Andrew J. Winton

The defendants, a law firm and its principals, sought to vary the terms of an injunction previously granted to the plaintiff law firm.

The original injunction mandated specific distributions of legal fees from client files transferred from the plaintiff to the defendants.

The defendants requested a new distribution ratio, citing a year of financial records and the end of the plaintiff's financing of disbursements.

The court found inordinate delay in the litigation process and substantial changes in circumstances, satisfying the heavy onus required to vary an injunction.

The motion to vary the fee distribution was granted, changing the allocation to 40% for plaintiffs, 40% for defendants, and 20% into a segregated trust fund.

This motion arose in a bankruptcy proceeding where the Trustee sought an order compelling a secured claimant to provide information regarding her claim and a direction to keep this information confidential from a foreign representative who had an indirect financial interest in the estate and was involved in collateral litigation against the claimant.

The claimant refused to provide the information without strict confidentiality, while the foreign representative sought to reserve rights to access it later.

The court declined to issue the requested directions, emphasizing that the Trustee should follow the statutory process for claim adjudication and that issues related to collateral litigation should be addressed in those separate proceedings.

The moving party, Foreign Representative of Urbancorp Inc., sought leave to appeal a distribution order from the Supervising Judge in Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings.

The order authorized a distribution to King Towns North Inc. (KTNI) related to the sale of "Bridge Geothermal Assets" and the interpretation of a "Transfer Provision" in a lease.

The core issue was whether the Transfer Provision violated the pari passu or anti-deprivation rules, particularly in light of Chandos Construction Ltd. v. Deloitte Restructuring Inc. The Supervising Judge found the provision valid, as it was triggered by a lease transfer, not insolvency, and did not violate the rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no prima facie meritorious issue or error in the Supervising Judge's application of the anti-deprivation rule as clarified in Chandos, and that the appeal would unduly hinder the proceedings.

The Monitor sought an order authorizing distributions from the sale of Geothermal Assets.

KTNI disputed the Monitor's recommended disallowance of its claim to a portion of the proceeds based on a transfer provision in the Berm Lease.

The court found that the plain language of the lease reserved the transfer value to KTNI and that the provision was not invalidated by the pari passu or anti-deprivation rules.

The Monitor was directed to distribute $2,049,000 to KTNI, but no funds were to be distributed to Doreen Saskin until her claim in the bankruptcy of KTNI's parent company was accepted.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion for a further and better Affidavit of Documents, challenging the defendant's claims of solicitor-client and litigation privilege over certain internal emails.

The plaintiff had previously received an anonymous package of the defendant's documents, which she reviewed before returning.

The court reviewed the contested documents and found that they were all protected by either solicitor-client privilege, as part of the continuum of legal advice, or litigation privilege, having been created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation following the plaintiff's termination.

The motion was dismissed, and the documents were not ordered to be produced.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against three corporate plaintiffs (former franchisees) in three related actions.

The plaintiffs argued they were impecunious and that an order would be unjust due to the defendants' delay, the existence of counterclaims, and the nature of franchise litigation.

The court found that the plaintiffs were not impecunious because their shareholders had the ability to fund the litigation.

Applying a holistic approach, the court determined it was just to order security for costs, but reduced the quantum to reflect the defendants' delay and the overlapping counterclaims.

In the context of CCAA proceedings for the Urbancorp entities, the Monitor brought a motion for an order approving and directing distributions from the sale of geothermal assets.

The court approved two unopposed distributions recommended by the Monitor in its Forty-Fifth Report, specifically regarding VII - Curve and UNKI.

The balance of the requested relief was adjourned to a date to be set.

Parc-IX Limited applied to set aside an arbitral award, arguing the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction by failing to consider legal regulations (Rental Replacement Unit policy) affecting property valuation under a ground lease.

Manufacturers Life Insurance Company cross-applied to enforce the award.

The court dismissed Parc-IX's application, finding the arbitrator did consider the regulations but determined they did not apply on the facts, acting within jurisdiction.

The application to set aside the costs award was also dismissed, affirming that costs are determined on the facts of each case.

Steve (Uziel) Igel sought leave to intervene as an added party in an action (the "Andrews Action") commenced by Jeffrey Feldberg against David Andrews and his companies.

The Andrews Action's allegations against Andrews are based on alleged misconduct attributed to Igel, which are also central to a separate, ongoing "Igel Action" between Igel and Feldberg.

Igel sought to intervene under Rule 13.01, arguing common questions of law/fact, reputational interest, and potential adverse effects from a judgment, particularly a pending Rule 21 motion to strike the Andrews Action as an abuse of process.

The court found Igel satisfied the threshold requirements for intervention.

The court granted Igel leave to intervene in the Rule 21 motion, finding he could make a useful contribution, but dismissed his request to be added as a full party to the entire Andrews Action as premature, subject to revisiting after the Rule 21 motion.

Feldberg also brought a successful motion to strike certain paragraphs and exhibits from an affidavit based on settlement privilege.

Costs were awarded.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The underlying defamation action arose from the appellants protesting outside the respondents' law office with signs alleging unpaid accounts for rehabilitation services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the expression related to a private commercial dispute, not a matter of public interest, despite the motion judge improperly considering the appellants' motives and the manner of expression.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs order was denied.

The appellants and respondents, real estate developers, were engaged in two companion actions arising from a joint venture and shareholders' agreement.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the appellants' action, finding a right of first refusal clause in the agreement to be an unenforceable restrictive covenant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the summary judgment, holding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate given the intertwined facts of the companion actions and the need for a factual matrix to interpret the contract.

The appellants sought dismissal of a defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, arising from an email sent by the appellant lawyer to a professional listserv alleging that the respondent physician had improperly altered medical assessors' reports and changed a doctor's impairment classification in the context of statutory accident benefits disputes.

The motion judge allowed the anti-SLAPP motion and dismissed the defamation proceeding; the Court of Appeal reversed that decision and remitted the defamation claim to the Superior Court.

A five-justice majority of this Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the respondent had discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4) by demonstrating grounds to believe his defamation claim had substantial merit, that the appellants had no valid defence of justification or qualified privilege, and that the public interest in permitting the defamation action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expression.

The majority also partially admitted fresh evidence tendered by the respondent, including a letter from the assessed specialist and letters from counsel for the magazine that republished the email.

Four justices dissented, concluding that the appellant lawyer had a valid defence of qualified privilege that gave her expression a real prospect of success at trial, and that the public interest in protecting her communication to fellow plaintiff-side personal injury lawyers outweighed the harm to the respondent's reputation.

In a CCAA proceeding involving a condominium project, the debtor sought to disclaim pre-sale agreements with unit purchasers.

The purchasers brought a motion for the production of an unredacted appraisal report referenced in the debtor's affidavit.

The court held that while the mandatory production requirement under Rule 30.04(2) is subject to discretion in CCAA proceedings, fairness and transparency required production of the unredacted report to the purchasers, subject to a non-disclosure agreement.

Cross-motions by a contingent creditor and real estate brokers for production of the reports were dismissed due to their lesser need and potential conflicts of interest.

The plaintiff, Canada Bread, sued the defendants (First Gulf and Mallot Creek) for negligence and breach of contract related to a bakery's design and construction.

An initial action was settled, and a release was executed for "known" claims.

Before the release, a fire occurred at the bakery.

Canada Bread's insurer was aware of First Gulf's potential liability for the fire, but Canada Bread itself was not.

Canada Bread subsequently commenced a second action for fire-related damages.

First Gulf brought a summary judgment motion before an arbitrator, arguing the release barred the second action.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding the release only covered "known" claims and that Canada Bread was unaware of First Gulf's fire-related liability at the time of the release.

First Gulf appealed this decision to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court granted leave to appeal on questions of law but ultimately dismissed the appeal, upholding the arbitrator's decision as reasonable.

The respondent credit union brought a motion to quash an appeal filed by debtors from a receivership order.

The order appointed a receiver over two residential properties pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellants sought to appeal without leave.

The court held that no appeal as of right existed and declined to grant leave to appeal, finding that the appeal did not raise an issue of general importance, was not prima facie meritorious, and would unduly hinder the receivership proceedings.

The motion was granted and the appeal quashed with costs fixed at $20,000.

Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario sought to lift a stay on its $330 billion health care cost recovery action against three tobacco companies (JTI-Macdonald Corp., Imperial Tobacco, Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc.) and eleven co-defendants, which was imposed under CCAA proceedings.

Ontario proposed to temporarily stay the effects of any judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the need to preserve the status quo in CCAA proceedings to facilitate a global resolution of significant claims.

Allowing Ontario's action to proceed would alter the level playing field, distract from restructuring efforts, and impose significant costs, prejudicing other stakeholders.

Appeal from a Superior Court decision on a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant brought multiple motions, including a successful section 137.1 motion but also unsuccessful constitutional and procedural motions.

The Court of Appeal addressed costs for both the motion and the appeal.

On the motion, no costs were awarded due to the presumption in section 137.1(8) and the offsetting effect of the appellant's unsuccessful meritless motions.

On the appeal, the appellant was awarded partial indemnity costs reduced to account for time spent on unsuccessful constitutional and procedural arguments.

The Monitor sought court advice and directions regarding a proposed extension of an Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) closing date and alleged material breaches of confidentiality obligations by the purchaser, Lagasco Inc., in a Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceeding.

The court authorized the Monitor to agree to a final three-week extension of the APA, noting the purchaser's good faith in dealing with unexpected financing issues, but expressed serious concerns about the confidentiality breaches.

The court directed the Monitor to ensure the extension was without prejudice to rights arising from these breaches and to prepare for a potential resumption of the sales process if the APA failed to close.

The appellant, a hotel owner, sought recovery for fire damage to its building caused by a fire in the respondents' leased restaurant space.

The appellant's insurer brought a subrogated action in the appellant's name.

The respondents argued that the lease terms barred the insurer from pursuing the claim.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding that the landlord's covenant to insure and the tenant's contribution to insurance costs triggered the principles established in the Supreme Court trilogy, preventing subrogation against the tenant.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the lease contained explicit "notwithstanding" language that overcame the trilogy principles and preserved the tenant's liability for its own negligence.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Functionary and Terra Firma brought a motion to late file a claim and to approve a settlement agreement between them regarding the distribution of the debtor's funds.

The court allowed the late filing of the claim but ruled the Functionary's unsworn report inadmissible.

The court dismissed the motion to approve the settlement, finding that a settlement of claims against the debtor requires the consent of the debtor or the Monitor, neither of which had agreed to the settlement.