Andrew Menchynski

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder of his common law partner and sentenced to 17 years parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence.

Amicus raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in failing to declare a mistrial when new evidence emerged during jury deliberations regarding the blue bathrobe used as a murder weapon, and (2) the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination of the officer-in-charge regarding information from a confidential informant about the appellant's alleged ties to organized crime.

The appellant also raised additional arguments regarding Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the new evidence, the evidentiary rulings, or the sentence imposed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sole issue on appeal was whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The appellant argued that his counsel was in a conflict of interest by representing both him and a potential third party suspect, the owner of the vehicle in which the drugs were found.

The counsel failed to advance a third party suspect defence and did not disclose the conflict to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal found that an actual conflict of interest existed, that the counsel's representation was materially and adversely affected by the conflict, and that a miscarriage of justice occurred.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her conviction on two counts of dangerous driving causing death and two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While backing out of a parking spot at a Costco store, the appellant's vehicle accelerated in reverse and crashed into the store's front entrance, killing two individuals and injuring two others.

The appellant claimed her foot became stuck under the brake pedal, preventing her from stopping the vehicle.

The trial judge rejected this explanation as implausible and found the appellant created a dangerous situation by reversing at high speed and taking no corrective action for at least five seconds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for dangerous driving and that the verdict was reasonable.

The Crown appealed a declaration that the restriction on enhanced pre-sentence custody credit in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.

The Court held that denying enhanced credit to offenders denied bail primarily because of prior convictions is overbroad under s. 7 because the provision captures persons unrelated to the public safety objective and affords limited meaningful review of endorsements.

The infringement was not saved by s. 1, as the measure was not minimally impairing and its deleterious liberty effects outweighed its benefits.

The Court also rejected the proposition that proportionality in sentencing process is an independent principle of fundamental justice under s. 7.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision declaring him not criminally responsible (NCR) for several offences, including criminal harassment, assault causing bodily harm, uttering a death threat, and breaching a recognizance.

He argued the NCR finding was unreasonable and based on a misapprehension of the evidence.

On appeal, the court admitted fresh psychiatric evidence that was unavailable at trial and which raised significant questions about the NCR conclusion.

Accepting the Crown’s concession, the court held that the fresh evidence could reasonably have affected the result.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered, limited solely to the NCR determination.