Vincenzo Rondinelli

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence, seeking to strike his guilty pleas.

The trial judge had held a full hearing and found the pleas were voluntary, fully informed, and unequivocal, supported by duty counsel's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal.

However, the Crown conceded that the dangerous offender proceeding was invalid because it occurred without the consent of the Attorney General as mandated by s. 754 of the Criminal Code.

The sentence appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new sentence hearing before a different judge.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned a stay of proceedings entered by the trial judge for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the appeal judge that the trial judge erred by failing to consider neutral delay factors, such as obtaining trial continuation dates, and by presuming prejudice without evidence.

The appeal judge correctly concluded that the delay was not unreasonable.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of a pilot charged with importing, trafficking, and possession of cocaine and hashish for the purpose of trafficking.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused, finding he was not a member of the conspiracy to import drugs, lacked actual knowledge of the drugs, and was not wilfully blind.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The Court held that the trial judge erred by excluding the accused's own intercepted statements, which were admissible as admissions regardless of his membership in the conspiracy.

The trial judge also erred in excluding hearsay statements of alleged co-conspirators and relying on irrelevant factors to determine conspiracy membership.

Furthermore, the trial judge's finding that the accused was not wilfully blind because further inquiry would have placed him in jeopardy was logically incompatible with his earlier finding that the accused was not acting under duress.

The respondent, a convicted sex offender, challenged the constitutionality of s. 487.055 of the Criminal Code, which permits ex parte applications for DNA samples from convicted offenders for inclusion in the national DNA data bank.

He argued the provision violated his Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, and 11 by allowing ex parte proceedings, lacking reasonable and probable grounds linking him to a specific crime, and constituting double punishment.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the DNA data bank provisions.

The Court found that the collection of DNA for identification purposes is reasonable under s. 8, analogous to fingerprinting, and that the ex parte procedure meets the requirements of procedural fairness under s. 7.

The Court also held that a DNA order is not a punishment under s. 11.

The appellant was convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery based solely on a fingerprint found on a pizza box used as a ruse to gain entry.

The victims could not identify the appellant and provided descriptions inconsistent with his appearance.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts unreasonable under s. 686(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code, as the fingerprint evidence alone, without any evidence as to when it was placed on the box, could not support a conviction in light of the exculpatory eyewitness testimony.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, including a twenty-year period of parole ineligibility, for an unprovoked shooting.

He argued the trial judge erred in a Corbett application and failed to instruct the jury on the use of previous consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reviewable error in the Corbett ruling and applying the curative proviso regarding the jury instructions due to the overwhelming case against the appellant.

The twenty-year parole ineligibility period was upheld given the appellant's serious criminal record and the fact he was on parole for manslaughter at the time of the offence.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for theft involving a breach of trust while employed by a trustee-in-bankruptcy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the circumstantial evidence supported the trial judge's finding of culpability and that the W. (D.) framework was properly applied.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, setting aside the six-month custodial sentence and substituting a six-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant was a first offender, the primary caregiver for two disabled children, and that the employer had made the affected clients whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving causing death, arguing that the trial judge's interventions during the defence expert's testimony raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and that the judge misapprehended the defence theory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the judge's interventions were appropriate in a judge-alone trial involving highly technical evidence and that the judge correctly understood and rejected the defence theory.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant, a licensed insurance broker, pleaded guilty to fraud after misappropriating approximately $227,000 from clients' accounts.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to give adequate weight to mitigating factors, including his gambling addiction and health challenges.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the original sentence but admitted fresh evidence regarding the appellant's severe cardiac condition, which developed shortly after his incarceration.

Given the risk that he could not receive adequate medical treatment in prison, the court allowed the appeal and substituted a 12-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder of his ex-wife.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on motive, eyewitness identification, DNA evidence under the victim's fingernails, and after-the-fact conduct including flight.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on eyewitness identification, hearsay evidence of the victim's statements, discreditable conduct, collateral evidence, consciousness of innocence, and the admission of autopsy photographs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors, noting the trial judge's charge was fair and balanced, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender provisions of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the error but argued the curative proviso should apply.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that based on R. v. Johnson, it is only in the rarest of circumstances that a failure to consider long-term offender provisions would not affect the outcome.

A new sentencing hearing was directed.

The Crown appealed an order quashing authorizations to take DNA samples from two respondents convicted of multiple murders.

The central issue was the interpretation of section 487.055(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which permits DNA sampling for offenders convicted of 'more than one murder committed at different times'.

The Court of Appeal rejected the application judge's 'transaction' analysis but affirmed the result, holding that 'different times' requires the murders to be distinguishable in nature or quality.

Because the murders committed by both respondents occurred in close proximity and were not distinguishable in nature or quality, the Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for uttering a threat to cause serious bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that it was implicit in the trial judge's reasons, having rejected the appellant's evidence, that the appellant had the requisite intent to commit the offence.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a committal for trial.

The appellant argued that the committing judge erred in accepting documentary evidence showing that investment funds were transferred to the appellant's own account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the committing judge erred in admitting the evidence, such an error did not constitute a jurisdictional error, and there was a basis for the committal.