Alexander Alvaro

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after a second trial following the Crown's successful appeal of his acquittal at the first trial.

The key difference between the trials was the admission of expert evidence from Mark Totten regarding the meaning of teardrop tattoos in gang culture.

At the first trial, the trial judge excluded Totten's evidence as unreliable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that Totten was qualified to give expert evidence.

At the second trial, Totten testified that a teardrop tattoo could signify one of three things: the loss of a loved one, time in prison, or the killing of a rival gang member.

He provided statistics claiming that of 290 gang members in his studies, 97 had been convicted of homicide, 71 had teardrop tattoos, and all 71 obtained the tattoo to signify killing a rival gang member.

The appellant was convicted.

On appeal, the appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence impeaching Totten's credibility and the reliability of his statistical evidence, including evidence from Totten's cross-examination in an unrelated murder trial and Totten's own research studies.

The fresh evidence demonstrated serious deficiencies in Totten's research methodology, misrepresentations regarding sample size, and unsupported statistical claims.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, found it sufficiently cogent to have disqualified Totten from testifying, and concluded that the absence of his evidence would reasonably have affected the verdict.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, five counts of aggravated assault, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and reckless discharge of a firearm arising from a shooting at the Eaton Centre.

The sole ground of appeal concerned the jury selection procedure.

The trial judge directed that the truth of challenges for cause be determined by static triers without a proper application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant had expressly and repeatedly declined to make such an application and sought rotating triers instead.

The Court of Appeal found this constituted jurisdictional error, as the default rule requires rotating triers and static triers may only be ordered upon satisfaction of statutory conditions precedent, including an application by the accused.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Attorney General of Ontario sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to strike an application concerning post-conviction disclosure and Charter rights for convicted offenders who have served their sentences.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding that the motion judge's reasons were inadequate and conclusory, failing to provide sufficient rationale for dismissing the motion to strike.

The court also found that the motion judge applied the "plain and obvious" test incorrectly to issues of standing and prematurity, which should have been subject to different principles.

The issues raised were deemed to be of public importance, satisfying the conjunctive test for leave to appeal under rule 62.02(4)(b).

The applicant sought a declaratory judgment affirming the Superior Court's jurisdiction under section 24(1) of the Charter to order post-conviction disclosure for individuals claiming wrongful conviction.

The respondent, the Attorney General of Ontario, brought a motion to strike the application, arguing the applicant lacked standing, the application was premature, and it failed to meet the section 7 Charter test.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the respondent had not met the high threshold of demonstrating it was plain, obvious, and beyond doubt that the application could not succeed.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered whether a person can be a party to the offence of conspiracy under s. 21(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, a youth convicted of conspiracy to commit murder for assisting two sisters in planning to kill their mother, argued that party liability should not apply to conspiracy.

The Court held unanimously that party liability to conspiracy is an offence known to Canadian law, but adopted the narrower Trieu model, limiting such liability to aiding or abetting the formation of the agreement or assisting new members to join a pre-existing agreement, and rejecting the broader McNamara approach extending liability to furthering the conspiracy's unlawful object.

Although the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on party liability, the curative proviso applied because the evidence of the appellant's membership in the conspiracy was overwhelming.