Claire L'Heureux-Dubé

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's guilty verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, finding that the verdict reached by the trial judge was not unreasonable in all the circumstances of the case.

The respondent, a 17-year-old, was photographed without her consent while sitting on the steps of a building in a public place.

The photograph was subsequently published in an arts magazine.

She brought an action in civil liability against the photographer and the magazine publisher for invasion of privacy.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the unauthorized publication of the photograph infringed the respondent's right to her image, which is an element of the right to privacy under the Quebec Charter.

The Court balanced this right against the appellants' freedom of expression, concluding that the artistic nature of the photograph did not justify the infringement absent a predominant public interest.

The award of $2,000 in moral damages was upheld.

The appellants challenged Alberta human rights legislation that omitted sexual orientation from the prohibited grounds of discrimination after a dismissed employee was denied access to the provincial human rights complaint process.

The Court held that the Charter applies to underinclusive legislation and that the omission created a discriminatory denial of the equal benefit and protection of the law contrary to s. 15(1).

The respondents failed to justify the omission under s. 1, including at the pressing and substantial objective stage of the Oakes analysis.

Applying Schachter, the Court held that reading in “sexual orientation” to the impugned provisions was the appropriate remedy.

The appeal was allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed with costs.

The appellants picketed a police station carrying placards alleging a police officer allowed or participated in the sexual abuse of children.

They were convicted of defamatory libel under s. 300 of the Criminal Code.

They appealed, arguing the defamatory libel provisions infringed their freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provisions infringe s. 2(b), they are justified under s. 1, subject to the severance of a portion of s. 299(c).

The Court found the protection of reputation to be a pressing and substantial objective, and that the provisions were rationally connected and minimally impairing, given the requirement of subjective knowledge of falsity and intent to defame.

The appeals were dismissed and the convictions upheld.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Forget J.A. The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the decision of the Commission d’appel en matière de lésions professionnelles was restored.

The Attorneys General of Alberta, Manitoba, and Prince Edward Island sought declarations validating past decisions of their provincial courts following a Supreme Court judgment finding the judges lacked independence.

The Court held that the doctrine of necessity applied, rendering past decisions valid without the need for declarations.

The Court also suspended the requirement for an independent judicial remuneration process for one year to allow governments time to comply.

The appellant was arrested for possession of narcotics.

Hours later, an RCMP officer conducted a warrantless inventory search of the appellant's impounded car pursuant to police policy, discovering cash and cocaine.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated section 8 of the Charter because an inventory search is not a valid objective of the common law power of search incident to arrest, and thus the search was not authorized by law.

However, applying the Collins test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the non-conscriptive evidence should not be excluded, as the breach was not serious and exclusion would have a more detrimental impact on the administration of justice.

The appellant, an insurer of cargo damaged in a maritime collision, appealed the dismissal of its action against the owners of the anchored ship.

The trial judge had refused to hear expert evidence because she was assisted by assessors, following settled Federal Court practice.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the rule against expert evidence where a judge sits with assessors is a procedural rule that violates the audi alteram partem principle.

The Court revised the rule to permit expert evidence and require disclosure of advice given by assessors on matters of fact.

The appellant appealed her conviction for first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no error in the jury charge regarding evidence of planning and deliberation.

The appellant agency sought an order to detain a pregnant woman who was addicted to glue sniffing in a health centre for treatment until the birth of her child, to prevent harm to the unborn child.

The superior court judge granted the order under the court's parens patriae jurisdiction, but it was set aside on appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the agency's appeal, holding that neither the law of tort nor the parens patriae jurisdiction recognizes an unborn child as a legal person possessing rights.

The Court concluded that extending the law to permit the detention of a pregnant woman to protect her fetus would involve major policy changes and complex ramifications that are best left to the legislature.

The appellant municipality appealed a judgment invalidating a residence requirement imposed on permanent municipal employees and ordering the respondent’s reinstatement and damages.

A majority of the Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the requirement unjustifiably infringed the respondent’s right to privacy under s. 5 of the Quebec Charter, while one set of reasons also held that municipalities are subject to the Canadian Charter and that the requirement violated s. 7 liberty.

The Court held that the decision where to establish one’s home is a fundamentally personal choice protected from unjustified interference and that the municipality’s objectives were insufficient or disproportionate.

The respondent’s cross-appeal seeking additional interim damages was also dismissed because the damages were not properly quantified and the Court of Appeal committed no reversible procedural error.

The appeal concerned the constitutional validity of federal toxic-substances provisions and an interim order limiting PCB releases after a prosecution for alleged discharge into a river.

The majority held that environmental protection through prohibitions against toxic substances is a legitimate criminal law purpose and that Part II of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act created a valid scheme targeting toxic substances through prohibitions backed by penal sanctions.

The dissent concluded that the scheme was fundamentally regulatory rather than prohibitory and could not be sustained under either the criminal law power or the national concern branch of peace, order and good government.

The appeal was allowed and the matter was remitted to the summary conviction court.

The appellant municipality sought dismissal of a bodily injury action on the basis that the respondent failed to comply with the 15-day notice requirement in municipal legislation after a sidewalk fall.

The appeal turned on whether art. 2930 of the Civil Code of Québec, which preserves the three-year prescriptive period for bodily injury claims notwithstanding contrary provisions, applies to municipalities and overrides s. 585 of the Cities and Towns Act.

The Court held that art. 2930 is a mandatory provision of public order, applies to legal persons established in the public interest, and takes precedence over the municipal notice regime insofar as that regime hinders bodily injury claims.

The Court also held that the Minister of Justice’s commentaries may assist with interpretation but are not binding.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault after having intercourse with his intoxicated second cousin.

At trial, the accused claimed actual consent, while the complainant testified she was too drunk to remember but would not have consented.

The trial judge did not instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the defence had an 'air of reality'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the combined evidence of the accused's belief in consent, the complainant's lack of memory, and the absence of violence provided sufficient plausible evidence to give the defence an air of reality, obligating the trial judge to put it to the jury even though it was not raised by defence counsel.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder after the trial judge allowed the Crown to reopen its case to call a new witness after the defence had closed its case.

The trial judge also allowed the Crown to cross-examine the accused on her bad character, including her sexual relationship with one of the co-accused and the presence of stolen property in her house.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to reopen its case at the third stage of the trial, as it prejudiced the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The Court found that the character evidence was properly admitted as it was relevant to significant issues in the case.

The appellant airlines purchased liquor abroad and stored it in customs bonded warehouses in Ontario for use on domestic and international flights.

The provincial liquor authorities charged markups and gallonage fees on the liquor.

The airlines sought restitution of the fees and a declaration that the provincial liquor monopoly was constitutionally inapplicable to their federal aeronautical undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the liquor was subject to the federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act and that the provincial monopoly applied, as providing liquor is not an integral part of an aeronautical undertaking.

However, the Court ordered the provincial authorities to make full restitution of the gallonage fees wrongfully collected under an inapplicable licensing regime.

The plaintiff sued her physician for the costs of raising her daughter, who was born with congenital injuries caused by maternal chickenpox.

The plaintiff alleged that had the physician properly advised her of the risks, she would have terminated the pregnancy.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the plaintiff would not have aborted the pregnancy even if fully informed.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the trial judge applied the wrong test for causation.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, affirming the modified objective test for causation in medical malpractice cases.

The appellant filed an access to information request for copies of weekend sign-in logs for employees of the Department of Finance.

The Minister disclosed the logs but deleted the employees' names, identification numbers, and signatures, claiming they constituted personal information.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the names prima facie constituted personal information, they fell within the exception in s. 3(j) of the Privacy Act because the number of hours spent at the workplace relates to the position or functions of the individual.

The Court ordered the disclosure of the requested information.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had allowed a Crown appeal from an acquittal and ordered a new trial because the trial judge stated a conclusion before the trial was completed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal's reasons for ordering a new trial.

The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm.

At trial, the Crown did not call the victim of the assault to testify, relying instead on other witnesses and forensic evidence.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the Crown had a duty to call the victim.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, ruling that the Crown has broad discretion in deciding which witnesses to call, including the victim, and is not required to call all material witnesses absent an abuse of process.