Thomas R. Lederer

The applicant, a branch of the United States Department of Defense, sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision certifying a union to represent its civilian employees in Ontario.

The Board had found that the applicant was a separate agency of the foreign state, had waived sovereign immunity, and was engaged in commercial activity.

The Divisional Court quashed the certification, holding that the applicant was an integral part of the U.S. government, had not waived its immunity, and was engaged in sovereign military support activities rather than commercial activities.

The applicant filed complaints against the Toronto Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police.

The Independent Police Review Director (IPRD) refused to deal with the complaints under s. 60 of the Police Services Act.

The applicant sought judicial review and moved to compel the IPRD to deliver a record of proceedings.

The motion judge ordered the IPRD to file the record.

The IPRD applied to a full panel of the Divisional Court to set aside the order, arguing it was not exercising a statutory power of decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the IPRD's decision under s. 60 affects the complainant's rights and constitutes a statutory power of decision within the meaning of s. 10 of the Judicial Review Procedures Act, thereby requiring the IPRD to file a record of proceedings.

The plaintiff's action was struck from the trial list and subsequently dismissed by a Master due to the inaction of her former counsel.

The plaintiff's second lawyer failed to advise her of the dismissal or her right to appeal.

Upon retaining new counsel, the plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to file a Notice of Appeal of the Master's order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the delay was attributable to the plaintiff's former counsel and that extending the time would not prejudice the defendants, in accordance with the principle that matters should be determined on their merits.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision awarding the landlord $10,439.50 for damages to the rental unit, including a destroyed kitchen countertop.

The tenant argued the Board erred by relying on hearsay evidence in the form of repair estimates and by double-counting expenses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that hearsay evidence is permitted under the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and that the Board reasonably concluded the countertop needed replacement without double-counting.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Assessment Review Board decision directing a rehearing of a property tax assessment appeal.

The Divisional Court held that the matter should proceed as an appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act rather than a judicial review, to preserve the court's gate-keeping function.

Converting the application to an appeal, the court granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by concluding there was a procedural fairness violation.

The Board had admitted the landowner's evidence but gave it no weight, which is a matter of evidentiary weight, not procedural fairness.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining the sale price, distribution of proceeds, and interest following an application for partition and sale of a jointly owned property.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings regarding the initial purchase contribution and the respondent's entitlement to occupation rent due to ouster.

However, the court found palpable and overriding errors in the calculation of carrying costs, the allocation of real estate commission, and the award of pre-judgment interest on funds already paid into court or held in trust.

The appeal was allowed in part to correct these financial calculations.

The appellant, a medical resident, appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board confirming the refusal to issue him a certificate of registration.

The refusal was based on outstanding, unproven criminal charges of sexual assault.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the law and violated the presumption of innocence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable as the regulatory scheme places the onus on the applicant to demonstrate good character, and considering unproven charges in the context of public interest does not violate the presumption of innocence.

Several public interest organizations sought leave to intervene as friends of the court on a motion to strike a constitutional application alleging that federal and provincial housing policies violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter by failing to ensure adequate housing.

The proposed interveners argued they could provide perspectives relating to poverty, disability, housing policy, international human rights obligations, and constitutional remedies.

The court emphasized that intervention on a Rule 21 motion is exceptional and requires a showing that the intervener will make a useful legal contribution beyond the parties’ submissions without prejudicing the proceeding.

Interventions focused primarily on social context or policy impacts were rejected because the motion concerned a narrow legal question regarding whether the application disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted limited intervention status to three groups with specific expertise relevant to Charter interpretation, international human rights law, and constitutional remedies, while dismissing the remaining intervention motions.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee revoking his certificate of registration for professional misconduct, including sexual abuse of a patient and conduct unbecoming a physician due to an aggressive outburst at a school concert.

The appellant argued the Committee erred by refusing to sever the sexual abuse allegation, making unreasonable credibility findings, and improperly disciplining him for off-duty conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Committee's decisions on severance, credibility, and off-duty conduct were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an arbitration award that found the termination of a nurse's employment amounted to double jeopardy.

The nurse had previously been suspended for her involvement in the assault of a patient, but the hospital later terminated her employment, claiming it had obtained new information about her role.

The arbitrator concluded there was no new information, only a reassessment of existing information, and thus the termination constituted double discipline for the same misconduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decision was reasonable and fell within the range of acceptable outcomes.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal decision that denied her entitlement to loss of earnings benefits due to her failure to accept offers of modified duties from her employer.

The applicant argued she was not given proper notice of the possible permanent termination of her benefits.

The Divisional Court found that the Tribunal's decision was reasonable, as there was ample evidence supporting the finding of notice and the applicant's capability to perform modified work.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision granting the landlord's application to terminate the tenancy for personal use.

The tenant argued the Board erred in finding good faith and that the affidavit required by s. 72 of the Residential Tenancies Act should have been sworn by the landlord's son.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the good faith finding was a question of fact not subject to appeal, and that the landlord's affidavit was sufficient as he required the unit for his personal use along with his family.

The applicant, a former NHL referee, sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision which dismissed his complaint that his termination was tainted by anti-union animus.

The applicant argued the Board applied the wrong legal standard of proof and made several evidentiary errors.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's decision was reasonable, applied the correct legal test, and was based on a thorough assessment of the evidence.

The moving parties, two of several defendants, sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction restraining them from using confidential information and competing with the plaintiff.

The motions judge had found a strong prima facie case that the former president breached his fiduciary duty and that the moving parties were impressed with the same duty.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision and no conflicting decision that would warrant granting leave.

The plaintiffs appealed a decision denying certification of a proposed class proceeding against the manufacturers of the drug Seroquel, as well as the associated costs award.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a cause of action under s. 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act and that the plaintiffs failed to meet the evidentiary threshold for the remaining certification criteria.

The court also found no error in principle in the costs award, noting the motion judge properly exercised her discretion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $30,000.

The respondent union brought a motion to dismiss four applications for judicial review commenced by the self-represented applicant.

The applicant had failed to set any of the applications down for a hearing, resulting in delays ranging from over two to nearly five years.

The court found the delay to be unacceptable and that it caused obvious prejudice in the employment context.

The court also noted the applicant's history of abusing tribunal processes and acting as a vexatious litigant.

The motion was granted, the applications for judicial review were dismissed, and the applicant's cross-motion was dismissed.

The appellant builder appealed a trial judgment ordering the return of the respondents' deposit and upgrade payments for a new home.

The trial judge found that the appellant's letter extending the closing date amounted to an anticipatory breach of the agreement of purchase and sale, which the respondents accepted, terminating the agreement.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by deciding the case on the unpleaded issue of anticipatory breach.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the finding of repudiation was a natural consequence of interpreting the documentary evidence and the appellant suffered no unfairness.

The court also upheld the trial judge's costs award to the third-party lawyer.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision refusing to set aside the Registrar's second dismissal of the action for delay.

The Master had applied the Reid factors and found the plaintiff failed to explain the delay or rebut the presumption of prejudice.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Master erred in law by failing to balance the delay against the overarching principle in Rule 1.04 that proceedings should be determined on their merits.

The court noted the defendant's counsel contributed to the circumstances leading to the second dismissal by failing to respond to a settlement offer as promised, and there was no evidence that a fair trial was no longer possible.

The applicant requested an adjournment of four motions brought by the respondent to dismiss his applications for judicial review for delay.

The applicant claimed he was unavailable and unable to prepare due to university obligations and a need to clarify opposing counsel's instructions.

The court dismissed the adjournment request, finding the applicant had been given every reasonable opportunity to schedule the hearing and had used delay tactics, noting he was nonetheless able to prepare a cross-motion and submissions.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against their residential property.

The respondents had obtained the certificate in the context of an oppression remedy claim involving a corporate dispute.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and discharged the certificate, finding that the motions judge erred in law by applying a broad equitable discretion instead of determining whether there was a reasonable claim to an interest in land.

The court concluded that the pleadings did not demonstrate a reasonable claim to an interest in the land, as the claims were for damages and corporate remedies, not for an interest in the property itself.