Étienne Lacombe

The appellant appealed his convictions for two sexual assaults against two sex workers, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury to disregard certain Crown cross-examination, admitting a photograph of the appellant, and allowing speculation about the cleaning of blood at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the cross-examination, the admission of the photograph, or the Crown's suggestions regarding the blood evidence.

The Court noted the overwhelming evidence against the appellant, including similar fact evidence, medical evidence, and corroboration by other witnesses.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and criminal harassment against a former co-worker.

He argued the trial judge erred by improperly relying on his evidence of prior consensual sexual activity with the complainant, which was not subject to a section 276 application, to undermine his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the sexual nature of the activity but solely on the fact that it revealed an inconsistency in the appellant's timeline of when he met the complainant.

This use did not impermissibly engage twin myths or stereotypes.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued the appeal judge erred in upholding findings that he lacked lawful authority for his repeated communications and that the communications caused the complainant objectively reasonable fear.

The Court of Appeal found no clear error of law, noting the volume and content of the communications, and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including hostage taking and intimidation of a justice system participant, after bringing an imitation explosive device into a courtroom during a family law proceeding.

He was sentenced to nine years in prison.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was disproportionate and failed to apply the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no reversible error and properly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors given the extreme seriousness of the offences.

The appellant, who had four grouped appeals pending in the inmate appeal stream, brought a motion for leave to add a new ground of appeal alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.

The proposed new claim targeted a different trial counsel than the one subject to an existing ineffective assistance claim that had already caused significant delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no reasonable explanation for the appellant's delay in raising the new claim and noting that allowing it would cause substantial further delay to the resolution of the already dated appeals.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault, unlawful confinement, and sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred in analyzing the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent and in applying delayed reporting principles to physical assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded that the appellant failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent after an initial refusal, and made no error in assessing the complainant's credibility regarding her delayed reporting.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for possession of a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition.

The charges arose from an altercation outside a bar where a handgun fell to the ground, which the trial judge concluded had fallen from the appellant's satchel based on circumstantial and video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge properly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered under s. 24(1) of the Charter for a violation of the accused's s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The application judge had found the net delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the application judge erred in her treatment of a discrete exceptional circumstance arising from the release of a Supreme Court of Canada decision that necessitated a rehearing of a change of venue motion.

The Court found the Crown had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the resulting delay and deducted an additional 93 days.

This brought the net delay below the presumptive ceiling.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, and by providing confusing instructions on motive to fabricate and prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence because the accounts of the complainant and the appellant's girlfriend were diametrically opposed.

The court also found no errors in the jury instructions regarding motive to fabricate or the limited use of prior consistent statements.

The appellant pleaded guilty to numerous offences including break and enter, robbery, dangerous driving, and assault causing bodily harm, and received a global sentence of five years' incarceration pursuant to a joint submission.

On appeal, the appellant challenged only the lifetime driving prohibition imposed for the single count of dangerous driving, which the Crown conceded was not available under the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the driving prohibition from life to the maximum available period of ten years and nine months, but declined the appellant's request for a work-related carve-out from the prohibition.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm, as well as his three-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a series of assaults against a single complainant, including an attempt to throw her off a balcony.

On the conviction appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments and rejection of the appellant's evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that the trial judge did not err in treating rehabilitation as a neutral factor.

Furthermore, the Court found no error in the denial of Downes credit for strict bail conditions, as the appellant failed to lead evidence regarding the specific terms of his house arrest and their impact on his liberty.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The applicant sought relief in an appeal before the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The court reviewed the record and applied the governing legal and procedural standards, including deference to factual and discretionary determinations where required.

The matter concluded with the following disposition: Appeal dismissed.

The appeal challenged the validity of a guilty plea to assault causing bodily harm.

Both parties acknowledged the plea did not reflect their agreement and resulted from mutual misapprehension.

The court allowed the appeal, substituted a conviction for common assault, and left sentence intact.

The appellant, a dangerous offender with an extensive history of child sexual offences, appealed his sentence of 20 months imposed for breaching a long-term supervision order and prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code.

The breach occurred when he attended a religious service in a church in the presence of numerous children, merely 30 days after being released to a community correctional centre.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) entitlement to sentence credit for the period between suspension of his long-term supervision order and the laying of charges; (2) the trial judge's allocation of pre-sentence credit at a ratio of 1:1.3 instead of 1:1.5 and the denial of a Duncan credit; and (3) that the sentence was imposed to ensure federal detention for treatment purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the sentence fit and imposed without error.

The appellant appealed a 9-year global sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that he did not receive adequate credit for presentence custody given the hardship endured.

Although the trial judge accepted the appellant's account of hardship and granted 3:1 credit, duty counsel submitted that the trial judge may have misapprehended the appellant's primary submission for a time-served sentence.

The appellate court found no error warranting interference, noting that the trial judge provided significant credit for hardship and properly rejected the time-served submission based on the seriousness of the offences and the appellant's degree of responsibility.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault under section 271 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on two grounds: (1) that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by requiring the appellant to prove his innocence rather than requiring the Crown to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) that the trial judge erred in failing to resolve significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework, correctly assessed credibility, and was not required to address every minor contradiction raised by the defence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and breach of probation, as well as his sentence of 30 months in custody less 7 months credit for presentence custody, followed by 18 months' probation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence on the basis that the trial judge erred in failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle by the sentencing judge and dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the circumstances did not warrant a conditional sentence and that the sentence fell within the applicable range.

The appellant appealed her sentence of 11 months in custody followed by two years' probation for fraud over $5,000, forgery, and impersonation to gain advantage.

The appellant had fraudulently represented herself as a registered practical nurse at five care homes over 14 months, administered medication to residents, and received remuneration for work she was not qualified to perform.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, finding that the sentencing judge properly considered aggravating and mitigating factors, that denunciation and deterrence were paramount given the extended period of fraudulent conduct, and that the custodial sentence was well within the appropriate range for such serious offences.

The applicant sought appointment of counsel pursuant to s. 684 of the Criminal Code to represent him on appeal of a lifetime weapons prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to possessing ammunition while subject to a s. 110 prohibition order and possessing explosive substances.

The applicant advanced two grounds of appeal: first, that the Crown failed to provide notice of the lifetime ban as an enhanced penalty prior to his guilty plea, contrary to s. 727(1); and second, that his prior s. 110 prohibition did not constitute a prior conviction sufficient to trigger the mandatory lifetime prohibition under s. 109(3).

The Crown conceded the applicant lacked financial means but opposed the application on grounds that the appeal was not legally complex.

The court granted the application, finding the issues were arguable and involved questions of mixed fact and law beyond the applicant's capacity to advance without counsel.