienapple principle.

The judge considered the serious aggravating factors, including the use of a handgun, the large number of people imperiled (especially children), the breach of bail, and the number of shots fired.

While acknowledging the devastating impact of the injuries, the court found that causation for the injuries was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt against the accused, thus not treating them as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included family support, employment efforts, youth, and the limited impact of race and social context on moral culpability.

The court imposed a sentence of 11 years in penitentiary, reduced by 10.5 months for pre-sentence custody, for a net sentence of 10 years, 1.5 months, to be served concurrently with a 12-month sentence for the bail breach.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and firearm offences, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on a photo line-up identification by a witness who had seen media coverage of the appellant, and that several counts should be stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the identification evidence, noting it was substantial recognition evidence based on prior familiarity.

The Crown conceded the Kienapple issue, and the Court stayed the related lesser firearm counts, otherwise dismissing the appeal.

The appellants, inmates at a medium-security penitentiary, appealed their convictions for assault, sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and robbery against another inmate.

One appellant also appealed his indeterminate sentence following a dangerous offender designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, sufficient reasons for credibility findings, and no Charter breach from missing security footage.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's risk could not be managed in the community on a long-term supervision order.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial arising from the operation of an escort service, the court convicted the accused on numerous human trafficking, procuring, obtaining sexual services for consideration, sexual assault, material benefit, advertising, and breach charges.

Applying a trauma-informed approach, the court accepted the evidence of several complainants describing coercive control, threats of exposure, exploitation of addiction, manipulation of work opportunities, and sexual access demanded by the operator of the business.

The court also admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence under the Handy framework, finding significant probative value that outweighed any prejudice in a non-jury trial.

The court acquitted on some trafficking and procuring counts where the Crown had not proven the necessary exploitation or control beyond a reasonable doubt.

Kevin George was charged with 14 criminal offences following a shootout at his child's birthday party.

The court found him guilty of discharging a firearm with intent at Demar Cadogan and Tianna Green, aggravated assault on Demar Cadogan and Tianna Green, and failing to comply with a release order.

He was found not guilty of attempted murder, other discharge firearm/aggravated assault counts, and firearm possession charges due to insufficient evidence regarding party liability, specific intent to kill, or proof of firearm type/licensing.

The court extensively analyzed circumstantial evidence for identity and the principles of party liability.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment, assault, mischief, extortion, sexual assault, forcible confinement, and breach of probation.

He appealed, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended evidence concerning post-offence emails and the testimony of a defence witness, which he claimed undermined trial fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence regarding the emails (as the overlooked email was not part of the evidentiary record) and no trial unfairness.

The court also found no misapprehension of the defence witness's evidence, as the trial judge's reasons reconciled it with the complainant's testimony.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was not granted.

The applicants, charged with various drug trafficking and weapons offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 915 days.

After deducting defence-caused delay and deliberation time, the net delay was 773 days, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court matters.

The Crown argued that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance justifying the delay.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the primary cause of the delay was the Crown's failure to provide timely disclosure, not the pandemic.

As the Crown failed to mitigate the delay or establish exceptional circumstances, the court found a breach of s. 11(b) and stayed the proceedings.

The appellant appealed his sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for 20 years for second-degree murder, which the trial judge ordered to be served consecutively to a previous parole ineligibility period for first-degree murder pursuant to s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Bissonnette, which struck down s. 745.51 as unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the Crown conceded the order could not stand.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal to the limited extent of quashing the consecutive order, making the parole ineligibility periods run concurrently.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that a W.(D.) instruction was required for a defence witness's testimony and that the trial judge inadequately treated her evidence.

The court found that a W.(D.) instruction was not warranted as the witness's evidence, while helpful, did not compel acquittal, and the trial judge's review of her evidence was accurate and even-handed.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery and sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

On appeal, he challenged the validity of the search warrant used to obtain evidence, arguing that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading information.

He also argued that the trial judge erred in finding the weapon used was a real firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even after excising misleading information, the ITO provided sufficient cumulative grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the weapon was a real firearm based on witness testimony and surveillance.

The appellant, Adonay Zekarias, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and committing an indignity to a dead body.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence to establish motive, the reliance on inferences for motive, and the use of after-the-fact conduct to prove intent.

The appellant also raised Charter breaches but conceded them given the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning on motive or intent, and adjourned the sentence appeal.

The appellant, Christian Masci, sought leave to appeal the total five-year sentence imposed following his convictions for pointing a firearm, possessing a firearm, and attempting to obstruct justice.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal but ultimately dismissed the appeal.

The court affirmed the sentencing judge's decision to impose consecutive sentences for the separate events, particularly the firearm possession offences, emphasizing that such decisions are entitled to deference and that the total sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, J.B., appealed his conviction for sexual assault against his stepdaughter and the imposed sentence.

The conviction appeal raised three grounds: improper reliance on the absence of exaggeration, improper use of prior consistent statements, and improper reliance on neutral aspects of evidence to confirm the complainant's account.

The appellant also challenged the s. 161(1)(a) prohibition order as overbroad.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's reasoning on credibility or confirmatory evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal in part, removing the s. 161(1)(c) order, as it was not retroactively applicable to an offence committed prior to its amendment in August 2012.

The defendant was tried on charges of invitation to sexual touching and breach of a prohibition order.

The child complainant alleged she spent the night at the defendant's apartment and he propositioned her the next morning.

The defendant denied she entered his home.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the sexual touching charge due to reliability concerns with the complainant's evidence.

However, the court found the defendant guilty of breaching the s. 161 prohibition order, rejecting the argument that the contact was de minimus.

The appellant challenged his conviction and sentence, arguing the application judge erred by not allowing cross-examination of an affiant regarding omitted information about the appellant's residence and the reliability of a confidential informant (CI#1).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's discretionary decision.

The court held that the omitted information about the appellant's residence was not sufficiently cogent to warrant cross-examination, and the affiant's omission of CI#1's general comment about lying was not an attempt to mislead, nor did it detract from the specific, corroborated information provided by CI#1 for the search warrant.

This is an appeal from convictions for drug and firearm offences and the imposed sentence.

The appellant challenged the validity of search warrants, the warrantless "pinging" of his cell phone, and the calculation of pre-trial custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the warrants and the admissibility of evidence, including the "judge-shopping" issue.

The sentence appeal was allowed to grant additional pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was based on the dismissal of a mid-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exercise of case management powers in dismissing the late application, nor any basis for the application to have succeeded on its merits.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court finding the eight-year sentence imposed was entirely fit in the circumstances, despite some mitigating factors not being specifically mentioned by the trial judge.

The accused was charged with ten offences arising from a series of events over three days, including a home invasion, gas station robberies, vehicle thefts, and a police pursuit.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on clothing, stolen property, fingerprints, and tracking data.

The court applied the standard for circumstantial evidence, finding the accused guilty of the home invasion, vehicle thefts, license plate thefts, and failing to stop for police, as his guilt was the only rational conclusion.

However, the court found the accused not guilty of the gas station robbery and an attempted robbery, as the evidence left a reasonable doubt regarding his specific identity among multiple individuals present.