Thomas R. Lederer

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) requiring him to be cautioned and to participate in a behavioral program.

He argued he was denied procedural fairness because the ICRC failed to disclose 13 interview summaries, 20 internal complaints, and hospital policies considered by its medical inspector.

The Divisional Court found that while the applicant was aware of the complaints and policies, the failure to disclose the 13 interview summaries breached the duty of procedural fairness.

The application was allowed, the ICRC decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for reconsideration following proper disclosure.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus to compel the Ministry of the Environment to issue a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind energy project, or alternatively, to compel a decision.

The applicants argued they had a legitimate expectation of a decision within six months based on a Ministry service standard.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no clear legal duty to issue the approval and no enforceable right arising from the service standard.

The Court also held that the Director reasonably postponed the decision due to pending litigation regarding the Crown's duty to consult aboriginal people.

Declaratory relief was also denied.

The moving parties brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order dismissing their motion for leave to appeal a costs order.

They argued they were denied natural justice regarding submissions on the responding party's impecuniosity and that the trial judge erred in considering impecuniosity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motions judge applied the correct test for leave to appeal, made no error in principle, and properly considered impecuniosity as a relevant factor in awarding costs.

The appellant lawyer appealed a decision of the Law Society Appeal Panel, which had overturned a Hearing Panel's finding that he did not commit fraud in certain real estate transactions.

The appellant argued the Appeal Panel failed to respect the Hearing Panel's credibility finding that he had an honest but mistaken belief that the lenders knew the actual structure of the transactions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Appeal Panel that the Hearing Panel's credibility findings were tainted by its flawed legal analysis of fraud, and upholding the referral to a new Hearing Panel.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board regarding whether her Master's degree program was "primarily psychological in nature." The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board conducted a detailed and nuanced examination of the material and that its decision was not demonstrably unreasonable.

The Court noted it was bound to afford deference to the Board's expertise.

No costs were ordered.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a supplementary interest arbitration award concerning per diem meal allowances for cabin personnel on a new low-cost carrier.

The union argued the arbitrator was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to reverse his previous award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to clarify an inherent contradiction in the initial award to reflect his manifest intention that the new service remain competitive as a low-cost carrier.

The arbitrator's decision to impose the mainline per diem rate was reasonable.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding her guilty of professional misconduct.

The appellant argued that the Committee improperly reversed the onus of proof and applied a different standard in scrutinizing the evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee correctly articulated the law respecting burden of proof and credibility, and reasonably concluded there was sufficient evidence to establish professional misconduct.

The appellant, a chiropodist, appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he breached professional standards by attempting to induce teachers to purchase orthotics during presentations.

He challenged the panel's findings, its refusal to grant an adjournment to retain a new expert, and the penalty imposed.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the panel's decision reasonable and the refusal of an adjournment within its discretion.

The court allowed the appeal in part regarding the penalty, imposing a $5,000 cap on the costs of supervision, but otherwise upheld the $38,000 costs order and awarded $15,000 in appeal costs to the respondent.

The plaintiff suffered the loss of his left eye when a firecracker was lit and thrown by the defendant Joel Binns.

The defendants Joel Binns and his father Michael Binns were noted in default.

The court granted default judgment, finding Joel Binns liable for the battery/negligence and Michael Binns liable for failing to supervise or warn his son about fireworks.

The court assessed damages, awarding the plaintiff $125,000 in non-pecuniary damages, plus out-of-pocket expenses, lost wages, and interest, totaling $175,708.14, along with partial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed an order requiring him to pay rent arrears, arguing the motion judge was biased.

The appellant alleged institutional bias because the respondent's counsel also served as a Deputy Judge in the same region as the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no institutional bias, noting that Deputy Judges are permitted to practice law and are not accorded special status.

The court also rejected the allegation of actual bias, finding the motion judge's order was a proper exercise of discretion.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s administrative order dismissing the action for failure to set the matter down for trial within the required time.

Applying the factors outlined in Reid v. Dow Corning Corp., the court considered the explanation for delay, inadvertence in missing the deadline, promptness in bringing the motion, and prejudice to the defendants.

The court found that the delay resulted from inadvertence, that the plaintiff acted promptly after learning of the dismissal, and that the action had not been abandoned.

Although the defendants argued the claim was statute‑barred and that presumptive prejudice arose from the expiry of the limitation period, the court held the limitation issue could not be determined definitively at this stage and that no substantial prejudice would arise from allowing the action to proceed.

The registrar’s dismissal order was therefore set aside.

The defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity scale following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal.

The plaintiff argued that he should be awarded costs or that no costs should be ordered.

The court found no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event, noting that the plaintiff had initially sought the very adjournment that the motion judge ultimately granted.

Costs were awarded to the defendants in the amount of $6,122.73.

The applicant unions brought an application seeking a declaration that the Expenditure Restraint Act is unconstitutional and of no force and effect, arguing it violated their members' freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by rolling back and capping wage increases.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the legislation did not substantially interfere with the freedom of association, as it applied broadly across the federal public sector and did not target associational activities.

The court further held that even if there was a breach of s. 2(d), it would be saved under s. 1 of the Charter as a demonstrably justified response to the 2008 global economic crisis.

The plaintiff alleged that the provincial government induced a breach of his employment contract and intentionally interfered with his economic relations after revoking his security clearance to access the government licensing database used at a private motor vehicle licensing office.

The revocation followed a security screening that revealed past associations with outlaw motorcycle gangs.

The court held that the government’s decision was part of a general security screening policy designed to protect sensitive government databases and was not directed at causing a breach of the plaintiff’s employment contract.

The evidence did not establish the requisite intention to induce breach of contract, nor did it show the use of unlawful means necessary to support the tort of intentional interference with economic relations.

The plaintiff’s action was dismissed.

The Crown and Ontario First Nations entered into a revenue sharing agreement requiring the Crown to appoint a First Nations representative to the board of directors of the Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation (OLG).

When no appointment was made, First Nations sought arbitration.

The Crown and OLG moved to strike the claim, arguing the appointment was protected by Crown prerogative and non-justiciable.

The arbitration panel dismissed the motion and also allowed First Nations to withdraw its claim against OLG.

The Crown and OLG appealed both decisions.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the Crown prerogative could not be used to avoid a declaration that a contract had been breached, and that OLG was not a necessary party to the arbitration.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order adjourning the defendants' summary judgment motion.

The motion judge had adjourned the summary judgment motion to allow for discoveries to be completed, as the defendants had not provided an evidentiary record to support their limitation period defence.

The plaintiff argued the motion should have been dismissed outright for failure to put their best foot forward.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's exercise of discretion to control the process.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons finding her guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence following the death of a patient who underwent high-volume liposuction.

The Committee found she breached standards of practice regarding extraction volumes, informed consent, and post-operative care, and that her website advertising violated regulations banning testimonials and superlatives.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Committee's findings on the standard of practice, its evidentiary rulings, and its conclusion that the advertising ban was a justified limit on freedom of expression under s. 1 of the Charter.

The penalty restricting her practice to acting as a surgical assistant in a hospital was also upheld as reasonable.

The applicant employee sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed his grievance regarding his termination for cause.

The respondent union and employer brought a motion to quash the application on the basis that the employee lacked standing.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the union was the exclusive bargaining agent and the employee had no independent right to seek judicial review.

The court rejected the employee's argument that he was denied natural justice due to the lack of an interpreter at the arbitration, noting that he was fluent in English and that any complaint regarding the union's representation should have been brought before the Ontario Labour Relations Board as a breach of the duty of fair representation.

The plaintiffs and four defendants (the Teskey defendants) sought leave to appeal a decision regarding the certification of a class action arising from a propane facility explosion.

The motions judge had refused to certify claims against the Teskey defendants in strict liability, nuisance, and under the Occupiers' Liability Act, but certified a claim in common law negligence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the refusal to certify those claims against the landlords.

The Court granted the Teskey defendants' motion for leave to appeal the certification of the common law negligence claim, finding good reason to doubt whether the landlords owed a duty of care to neighbours based on the lease provisions.

EllisDon applied for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision that admitted a photocopy of a 1958 working agreement and found the unions were estopped from enforcing it for only two years.

The Divisional Court held that the OLRB erred in law by admitting the document as a business record or ancient document without assessing its reliability.

Furthermore, the Court found that the OLRB's decision to limit the estoppel to two years was unreasonable, as EllisDon had permanently lost the opportunity to seek a legislative solution.

The Court quashed the OLRB's decision and dismissed the unions' grievances, ruling the estoppel must be permanent.