A.J. Goodman J.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the defence sought to have the jury instructed to consider the post-event actions of paramedics and hospital staff when assessing the accused's intent.

The defence argued that these post-offence consequences were relevant to the common sense inference of intent, relying on R. v. Pittman and R. v. Boone.

The Superior Court of Justice rejected this request, holding that third-party post-offence conduct has no bearing on the accused's subjective intent at the time the firearm was discharged.

The court concluded that the common sense inference must be based on the natural and probable consequences of the act itself, not subsequent medical interventions.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to edit his extensive criminal record before testifying.

The accused argued that Gladue principles should be applied to the Corbett analysis, given his Indigenous background and the systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous persons.

The court agreed, holding that an accused's Indigenous background and the systemic factors contributing to their criminal record are relevant to balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record.

The application was granted, and the court excluded the accused's prior crimes of violence and older youth offences, while permitting cross-examination on crimes of dishonesty.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the transcript of an Agreed Statement of Facts (ASF) from a witness's prior guilty plea for substantive use.

The witness, who had pled guilty to attempt to obstruct justice, claimed a lack of memory regarding the events when testifying.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's recantation and that procedural reliability was met because the ASF was sworn under oath, adopted during a guilty plea with counsel present, and subject to cross-examination at trial.

The application was granted, allowing the edited transcript to be used for the truth of its contents.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for intending to harass his former spouse by sending repeated emails.

At trial, the self-represented appellant testified that he believed the police caution against contacting the complainant did not apply to emails regarding immigration matters.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge misapprehended the police officer's evidence regarding the caution and failed to properly apply the second and third prongs of the W. (D.) test to the appellant's exculpatory evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, a chartered accountant, was convicted of defrauding the Government of Canada of income tax and GST/HST over $5,000.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence and a $500,000 fine, arguing the fraud exceeded $1 million.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fraud exceeded $1 million, so the statutory aggravating factor did not apply.

Considering the accused's lack of prior record, good character, and the availability of a conditional sentence at the time of the offence, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day and a fine of $445,789.30.

The offender, a high school teacher, was convicted of voyeurism after surreptitiously recording videos of female students' cleavage using a pen camera over an 18-month period.

The Crown sought 12 to 18 months' imprisonment, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the significant breach of trust, the vulnerability of the underage victims, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

Finding that a conditional sentence would not adequately address these principles, the court imposed a sentence of 6 months' imprisonment followed by 12 months' probation.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence of alleged sexual misconduct by the accused towards another complainant.

The accused had previously been tried and acquitted of the charges relating to that other complainant, although the trial judge in that case noted the allegations were likely true on a balance of probabilities.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the doctrine of issue estoppel prevents the Crown from re-litigating an issue determined in the accused's favour in a prior criminal proceeding, even if decided on the basis of reasonable doubt.

Admitting the evidence would violate trial fairness and judicial finality.

The plaintiff brought a motion for an order requiring the defendant private investigation firm to produce a surveillance report and video.

The defendant had been hired by the plaintiff's former spouse during matrimonial proceedings to conduct surveillance on the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of privacy and sought production of the report.

The defendant claimed the report was protected by litigation privilege and common law case-by-case privilege.

The court held that litigation privilege from the spent matrimonial proceedings did not apply to this unrelated civil action.

The court also applied the Wigmore criteria and found that the defendant failed to establish a common law privilege.

The motion for production was granted.

The applicant, charged with fraud related to an alleged RRSP stripping scheme, brought a Charter application under ss. 8 and 24(2) to exclude evidence seized from various financial institutions and his residence.

He argued the affiant made intentional misrepresentations and omissions in the Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

The court conducted a Garofoli review and found that, despite some minor errors and one misrepresentation regarding a CRA auditor's opinion, there remained sufficient evidence upon which the issuing justices could have granted the authorizations.

The court also found the applicant had a negligible expectation of privacy in the bank and business records.

The application was dismissed, and the court noted that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2).

The applicants brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing their s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 43.5 months.

After deducting 5.5 months of defence waiver and 6 months for exceptional circumstances (Crown illness and underestimation of trial time), the net delay was 32 months.

The court found the case was not particularly complex and the remaining delay exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The application was granted and a stay of proceedings was entered.

The applicant, a mortgage broker charged with multiple counts of sexual assault and fraud, brought a pre-trial motion seeking the production of third-party financial and police records relating to the complainants and other witnesses.

The court applied the framework under sections 278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while some financial records were likely relevant to the fraud allegations and the narrative of the transactions, the applicant failed to establish the likely relevance of personal banking records and police occurrence reports.

The court ordered the production of specific records that met the threshold and denied the remainder.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the Agreed Statements of Fact (ASF) from two co-accused who had previously pleaded guilty to manslaughter and subsequently recanted portions of their ASF while testifying.

The defence conceded necessity and threshold reliability but contested the scope of the ASF to be admitted.

The court granted the application but ordered the ASF to be edited to exclude hearsay, background information, and matters beyond the witnesses' personal knowledge, allowing only what the witnesses personally heard or observed.

The applicant sought the appointment of Section 3 counsel under the Substitute Decisions Act for her mother, whose capacity was in issue amid a family dispute over powers of attorney.

The respondent opposed the appointment, relying on a geriatric psychiatrist's report concluding the mother had severe dementia, lacked capacity to instruct counsel, and would likely suffer significant emotional distress if forced to deal with an unfamiliar lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while Section 3 counsel can sometimes be appointed even when a person cannot provide instructions, in this specific case it would not be in the mother's best interests, would be ineffective, and would not assist in resolving the underlying litigation.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including robbery and firearms offences.

The sole issue was the sufficiency of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The principal witness had only a brief, dark observation of the assailants while intoxicated, and her subsequent in-dock identification was tainted by prior conversations and a flawed photo line-up.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by committing the applicant to trial where the identification evidence was so frail and uncertain that it amounted to no evidence at all.

The application was granted and the committal was quashed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving while operating an e-bike.

He argued that the trial judge erred in law by concluding that the undisputed facts—including erratic driving, swaying, red eyes, and an odour of alcohol—amounted to impairment.

He also argued the trial judge misapplied the circumstantial evidence test and improperly discounted the lack of impairment indicia at the police station.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the legal test for impairment and reasonably concluded that the totality of the evidence proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The plaintiff insurance brokerage moved for an interlocutory injunction to restrain a former employee and his new employer from breaching non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses in an employment agreement.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found a strong prima facie case of breach.

However, the court denied the injunction regarding non-solicitation, finding that any loss of clients could be quantified in damages.

The court granted the injunction regarding the misuse of confidential information, finding that the loss of competitive advantage and market share constituted irreparable harm.

The appellant appealed a 20-year driving prohibition imposed in 2009 following guilty pleas to care and control over 80mg and breach of probation.

The appellant had an extensive record of drinking and driving offences spanning over 40 years.

The appeal was brought over five years after sentencing.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no palpable or overriding error by the sentencing judge, noting the appellant's record and the fact that he had been convicted of another impaired driving offence in 2014 while the appeal was pending.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing his wrongful dismissal action for delay.

The action was administratively dismissed after plaintiff's counsel failed to pass the trial record in accordance with a court-ordered timetable.

The court applied the Reid factors and found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the extensive litigation delay, failed to demonstrate inadvertence, and did not move promptly to set aside the dismissal.

The motion was dismissed, upholding the administrative dismissal.

The applicant, charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized from his vehicle pursuant to a search warrant.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds and relied on an uncorroborated confidential informant tip.

He also argued the indictment violated the single transaction rule under s. 581 of the Criminal Code by combining drugs seized from his person upon arrest with drugs later seized from his vehicle.

The court dismissed the application, finding the ITO contained sufficient corroborated grounds to justify the warrant.

The court also held that the single transaction rule was not violated, as the seizures occurred on the same day and formed part of a continuous series of acts.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the court received written submissions on costs.

The court noted unprofessional comments made by the appellant's counsel in their submissions.

As the respondent was substantially successful on the appeal, the court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $4,483.11 on a partial indemnity basis pursuant to Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.