Catherine V. Weiler

The appellant, M.D., appealed a conviction for sexual assault.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the appellant's evidence on the basis that it appeared "tailored" to the Crown's evidence and disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found this constituted a legal error, as it improperly used the appellant's constitutional rights to disclosure and presence at trial as a basis to impugn credibility.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial, emphasizing that such an error goes to the heart of trial fairness and the right to make full answer and defence.

Two appellants were convicted of murder arising from a shooting in Toronto allegedly motivated by street gang rivalries.

The appellants appealed their convictions on four grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in admitting expert opinion evidence on street gangs from a Toronto Police Service detective; (2) the trial judge erred in admitting handwritten rap lyrics seized from an apartment; (3) the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification evidence; and (4) the trial judge's conduct gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals and the sentence appeal, finding that while the trial judge committed an error in principle regarding expert evidence bias analysis, the evidence was properly admitted.

The court also found the jury instructions on eyewitness identification were adequate and fair, and that the trial judge's conduct, though at times harsh, did not demonstrate bias when viewed contextually.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 10 years' imprisonment (less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 3 years) imposed for guilty pleas to possession of a counterfeit mark, operation of a motor vehicle while disqualified, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and failure to stop at the scene of an accident.

The appellant was a serious serial recidivist with 51 prior convictions spanning 20 years, predominantly for driving-related offences.

The incident involved a high-speed chase through city streets at speeds up to 138 km/h, resulting in a collision that caused serious injuries to the other driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and upholding the sentence as appropriate given the appellant's extensive criminal record, poor rehabilitation prospects, and the need for public protection.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's December 27, 2018 disposition ordering his detention on a forensic unit at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with specified privileges.

The appellant contended that the Board departed from a joint submission of the parties by rejecting his request for community privileges accompanied by an approved person, and that he was denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no joint submission was made and that the Board's decision requiring staff accompaniment was amply supported by evidence of the appellant's history of violence, hallucinations, and medication non-compliance, as well as the opinion of his treating psychiatrist.

An application for interim release pending a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal.

The applicant had been convicted of assault-related offences and sentenced to 4.5 years imprisonment.

Following release on statutory release and subsequent immigration detention, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial.

The applicant sought interim release pending the new trial.

The motions judge granted the application on consent terms but noted that the application should have been brought before the Superior Court of Justice rather than the Court of Appeal, as the Superior Court had concurrent jurisdiction at the time the application was made.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the absence of evidence that anyone heard the alleged assault.

The appellant contended that given the complainant's evidence, it was implausible that no one would have heard anything if the assault had actually occurred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge understood and correctly applied the law regarding absence of evidence and reasonable doubt, and that the trial judge's thorough reasons demonstrated a clear path to conviction based on the facts found.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference with a 14-year-old minor.

The appellant admitted to the sexual activity but claimed a mistaken belief that the complainant was of legal age.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, finding he had not taken reasonable steps to confirm the complainant's age.

The appellant argued the trial judge unreasonably relied on "selfie" photographs, engaged in impressionistic reasoning about the complainant's appearance, and failed to provide adequate reasons.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reliance on the photographs was reasonable and that lay witnesses are permitted to express opinions about apparent age based on ordinary human experience.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of assault with a weapon, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of assault following a jury trial.

He appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial was unfair due to self-representation despite requesting counsel, and that the trial judge failed to provide proper limiting instructions on prior consistent statements and multi-count indictment evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction on the complainant's prior consistent statements made to her family doctor, mother, and family lawyer.

The court determined this error was fatal given the centrality of credibility, the substantive details of the statements, and the Crown's closing address inviting the jury to infer truthfulness from consistency.

An appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, detained at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health under a warrant of committal, challenged the Board's May 8, 2018 disposition imposing a detention order on a general secure unit and refusing community living privileges.

The appellant did not contest the Board's finding that she posed a significant threat to public safety but argued the conditions were not the least onerous and restrictive.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable based on the evidence regarding the appellant's mental illness, risk of reoffending, and the evidentiary basis for the alcohol prohibition condition.

The appellant appealed his sentence imposed by the trial judge following conviction on counts of fraud and money laundering.

The trial judge ordered the appellant to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture in the amount of $1,150,000 within five years of release from custody.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in fixing the payment period because he failed to consider the appellant's ability to pay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did consider ability to pay as a relevant factor, noting that both counsel made submissions on the period for payment and the trial judge's order fell within the range suggested by counsel.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

An appellant who was found not criminally responsible on a charge of assault in 2007 appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for a declaration that section 672.56 of the Criminal Code violated her Charter rights under section 7.

The appellant argued that the section did not afford a not criminally responsible accused the ability to compel the Ontario Review Board to hold a hearing to review a decision by a hospital to significantly increase restrictions on liberty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code provides adequate procedural safeguards and liberty protections for such accused persons.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud over $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime exceeding $5,000.

The trial judge found that the appellant became wilfully blind to the fraudulent nature of funds deposited into his business account.

The appellant claimed he was unaware of the fraud and that the funds originated from identity theft of a third party.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding that the trial judge properly applied the doctrine of wilful blindness based on inherently suspicious circumstances and cumulative circumstantial evidence, including the pattern of deposits, frequent cash withdrawals, and purchases unrelated to any legitimate business purpose.

The appellant was convicted of three counts: intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire to his dwelling house knowing it was inhabited or occupied (s. 433(a)), intentionally or recklessly causing damage by fire that seriously threatened the safety and property of residents in proximity (s. 434.1), and wilfully endangering his dog (s. 445(1)(a)).

The trial judge found the appellant deliberately set a fire by igniting paper under a television.

On appeal, the court allowed the appeal on counts one and four, quashing those convictions, while upholding the conviction on count two.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code against the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated October 2, 2017.

The appellant, declared not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, challenged three aspects of the Board's decision: (1) the finding that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety; (2) the Board's failure to consider a conditional discharge; and (3) the wording of condition 4(f) of the disposition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's findings on the first two issues but amended condition 4(f) to clarify the Board's intention regarding restrictions on the appellant's attendance at locations where children under 14 are present.

The appellant appealed a disposition order from the Ontario Review Board that imposed a hybrid detention order requiring detention at the Secure Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health with discretion to transfer to the General Forensic Unit or allow community residence in approved accommodation.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible for threatening others with a knife in 2011, had been living in the community under conditional discharge but experienced significant deterioration in 2017 due to medication non-compliance and substance use.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's findings of significant threat and the necessity of the detention order were amply supported by evidence.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that found him to remain a significant threat to public safety and ordered a conditional discharge with monthly reporting requirements.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that the Board's conclusion was reasonable based on evidence that the appellant intended to discontinue medication if absolutely discharged, had persistent persecutory delusions, and had a history of cannabis use that exacerbated his mental condition.

The court found it reasonable for the Board to conclude that absolute discharge would likely result in medication cessation, decompensation, and increased risk of threatening behaviour.

The law firm Crawley MacKewn Brush LLP (CMB) brought a motion seeking an order to be appointed as representative counsel for approximately 3,000 investors in the receivership of Crystal Wealth Management Systems Inc. The court-appointed Receiver, Grant Thornton Limited, and the Ontario Securities Commission opposed the motion, arguing that it would be duplicative of the Receiver's role and would result in unnecessary professional fees.

The court dismissed CMB's motion, finding that the Receiver was already adequately protecting and advancing the investors' interests, and that appointing representative counsel would add unnecessary expense without good reason.