Andrew Menchynski

A 19-year-old young person (Z.S.) was sentenced for first-degree murder committed when he was 16 years old.

The victim, Javonte Daley, was shot and killed on June 8, 2022, in a targeted shooting involving three assailants.

Z.S. pleaded guilty and admitted full participation in the murder.

The Crown initially sought an adult sentence but withdrew that position after receiving a psychological assessment.

The court imposed an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision (IRCS) order for nine years (five years in custody at Roy McMurtry Youth Centre and four years in the community under conditional supervision), with a one-year credit for pre-sentence custody.

The sentence reflects Z.S.'s significant mental health challenges, traumatic background, demonstrated remorse, and rehabilitation progress while balancing accountability and public protection.

Aziz Karem Hocaoglu was found guilty of sexual assault involving violent vaginal penetration and whipping, which left visible injuries on the victim.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violence and the relationship between the accused and the victim, and mitigating factors, such as the accused's lack of criminal record, work ethic, and community support.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for serious sexual assaults.

A sentence of 3 years and 6 months imprisonment was imposed, along with a DNA databanking order, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCRMD), appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) decision to reject a joint submission for his transfer to a less secure facility.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no procedural unfairness in the ORB's handling of the joint submission and that the ORB's decision to deny the transfer was reasonable given the appellant's recent history of aggressive and self-harming behaviour and the receiving institution's objections.

The appellant, Roger Bristol, sought leave to appeal a total sentence of ten years imposed following convictions for 32 counts of break and enter, 34 counts of failure to comply with probation, and two counts of attempted break and enter.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave and reduced the sentence to seven years.

The appellate court found that the sentencing judge erred by mischaracterizing the offences as "home invasion robberies," failing to properly weigh the appellant's mental health challenges and their impact on moral blameworthiness, and failing to give proper effect to the "jump principle." The court also considered a "Duncan credit" for time spent in lockdown during pre-sentence custody.

The applicant, Dexter Griffith, sought an order under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel to assist with his conviction appeal, having been denied legal aid due to perceived lack of merit.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court granted the application, finding that the appeal presented arguable grounds, specifically regarding the validity of a search warrant based on the Information to Obtain (ITO) and the permissible amplification of the ITO.

The court also determined that counsel was necessary given the complexity of the legal issues and the applicant's cognitive limitations following a traumatic brain injury.

The appellant sought an order for the production of lockdown records from the Toronto South Detention Centre for use in his sentence appeal.

The respondent consented to the order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, reserving the right to challenge the admissibility of the records as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the interests of justice warranted the order and directed the production of the specified records.

The appellants, Desiree McNeill and John Waechter, appealed their convictions for jointly possessing heroin and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

A central issue was whether police required a second warrant to examine a seized cellphone belonging to an individual not initially targeted by the investigation, given the broad authorization in the initial search warrant for electronic devices found in a suspected drug trafficking hub.

The Court of Appeal held that the initial warrant, supported by a comprehensive Information to Obtain (ITO), provided sufficient reasonable grounds to authorize the examination of any electronic device found in the premises, including those of unknown individuals, without requiring a second warrant.

The court also found no basis to challenge the reasonableness of the convictions, concluding that the trial judge's finding of joint constructive possession was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's reasons manifestly insufficient to permit meaningful appellate review, specifically noting a lack of engagement with issues of conditional discharge or expanded community passes.

The matter was remitted to a differently constituted Board for a new hearing to consider these issues expeditiously.

The appellant, Guesly Gemelus, appealed his convictions for threatening to cause death and disobeying a court order.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's failure to adequately consider material evidence impugning the complainant's credibility, specifically her animus towards the appellant, and the insufficiency of reasons for judgment.

The appellate court found that the trial judge failed to address the defence's theory regarding the complainant's motivation and animus, and did not sufficiently explain why this evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

This constituted a palpable and overriding error, undermining appellate review.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Appellants were convicted of unlawful confinement after making a lawful citizen's arrest of individuals caught stealing from their property.

The appellants bound the thieves with zip ties and, instead of immediately calling police, called the thieves' parents after the thieves allegedly requested this and offered compensation.

The appellants were acquitted of pointing a firearm, extortion, and assault, but convicted of unlawful confinement and received suspended sentences.

On appeal, the court found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the elements of unlawful confinement, particularly regarding the requirement that the Crown prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown's closing submissions incorrectly suggested guilt was automatic upon failure to deliver the accused to police forthwith, without regard to consent.

The trial judge failed to correct these errors and inadequately instructed the jury on consent as an essential element.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition dated September 14, 2018, which ordered his detention at Ontario Shores Centre for Mental Health Sciences.

The sole issue on appeal was whether the Board erred in law or acted unreasonably in declining to impose a conditional discharge.

The appellant suffers from Schizoaffective Disorder with no insight into his condition, a pattern of medication noncompliance and substance abuse, and would not voluntarily return to hospital if requested.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Board's decision and upheld the detention order, noting that the need to supervise housing and permit quick readmission if necessary are relevant considerations in determining whether a conditional discharge is appropriate.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime.

On appeal, he challenged the issuance of the search warrant that resulted in the charges against him.

The Court of Appeal found that the reviewing judge's decision was deserving of deference and that, on the basis of the record before her, the issuing justice could properly issue the warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and sexual invitation involving two foster children.

The appeal raised multiple grounds including reasonable apprehension of bias arising from the trial judge's prior involvement in the appellant's former husband's trial, improper elicitation of evidence from a key witness, failure to consider lost evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and alleged errors in the trial judge's reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the trial was fair, counsel was competent, and the trial judge's reasons were adequate and supported by the evidence.

The Crown appealed from directed acquittals on charges of break and enter, pointing a firearm, and forcible confinement arising from an alleged assault on Alex Gingras.

The trial judge had granted a directed verdict motion at the end of the Crown's case.

The respondent did not appeal his convictions on other charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge improperly assessed the credibility and reliability of the Crown witness and that there was evidence capable of supporting convictions on all three counts.

The court rejected the respondent's alternative argument that the verdicts would necessarily have been the same had the trial judge properly refused the directed verdict motion, as it could not assume the respondent would not have testified.

The appeals were allowed, the acquittals were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was charged with drug trafficking offences after police executed a search warrant for his residence based on information from an untested confidential informant.

The police obtained the warrant with minimal corroboration of the informant's tip and without full disclosure of the informant's criminal record.

The trial judge found the search and arrest violated the appellant's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), finding the police acted in good faith.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in characterizing the police conduct as good faith and in failing to properly weigh the Grant factors.

The court held that negligent investigation and preparation of the information to obtain warrant, combined with misleading language regarding the informant's credibility, constituted serious Charter breaches that required exclusion of the evidence.

Two appellants, both found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder and incapable of consenting to medical treatment under provincial law, appealed detention orders imposed by the Ontario Review Board.

The central issue was whether an accused person incapable of consenting to medical treatment could nonetheless consent to a condition regarding psychiatric or other treatment under section 672.55(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the capacity required to consent to such a condition differs from the capacity required to consent to the treatment itself.

An accused need only understand information relevant to the operation of the condition and appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of agreeing to it, including potential consequences for liberty.

The Court overruled its prior jurisprudence to the contrary and allowed the appeals, remitting the matters back to the Board for re-hearing.

The accused was charged with offences relating to forcing two minors to work in the sex trade.

She pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving a material benefit from the sexual services of minors pursuant to section 286.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought the mandatory minimum sentence of two years imprisonment.

The defence argued for a suspended or conditional sentence and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum provision.

The court found that while the mandatory minimum was grossly disproportionate to the offender's circumstances, it could not be saved under section 1 of the Charter.

The court imposed a sentence of eight months incarceration, finding that the offender's own history of sexual exploitation and ongoing victimization at the time of the offences substantially reduced her moral culpability, despite the serious nature of the crimes and the harm caused to the young victims.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault arising from incidents in a domestic relationship.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the complainant's testimony, which the appellant denied.

The appeal raised three grounds: whether the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the limited use of prior consistent statements; whether the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defence of mistaken belief in consent; and whether the trial judge erred in refusing to admit evidence of other sexual activity between the appellant and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence from the Ontario Court of Justice.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant raised two grounds: that the trial judge erred in her similar fact ruling regarding collusion between complainants, and that the trial judge unevenly scrutinized the evidence of the complainants versus the appellant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the possibility of innocent collusion, made findings on the extent of discussions between complainants that were supported by the record, and properly assessed credibility.

The appellant's defence of shady business dealings was found to lack credibility and was contradicted by corporate documents.

Both the conviction appeal and sentence appeal were dismissed.

The Crown brought a motion for directions seeking to abridge time, dismiss the appellant's appeal from conviction and sentence, and issue a warrant for the appellant's arrest.

The appellant had been convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud and falsely obtaining a refund or credit under the Income Tax Act, and was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment.

Released pending appeal with a surrender date of May 1, 2017, the appellant failed to surrender and lost contact with counsel.

The Court of Appeal granted all three orders, finding the appellant in breach of his recognizance and deeming his failure to surrender as an abandonment of his appeal.