Vincenzo Rondinelli

The applicant sought judicial review of a Surrender Order made by the Minister of Justice, arguing that outstanding charges in Macedonia affected the reasonableness of the decision to extradite him to the United States.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the outstanding charges in Macedonia were for entirely different offences and did not affect the reasonableness of the decision to extradite.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and possession of a weapon dangerous to the public peace.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly concluded the appellant became the aggressor when he exited his vehicle, vitiating his self-defence claim and changing his purpose for possessing the knife to a dangerous one.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in cocaine in association with a criminal organization, arguing the transaction was a one-time occurrence unrelated to his membership in the Hells Angels.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the transaction was in association with the criminal organization, noting both participants were full patch members who met at a club function.

The court also dismissed grounds of appeal relating to the admission of expert testimony on motorcycle gangs, the appellant's claim of acting as an agent, and pre-trial custody credit.

Multiple appellants challenged jury convictions for two first degree murders and attempted murder arising from a retaliatory gang-related shooting.

The court rejected allegations of unfair trial management, unfair jury instructions, improper admission of prior K.G.B. statements and preliminary inquiry evidence, erroneous refusal of severance, improper admission of intercepted artistic expression, and misdirection on cell phone location evidence.

Applying a threshold reliability analysis informed by Khelawon, the court upheld admission of a key unavailable witness's prior statements.

The court also dismissed a fresh evidence application concerning synchronization of 911 and carrier clocks, holding the proposed evidence would not reasonably have affected the verdict given the broader evidentiary record.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant understood her rights and therefore no breach occurred.

The court further noted that even if a breach had occurred, the breathalyzer results would have been admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death while street racing and failing to stop at the scene of an accident.

He appealed his conviction on several grounds, including the trial judge's refusal to allow him to testify about a prior consistent statement made to police five hours after the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the statement lacked spontaneity and its exclusion caused no substantial wrong.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, seeking to realign the terms for each count to avoid deportation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act without changing the global sentence.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that courts should not impose artificial sentences to circumvent Parliament's will on immigration matters.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding when he knew of the allegations and failed to address all evidence concerning recent fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's interpretation of the evidence was not unreasonable and noting the trial judge properly relied on independent evidence from a social worker to reject the recent fabrication claim.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the defence of honest but mistaken belief, misapprehending expert evidence, and applying uneven scrutiny to the testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief.

The court also held that the trial judge properly used expert evidence to confirm the complainant's testimony regarding lack of consent and anal intercourse, and found no indication of uneven scrutiny.

The appellants appealed convictions for two counts of first degree murder and two counts of conspiracy to commit murder arising from planned execution-style killings.

They argued that undisclosed police criminal-record checks on prospective jurors created an unfair jury selection process and that the trial judge's final charge contained multiple reversible errors, including inadequate Vetrovec cautions and erroneous instructions on duress, conspiracy, included offences, bad character, and written jury materials.

The court held that any positive criminal-record information should have been disclosed, but the appellants failed to show a reasonable possibility that the non-disclosure affected the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial, particularly given trial counsel's awareness and inaction.

Although aspects of the charge were imperfect, the instructions were adequate when read as a whole and the prosecution case was overwhelming.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder, and one appellant appealed his sentence.

The victim was killed by a group of assailants who mistakenly believed he was their intended target.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions on reasonable doubt, the right to disagree, mistaken identity, or the defence of abandonment.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the 17-year parole ineligibility period due to the brutal nature of the murder.

The appellant appealed their conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge's instruction on corroboration was an error requiring a new trial, in light of the defence's closing argument.

Based on this concession, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for driving while disqualified under s. 259(4)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The information alleged he was disqualified by an order under s. 259(1).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding that the s. 259(1) order had expired at the time of the offences.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove that the appellant's provincial licence suspension was in respect of his prior dangerous driving conviction, which was required to rely on the definition of disqualification under s. 259(5).

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that a single interjection by the trial judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample circumstantial evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant had knowledge and control of the drugs.

The court also held that the trial judge's single interjection did not meet the high threshold for a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving (care or control).

The trial judge found that the appellant, who was the sole occupant of the vehicle and had control of the keys, repeatedly asked a passerby for a rope to pull his car back onto the road.

The Court of Appeal held there was adequate evidence to support the finding that the appellant created a risk of putting the car in motion while impaired, thereby creating a danger to the public.

The appeal was dismissed.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent on a charge of first degree murder.

The extradition judge committed the respondent for second degree murder, finding insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation for first degree murder under Canadian law.

The Minister of Justice subsequently ordered the respondent's surrender for the American offence of first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal quashed the surrender order, applying the 'misalignment test' to find it unreasonable to surrender the respondent for first degree murder without evidence of premeditation at the committal hearing.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the Minister's surrender order, holding that the 'misalignment test' is incompatible with the conduct-based approach to double criminality, the principle of comity, and the role of the extradition judge.

Prestige Toys Ltd. appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision revoking its motor vehicle dealer registration due to failure to disclose material facts to purchasers and misrepresenting selling prices.

The Registrar cross-appealed the Tribunal's refusal to revoke the salesperson registration of Lioubimova, the sole officer and director.

The Divisional Court dismissed Prestige's appeal, finding the Tribunal reasonably interpreted the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act to consider the past conduct of both the corporation and its director.

The Court allowed the Registrar's cross-appeal, finding the Tribunal failed to properly analyze evidence of Lioubimova's personal involvement, and remitted her matter for a re-hearing.

The appellant was sentenced to a 90-day intermittent sentence for assault causing bodily harm, and two concurrent 18-month conditional sentences for uttering a death threat and pointing a firearm.

The Court of Appeal held the intermittent sentence was legal but had to be served on consecutive days.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is not a 'sentence of imprisonment' within the meaning of s. 732(1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore does not render an intermittent sentence illegal or require it to be served on consecutive days.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting at a Toronto nightclub.

On appeal, they argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding eye-witness identification, post-offence conduct, and planning and deliberation.

The Court of Appeal found that the eye-witness testimony, combined with confirmatory physical evidence such as gunshot residue and hidden bullets, was sufficient to support the convictions.

The court also held that the trial judge's jury instructions were fair, balanced, and legally correct.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction, arguing that a 15-minute delay before providing a roadside breath sample violated his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a 15-minute delay for the purpose of obtaining a proper breath sample is a justified limitation on the right to counsel, rendering the availability of cell phones irrelevant.

The appellant was convicted of assaulting and sexually assaulting his wife over a four-year period.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on the use of evidence across counts, that the indictment violated the single transaction rule, and that the jury instructions compromised the requirement of unanimity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the multiple incidents constituted a pattern of conduct properly charged as a single transaction, and that individual jurors are entitled to reach different conclusions on which specific incidents occurred provided they are unanimous on the essential elements of the offence.