Claire L'Heureux-Dubé

The appellants appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that reversed the trial judge's order awarding them custody of the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, finding no error by the trial judge, and restored the original order granting custody to the adoptive grandparents.

A plant operated by the respondents discharged chlorine into adjacent waters, killing fish.

The authorities obtained a search warrant under s. 487(1) of the Criminal Code to search for evidence of negligence that would negate a defence of due diligence to strict liability environmental offences.

The respondents successfully applied to quash the warrants in the lower courts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the broad wording of s. 487(1) authorizes the issuance of warrants to search for and seize evidence of negligence in the investigation of strict liability offences.

The accused arrived at Pearson International Airport and was suspected by customs officers of having ingested narcotics.

He was detained in a 'drug loo facility' until he passed 84 pellets of heroin.

He was convicted at trial, but the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding violations of his Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the detention and 'bedpan vigil' were authorized by s. 98 of the Customs Act and did not violate the accused's rights under s. 7 or s. 8 of the Charter.

The appellants were convicted of conspiracy to traffic in cannabis resin following a reverse sting operation in which the RCMP offered to sell them a large quantity of hashish.

The appellants sought a stay of proceedings, arguing the police conduct was illegal and constituted an abuse of process.

They also sought disclosure of legal advice the RCMP received from the Department of Justice, which the Crown claimed supported the police's good faith belief in the operation's legality.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police are not immune from criminal liability and that their conduct in offering to sell narcotics was illegal.

Furthermore, by asserting good faith reliance on the legal advice, the RCMP waived solicitor-client privilege.

The Court ordered disclosure of the relevant legal advice and directed a new trial limited to the issue of whether a stay of proceedings should be granted.

The parties cohabited for four years and were married for three.

The appellant wife suffered from various health problems and eventually became completely disabled and unable to work.

Upon separation, the trial judge and Court of Appeal denied her permanent spousal support, finding no compensatory basis or contractual agreement for support.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Divorce Act and provincial legislation recognize three bases for spousal support: compensatory, contractual, and non-compensatory.

Even where a spouse has not suffered economic disadvantage caused by the marriage, a mutual obligation of support may arise from the marriage relationship itself, entitling a sick or disabled spouse to support based on need and the other spouse's ability to pay.

The appellant, a 30-year-old able-bodied widow without dependent children, was denied survivor's benefits under the Canada Pension Plan because she was under the age of 35.

She challenged the age-based eligibility criteria as discriminatory under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, establishing a comprehensive three-step framework for equality analysis.

The Court held that while the legislation drew a distinction based on the enumerated ground of age, it did not violate the appellant's essential human dignity, as the provisions were ameliorative in nature and corresponded to the actual long-term needs and circumstances of older surviving spouses.

The respondent, a Treaty 6 Indian, built a log cabin in a provincial park to use while hunting.

He was convicted under provincial park regulations for building a dwelling without permission.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the construction of the cabin was reasonably incidental to the respondent's treaty right to hunt, which traditionally involved an expeditionary method requiring shelter.

The provincial regulations conflicted with this treaty right and were therefore inapplicable to the respondent under s. 88 of the Indian Act.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The police received a disconnected 911 call from the appellant's apartment.

Upon arrival, the appellant answered the door, stated there was no problem, and attempted to close the door.

The police forced entry to investigate the call and found the appellant's wife crying with a swollen eye, stating the appellant had hit her.

The appellant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer with intent to resist arrest after a struggle ensued.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police have a common law duty to protect life and safety, which justifies a forced entry into a dwelling to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller when the call is disconnected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents licensed their trademark and secret formula for 'Clamato' juice to a licensee, who subsequently sub-contracted manufacturing to the appellants.

After the respondents terminated the licence, the licensee and appellants used the confidential information to develop a competing clam-free product, 'Caesar Cocktail', which they brought to market immediately.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellants were liable for breach of confidence but vacated the permanent injunction granted by the Court of Appeal due to the respondents' delay and the 'nothing very special' nature of the information.

Instead, the Court ordered financial compensation limited to the 12-month 'head start' period the appellants gained by misusing the confidential information.

The accused was convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder.

On appeal, he sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence and raise the defence of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for the first time.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence and ordered a new trial limited to the issue of NCRMD.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court held that the fresh evidence was properly admitted despite failing the due diligence requirement, as it was in the interests of justice.

The Court also held that the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to order a new trial when the NCRMD defence is raised for the first time on appeal.

However, the Court of Appeal erred in limiting the new trial to the NCRMD issue, as this would restrict the accused's right to control his defence and offend the presumption of innocence.

A full new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder involving two women killed in similar circumstances.

The trial judge admitted similar fact evidence and DNA evidence from hair samples the appellant had voluntarily provided during the investigation of the first murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the criminal standard of proof to the similar fact evidence, and that the use of his hair samples in the second investigation violated his Charter rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a jury may consider similar fact evidence if they conclude on a balance of probabilities that the same person committed the acts, and that the unconditional consent to provide hair samples extinguished any expectation of privacy.

The appellant, executor of her late husband's estate, challenged the validity of ad valorem probate fees imposed by Ontario Regulation 293/92 under the Administration of Justice Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the probate levy is a direct tax, not a fee, because it is compulsory, levied by a public body for a public purpose, and lacks a nexus between the quantum charged and the cost of the service provided.

The Court concluded that the tax was unconstitutional because it was imposed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council without clear and unambiguous authorization from the legislature, violating the principle of no taxation without representation codified in section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The appeal was allowed, the regulation was declared invalid, and the appellant was refunded the fees paid.

The appellants challenged a municipal resolution passed by the City of Sarnia authorizing a judicial inquiry into certain land transactions involving the former Town of Clearwater.

The appellants argued that the resolution was vague, lacked particularity, and was a colourable attempt to conduct a substitute police investigation, thereby infringing the federal criminal law power.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the resolution was validly enacted under s. 100(1) of the Municipal Act, as it was directed at matters of municipal good governance and public business.

The Court also upheld the quashing of summonses issued to city officials, finding that the subjective intent of individual councillors was irrelevant to the validity of the resolution.

The respondent confessed to sexually touching young boys after being confronted by the father of one of the victims, who held a knife to his throat and threatened him.

The statements were admitted at trial without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.

The respondent was convicted, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the evidence of the parents' prior contact with the police and their plan to trick the respondent was sufficient to alert the trial judge to the need for a voir dire to determine if the father was a person in authority.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to extend the period of suspension of the Court's previous judgment requiring an independent process for setting judicial remuneration.

The Court granted the motion, extending the suspension for two months or until Bill C-37 receives Royal Assent, whichever is sooner.

The accused, knowing he was HIV-positive, engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with two complainants without disclosing his status, despite being instructed by public health officials to do so.

The complainants testified they would not have consented had they known.

The trial judge acquitted the accused of aggravated assault, and the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that a failure to disclose HIV-positive status can constitute fraud vitiating consent to sexual intercourse under s. 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code if it exposes the complainant to a significant risk of serious bodily harm.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based largely on circumstantial evidence, including post-offence conduct such as flight and concealment.

The trial judge delivered jury instructions in segments throughout the trial and provided written transcripts to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the reasonable doubt standard specifically to the post-offence conduct, and that the piecemeal jury charge format was a reversible error.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reasonable doubt standard applies only to the final evaluation of guilt, not to individual pieces of evidence, and that while the format of the jury charge was unorthodox and risky, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case.

The Crown brought applications to quash two appeals purportedly brought as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applications were based on recent amendments to the Criminal Code that eliminated the right to appeal without leave where an acquittal is overturned by a court of appeal and a new trial ordered.

The appellants argued their right to appeal had accrued before the amendments came into force.

The Court held that the right to appeal as of right is only acquired when the court of appeal renders its judgment.

Since the conditions precedent were not fulfilled before the amendments took effect, the appeals were quashed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal finding him guilty of sexual assault involving mentally handicapped persons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that even though section 273.1 of the Criminal Code was not in force at the time of the alleged acts, the appellant must be convicted based on the evidence.

The respondent company operated a sand and gravel mine and was ordered by a development officer under the Planning Act to stop mining on a specific parcel of land and restore it.

The respondent did not appeal the order to the Development Appeal Board but failed to restore the site.

When charged with failing to comply with the order, the respondent argued by way of defence that it had a valid non-conforming use.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to determine the merits of the administrative order in a penal proceeding, as the Planning Act provided a comprehensive appeal mechanism that the respondent failed to utilize.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction restored.