Claire L'Heureux-Dubé

The appellant city hired a temporary employee through a personnel agency.

The respondent union sought to have the employee included in its bargaining unit, arguing the city was the real employer.

The Labour Court found that the city was the real employer based on its control over the employee's working conditions and day-to-day work.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Labour Court's decision was not patently unreasonable, affirming that a comprehensive approach considering multiple factors is appropriate for identifying the real employer in a tripartite relationship.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault.

The trial judge sentenced him to 12 months and 6 months concurrently, finding neither assault was a 'major sexual assault' under the Alberta Court of Appeal's starting-point approach.

The Court of Appeal overturned the sentence, substituting a global sentence of 5 years, holding the trial judge erred in not classifying the first assault as major.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's sentence, holding that a sentencing judge's failure to categorize an offence according to judicially created categories is not an error in principle, and an appellate court should only intervene if the sentence is demonstrably unfit or if there is an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or overemphasis of appropriate factors.

The accused was convicted of fraud relating to a mortgage document.

At trial, the Crown was permitted to call reply evidence concerning the accused's conduct regarding a later mortgage and whether he held himself out as a chartered accountant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons from the Court of Appeal that the Crown was erroneously permitted to call reply evidence in breach of the collateral fact rule.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal that affirmed the dismissal of his application for certiorari.

The appellant sought to quash his committal to stand trial on a charge of possession of marijuana for the purposes of trafficking.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal orally, holding that there was sufficient evidence to justify the committal.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that while there was a breach of the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, an adjournment was the appropriate remedy rather than a stay of proceedings.

The Court also noted that the test for determining the degree of relevance required for Crown production is set out in Stinchcombe and O'Connor, and the phrase 'an air of reality' should be avoided.

The police received an anonymous Crime Stoppers tip that the accused was growing marijuana.

Based on the tip and subsequent police observations, a search warrant was obtained and executed, leading to drug charges.

At trial, the accused sought disclosure of the tip sheet, which the trial judge ordered produced after editing out identifying details.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the tip sheet was protected by informer privilege, which is absolute subject only to the 'innocence at stake' exception.

The Court concluded that the trial judge erred in editing and disclosing the document, as it is impossible to know what details might reveal an anonymous informer's identity.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that overturned a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge had ordered the stay due to a 20-month delay between the issuance of an arrest warrant and the actual arrest, finding a breach of the right to be informed of the specific offence without unreasonable delay under section 11(a) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that there was no proof of prejudice to the accused.

In an addendum, the Chief Justice noted that an infringement of section 11(a) could potentially be established based on economic prejudice, rather than solely on prejudice to the right to a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting a two-and-a-half-year-old child.

At trial, the Crown did not call the child to testify, but instead introduced out-of-court statements made by the child to others.

The trial judge admitted the statements without conducting a formal inquiry into whether it was necessary to rely on hearsay rather than calling the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in failing to make a formal finding of necessity, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

The uncontradicted expert evidence established that the child would have been traumatized by testifying and lacked testimonial competence, meaning a trial judge would inevitably have found the necessity requirement met.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant companies were defrauded by their bookkeeper, who issued 155 fraudulent cheques payable to third parties and deposited them into her own accounts at the respondent bank.

The bank accepted many of the cheques without endorsement, and the bookkeeper forged endorsements on the rest.

The appellants sued the bank for conversion.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the bank was strictly liable for conversion.

The cheques were not payable to fictitious persons under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act because the intention of the corporate drawer, not the fraudulent employee, governed.

Furthermore, the bank could not rely on s. 165(3) to claim the rights of a holder in due course, as that section only protects a bank when a cheque is deposited to the credit of the legitimate payee or endorsee.

The appellant, a beneficial owner of common voting shares of the respondent bank, submitted proposals for inclusion in a management proxy circular.

The bank declined to include the proposals because the appellant was not a registered shareholder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 143(1) of the Bank Act, only a 'shareholder entitled to vote' may submit a proposal, and under s. 93(1), the bank may treat the registered owner as the person exclusively entitled to vote.

Therefore, a beneficial shareholder cannot submit a shareholder's proposal.

The appellant broadcaster challenged an order made by a trial judge under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code excluding the public and media from part of the sentencing proceedings of an accused who pleaded guilty to sexual offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 486(1) infringes the freedom of the press guaranteed by s. 2(b) of the Charter, it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to protect the proper administration of justice.

However, the Court found that the trial judge erred in exercising his discretion to exclude the public in this specific case, as there was insufficient evidence to support a concern for undue hardship to the victims or the accused.

The appeal was allowed and the exclusion order was quashed.

A class action was brought on behalf of hospital patients after illegal strikes by unionized employees disrupted care and services at a psychiatric institution.

The Court held that Quebec class action procedure does not alter the ordinary civil rules of evidence, and that prejudice may be proved by sufficiently serious, precise and concordant presumptions of fact.

It further held that moral prejudice in Quebec civil law is compensable on an objective basis and is not conditional on the victim’s subjective ability to enjoy monetary solace, although functional considerations remain relevant to quantification.

The Court concluded that the temporary discomfort suffered by the patients did not amount to an interference with inviolability under s. 1 of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, but did interfere with dignity under s. 4.

Exemplary damages were properly awarded under s. 49 because the interference was unlawful and intentional.

The appellant's 19-year-old son was fatally shot by a police officer while fleeing arrest.

The appellant brought a civil liability action against the officer and his employer, claiming compensatory and exemplary damages.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solatium doloris (grief and distress) is a compensable head of moral prejudice in Quebec civil law, and referred the matter back to the Court of Appeal to assess the quantum.

However, the Court dismissed the claims for interference with parental rights and for the victim's loss of life expectancy, ruling that the right to life is extinguished upon death and cannot be transmitted to heirs.

The Court also denied exemplary damages, finding that the officer's negligent conduct did not amount to 'intentional interference' under the Quebec Charter.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing bodily harm after a motor vehicle accident.

At the hospital, a police officer demanded a blood sample but failed to provide the medical assurances required under s. 254(4) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge excluded the blood evidence, finding the accused did not consent, and acquitted him.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the demand was deficient and violated the Charter, consent is not an essential element under s. 254(3), and the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) must be determined at a new trial.

The appellants, members of the Algonquin people, were convicted of entering a controlled harvest zone without paying a motor vehicle access fee, and one appellant was convicted of fishing without a licence.

They argued they were exercising an aboriginal right to fish.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that aboriginal rights can exist independently of aboriginal title and that the failure of the French colonial regime to legally recognize such rights did not extinguish them.

The Court found the appellants had an aboriginal right to fish for food in the zone.

The federal fishing licence requirement was found to be an unjustified infringement of this right, but the provincial motor vehicle access fee was held to be a valid user fee that did not infringe the right.

The appellant, a regional legal aid corporation, requested a business tax exemption for its legal aid bureau under the Act respecting Municipal Taxation.

The municipal commission refused the exemption, finding that professional legal services did not fall under the exemption for activities carried on mainly for social purposes.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the commission's decision was patently unreasonable.

The Court found that the professional legal services offered by a legal aid bureau to economically underprivileged persons are inherently social in nature and clearly qualify for the business tax exemption under s. 236(5) of the Act.

The appellants, members of the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations, were convicted of gambling-related offences under the Criminal Code for conducting high stakes bingo and other gambling activities on their reserves.

They appealed, arguing that their activities were protected by an inherent aboriginal right to self-government under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which included the right to regulate gambling.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Van der Peet test and held that the claimed right must be characterized as the right to participate in and regulate gambling activities.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that gambling or its regulation was an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the First Nations at the time of contact.

The appellants were convicted of attempting to sell herring spawn on kelp without the required licence and argued that the prohibition infringed an aboriginal right protected by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The majority held that the conduct amounted to an attempt to sell and that the Heiltsuk had established an aboriginal right to trade herring spawn on kelp on a commercial basis, grounded in pre-contact practices integral to their distinctive culture.

The majority further held that the right had not been extinguished and that the regulatory scheme prima facie infringed it.

However, the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether the infringement was justified, so a new trial was ordered on guilt or innocence and on justification.

A dissent would have found either no applicable aboriginal right in the circumstances or that any such right had been extinguished.

The accused was convicted of narcotics offences based on the viva voce evidence of a co-accused who had been arrested during an illegal search of a marijuana-growing operation.

The co-accused had pleaded guilty and volunteered to testify.

The Court of Appeal excluded the testimony under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the connection between the illegal search and the witness's decision to testify was too remote.

The Court distinguished between the discovery of inanimate objects and live witness testimony, noting that the witness's voluntary decision to cooperate severed the temporal and causal links to the Charter breach.

The union applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for a unit of foremen employed by the appellant.

The Board rejected the application, finding that the appropriate unit consisted of all foremen employed by all members of the employers' association.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the Board's decision, concluding it acted outside its jurisdiction by effectively imposing a multi-employer unit without the union's consent.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Board had jurisdiction to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to suggest a different composition.

The Court found the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable given its expertise and the need for industrial stability.