Andrew J. Winton

The defendants brought a motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals arising from the plaintiff’s examination for discovery in a commercial dispute alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and misuse of proprietary information following the departure of key employees to a competitor.

The court applied the relevance principles under Rules 31.06 and 30.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the governing jurisprudence on discovery scope.

Some questions and undertakings were ordered answered where they were relevant to damages, business dealings, or the alleged misuse of confidential materials, while others were refused as speculative or unrelated to the pleaded issues.

The court also addressed requests for commercially sensitive documents, ordering production of certain manuals and a DVD containing returned documents subject to a confidentiality agreement but rejecting a “counsel eyes only” restriction.

The plaintiff was ordered to provide outstanding undertakings and answers within 45 days and to attend for a further seven hours of discovery.

The defendant Ministry brought a motion for leave to appeal a decision upholding a Master's refusal to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay at a status hearing.

The delay was largely attributed to the plaintiff's former solicitors.

The court found no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the reviewing judge's decision, which properly applied the test for delay and deferred to the Master's exercise of discretion.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking the court’s determination of which competing discovery plan should govern the litigation.

The defendants argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose a discovery plan or that the request was premature given the absence of a sufficient evidentiary record.

The court held that determining issues such as relevance, proportionality, and unity of interests in the discovery process required a more developed evidentiary foundation and that mediating disputes between competing plans without such evidence would be inappropriate.

The court emphasized that discovery planning is a dynamic process and that parties may later seek directions if disagreements affecting the conduct of the action arise.

The motion was effectively declined, with the court encouraging further negotiation and leaving open the possibility of future procedural directions.

The applicants sought a declaration that they validly exercised a shotgun buy/sell provision in a shareholders agreement, requiring the respondents to transfer their shares in the corporation.

The respondents argued the shotgun notice was invalid because it was issued jointly by two shareholders, and alternatively, that the applicants repudiated the agreement by demanding a release not required by the contract.

The court held that the shotgun provision, interpreted in its factual matrix, allowed for joint exercise by the applicants as a single shareholder group.

The court further found that the applicants did not repudiate the agreement, as they were ready and willing to close without the disputed release, whereas the respondents refused to close.

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to transfer their shares.

The appellants appealed an order declining to stay the respondent's action.

The appellants argued that an arbitration clause in their agreement encompassed the issues raised in the litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was no arguable arbitration provision in the contract at the relevant time, as the written contracts containing such clauses had expired and the appellants had previously communicated their desire not to arbitrate disputes.

The court also agreed with the motion judge that the claims did not fall within the alleged clause and that Ontario was the more convenient forum.

The appellants, having been successful in their appeal which struck the respondent's counterclaim and third-party claim, sought their costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court fixed the costs for both appellants but declined to include any fees or disbursements related to a voluntary mediation.

The court held that voluntary mediation is not a step authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a matter of policy, the costs of voluntary mediation should be borne equally by the parties to encourage settlement efforts without fear of increased costs if unsuccessful.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motions under Rules 20 and 21 to strike the respondent's claims for constructive dismissal and related torts as statute-barred.

The motion judge had found that the claims could have been discovered before the respondent resigned, potentially triggering the six-year limitation period under the transitional provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a cause of action for constructive dismissal arises only when the employee resigns.

As the resignation occurred in May 2004, the two-year limitation period applied and the claims were statute-barred.

The court also held that the motion judge erred in linking the Rule 20 and Rule 21 motions, and found no triable issue regarding promissory estoppel or acknowledgment of liability.

The applicant, a former employee and pension plan member, sought an order compelling the employer to commence proceedings to wind up the pension plan under s. 68(1) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The employer brought a motion to strike these claims, which was dismissed by the motion judge and the Divisional Court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claims, holding that based on the Supreme Court's decision in Buschau, the court does not have jurisdiction to compel an employer to wind up a pension plan at the request of plan members.

Doing so would circumvent the statutory scheme and usurp the authority of the Superintendent of Financial Services.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for fraud and awarding the respondent $216,000 plus costs.

The respondent had been induced to invest $200,000 in a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by a co-defendant, who used the appellant's name and a 'show of money' transaction to give the scheme an air of legitimacy.

The trial judge found that the appellant was wilfully blind to the fraudulent scheme and his role in it.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's factual inferences and dismissed the appeal, upholding the finding of liability based on wilful blindness.