Claire L'Heureux-Dubé

The respondent employee suffered a back injury in the course of her employment and subsequently received substandard medical treatment from a doctor, leading to an action in negligence.

The Workers' Compensation Board issued a certificate barring the action under section 11 of the Workers' Compensation Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, adopting the dissenting reasons of Donald J.A. in the court below, and restored the Board's certificate barring the action.

The appellants, representing French linguistic minority parents in the Summerside area, requested a local French language school for their children under s. 23 of the Charter.

The French Language Board approved the request, but the Minister of Education refused, offering instead to bus the children to an existing French school 28 to 46 kilometres away.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Minister's decision was unconstitutional.

Where numbers warrant, s. 23 grants the minority language community the right to management and control over their educational facilities, including their location.

The Minister's discretion is subordinate to the Charter and the minority's right to preserve and promote its language and culture.

The appellant's driver's licence was cancelled because he suffered from homonymous hemianopia, which reduced his peripheral vision below the Superintendent's absolute standard of 120 degrees.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of physical disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Meiorin test and held that the blanket refusal to issue a licence without the possibility of individual assessment constituted discrimination.

The Superintendent failed to prove that accommodating the appellant through an individualized assessment would cause undue hardship.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for compensation by the Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec and the Commission des affaires sociales.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the Commission's decisions were patently unreasonable because the evidence clearly showed the appellant met the definition of 'spouses' under the Automobile Insurance Act.

The Court ordered the payment of compensation and additional indemnity with interest.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a five-year-old child.

At trial, the child witness was unresponsive and failed to adopt her videotaped statement to the police.

The trial judge refused to admit the child's out-of-court statements to relatives and the police under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, holding that the Crown failed to establish necessity because it did not present extrinsic evidence explaining why the child would not testify.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that necessity can be established based on the child's inability to testify meaningfully at trial, without requiring extrinsic evidence as to the reason for the inability.

The appellant taxpayer entered into debenture agreements to borrow New Zealand dollars at a high interest rate, and simultaneously entered into a forward exchange contract to convert the funds to US dollars for use in its business, while hedging the exchange rate risk.

The taxpayer deducted the high interest payments under s. 20(1)(c)(i) of the Income Tax Act and reported the resulting foreign exchange gain on capital account.

The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, arguing the interest deduction should be limited to the lower rate applicable to US dollars based on the economic realities of the transaction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the taxpayer's legal relationships must be respected and that the borrowed New Zealand dollars were directly used to earn income.

The Court allowed the appeal, permitting the full interest deduction, and dismissed the Minister's cross-appeal, holding the foreign exchange gain was on capital account.

The appellant, a Mi'kmaq Indian, was charged with fishing without a licence, fishing during the close season with illegal nets, and selling eels without a licence.

He argued that the Treaties of 1760-61 granted him a treaty right to catch and sell fish, exempting him from the regulations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the treaties included an implied right to hunt and fish to obtain necessaries (a moderate livelihood) through trade.

The discretionary licensing system and close season under the federal fisheries regulations infringed this treaty right and were not justified.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The respondent insured her husband's life and designated herself a revocable beneficiary.

She, her husband, and children were petitioned into receivership.

The trustee in bankruptcy surrendered the policy for its cash surrender value.

The respondent sought to enjoin the trustee, arguing the right to surrender was exclusively attached to the person and exempt from seizure.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the exemption provisions of the Civil Code of Lower Canada governing life insurance contracts are exhaustive.

Since the respondent's policy did not qualify under the specific exemptions, the rights under the policy, including the right to surrender for its cash surrender value, were seizable by the trustee under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The appellant school superintendent sued after a school board declared his position redundant and transferred him to a lesser role.

The respondents argued the claim was barred by the six-month limitation in s. 7 of the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The majority held that the limitation does not protect all acts of a public authority as a matter of status and applies only where the plaintiff's claim correlates to a public duty or power of a public character.

Although the board's overall reorganization was a public initiative, the implementation affecting the appellant was characterized as an internal labour relations matter with a predominantly private aspect.

The appeal was allowed and the action was permitted to proceed against the board.

The appellant was arrested in connection with a cocaine transaction and placed in a cell with an undercover police officer.

The appellant initiated a conversation about the arrest, during which the undercover officer asked 'What happened?' and mentioned that his fingerprints were on the drugs, prompting the appellant to admit his fingerprints were also on the drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the undercover officer's conduct did not amount to active elicitation or the functional equivalent of an interrogation.

The statements were volunteered by the appellant, and his section 7 right to silence was not violated.

The appellant, an inmate serving a life sentence, was charged with a serious disciplinary offence and faced potential solitary confinement.

He applied for legal aid for his disciplinary hearing, but the Legal Services Society refused, claiming such hearings were not covered under the Legal Services Society Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was entitled to legal services under the Act because the proceedings could lead to confinement.

However, the Court ruled that the Society retains the discretion to determine the appropriate level of legal services required, which may not necessarily include full legal representation at the hearing.

The Minister of Health and Community Services sought to extend an order granting him custody of the appellant's three children.

The appellant, an indigent parent, was denied legal aid for the custody hearing because the provincial guidelines did not cover custody applications.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the state's removal of a child from parental custody constitutes a serious interference with the psychological integrity of the parent, engaging the right to security of the person under section 7 of the Charter.

The Court concluded that in the circumstances of this case, the appellant's right to a fair hearing required that she be represented by counsel, and the government's failure to provide state-funded counsel violated section 7.

The infringement was not saved by section 1.

The claimant, a female forest firefighter, was dismissed after failing a newly implemented aerobic fitness test.

The test had a disproportionately negative effect on women.

The arbitrator found adverse effect discrimination and reinstated her, but the Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, replacing the conventional bifurcated approach to discrimination with a unified three-step test for bona fide occupational requirements (BFOR).

The Court found the government failed to establish that the aerobic standard was reasonably necessary to identify those able to perform the job safely and efficiently, and failed to show it could not accommodate the claimant without undue hardship.

The appellant union's members were locked out by the respondent employer.

Union members distributed leaflets outside the premises of four non-employer respondents who sold the employer's products.

The union members did not trespass or block vehicles.

The respondents obtained an injunction against the union, arguing the leafleting was prohibited secondary picketing under s. 104(2) of the New Brunswick Industrial Relations Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 104(2) must be interpreted in light of s. 5(4) of the Act and the Charter to prohibit only persuasion that is coercive, intimidating, threatening, or intended to cause undue influence, and therefore does not prohibit peaceful leafleting.

During a labour dispute, members of the appellant union distributed leaflets at secondary KMart stores urging a consumer boycott.

The Labour Relations Board ordered the union to refrain from this activity, finding it constituted prohibited picketing under the Labour Relations Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the statutory definition of picketing, which encompassed peaceful consumer leafleting, infringed the guarantee of freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court found the infringement could not be justified under s. 1 because the blanket prohibition on leafleting was overly broad and did not minimally impair the right.

The definition of picketing was struck down, with the declaration of invalidity suspended for six months.

The appellant was driving while pregnant and was involved in a motor vehicle accident, allegedly due to her negligence.

Her child was subsequently born alive but suffered permanent injuries resulting from the accident.

The child, through his litigation guardian, sued the mother in tort.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a mother cannot be held liable in tort for damages to her child arising from a prenatal negligent act.

Imposing such a duty of care would result in unacceptable intrusions into the bodily integrity, privacy, and autonomy rights of pregnant women.

The appellant, who suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, was found not criminally responsible for various offences and was conditionally discharged by the Review Board.

He challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter, as they are carefully crafted to protect the liberty of the NCR accused while ensuring public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who had a history of psychiatric illness, was found not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder for breaking and entering.

The Review Board repeatedly granted him conditional discharges, denying an absolute discharge because it could not conclude he was not a significant threat to public safety.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 672.54 of the Criminal Code under sections 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Winko, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions do not violate the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

The accused was charged with sexual offences and made an initial confession to police that was later ruled inadmissible.

During a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, the accused made a 'protected statement' confirming the earlier confession.

At trial, the accused testified and denied the offences.

The Crown cross-examined him on the protected statement to challenge his credibility under s. 672.21(3)(f) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the protected statement was inadmissible because it was derived from the prior involuntary confession.

The Court concluded that s. 672.21(3)(f) cannot be interpreted to permit the use of an involuntary confession, as doing so would violate section 7 of the Charter.

The respondent patient sued the appellant doctor for medical malpractice after he allegedly misdiagnosed her breast cancer.

The action was commenced outside the standard two-year limitation period.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the running of time was postponed under s. 6(4)(b) of the Limitation Act.

The Court held that the provision requires a subjective/objective approach, postponing the limitation period until a reasonable person would conclude that the plaintiff could reasonably bring an action in light of their own serious, significant, and compelling circumstances.

The appeal was dismissed, allowing the action to proceed.