Susan E. Healey

The defendants First Student Canada, David Ribble, 1853780 Ontario Inc. o/a Kee to Bala, and Ryan Zaroski sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for damages arising from an assault on Ryan Turcotte.

The assault occurred in a parking lot after Turcotte disembarked from a chartered bus service provided by the defendants.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence under the Occupiers’ Liability Act, Liquor Licence Act, and general negligence.

The court found no evidence that the defendants failed in their duty of care regarding premises safety, bus security, or intoxication monitoring.

The court also rejected allegations that the defendants should have diverted the bus, prevented Turcotte or the assailants from leaving, or provided more explicit warnings, concluding that Turcotte was aware of the potential danger.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the moving defendants.

Allstate Insurance Company of Canada brought a motion seeking to dismiss Jamie Patino's application as premature or an abuse of process, or alternatively, to narrow its scope.

Patino's application sought declarations regarding Allstate's duty to defend and indemnify him following a motor vehicle accident, particularly concerning an alleged material misrepresentation about vehicle use.

The court denied Allstate's motion to dismiss, finding the application neither premature nor an abuse of process if strictly limited to specific legal questions.

The court ordered that the application would focus on whether Allstate could deny indemnification despite not voiding the policy, and whether a finding of misrepresentation would alter this.

Leave was granted for Patino to amend his application to seek declarations regarding his right to counsel of choice and to direct his defence in a related action.

This endorsement addresses costs, pre-judgment interest, and collateral benefit deductions following a three-week jury trial in a motor vehicle accident case.

The court determined pre-judgment interest for Meaghan Dunk's general damage award and denied the defendants' request for collateral benefit deductions from her future health care award, emphasizing the strict onus on defendants to prove overlap with statutory accident benefits.

The court also fixed Meaghan Dunk's costs at a substantial indemnity rate from the date of her Rule 49 offer, and partial indemnity prior, and adjusted her disbursements.

For Shelby Dunk, whose claim settled, the court fixed her disbursements.

The applicant was completely successful on a motion for the sale of the matrimonial home and boat.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of $38,597, arguing the respondent's allegations of financial impropriety were unreasonable and unnecessarily complicated the proceedings.

The court agreed, finding the respondent's conduct egregious and noting the applicant had made multiple reasonable settlement offers.

The court awarded the applicant $38,500 in costs, to be paid from the respondent's share of the net sale proceeds of the matrimonial home.

The applicant wife brought a motion seeking an interim order for the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home and a boat.

The respondent husband opposed, arguing that a sale would prejudice his claim for unequal division based on alleged misappropriation of corporate funds by the applicant and incomplete financial disclosure.

The court found that the respondent failed to establish a prima facie case for unequal division, noting the high threshold for such claims and the applicant's thorough financial disclosure.

The court also highlighted the respondent's history of financial irresponsibility.

The motion for sale was granted, as the court determined it was justified to prevent further delay and unnecessary legal costs.

The Regional Municipality of York sought certiorari to quash a disclosure order made by a justice of the peace, which required the prosecutor to disclose a user's manual outlining testing procedures for a Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device in a speeding case.

The court found that the York Regional Police and the provincial prosecutor are not a single Crown entity for disclosure purposes, and certiorari was an available remedy as the order affected the prosecutor's legal rights on a final basis.

The court held that the testing procedures were not "fruits of the investigation" under the Stinchcombe first-party disclosure regime but rather a third-party record, and therefore the justice of the peace erred in ordering the prosecutor to disclose it.

The application for certiorari was allowed, and the disclosure order was quashed.

The plaintiff suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in a multi-vehicle highway collision.

He lost control of his vehicle after being cut off by an unidentified driver, struck the median, and was subsequently T-boned by the defendant's vehicle.

The court found the unidentified driver 70% liable and the defendant 30% liable for following too closely.

The plaintiff was awarded over $3.2 million in damages, primarily for future care costs.

The plaintiff's claim against his own insurer for unidentified motorist coverage was dismissed because the identified defendant was found partially liable.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident case moved to admit his out-of-court statements to police for substantive use, as he suffered from post-traumatic amnesia and could not testify to the events.

The court admitted the statements under the principled approach to hearsay, finding them necessary and sufficiently reliable, corroborated by an independent witness.

The court also excluded the investigating officer's written commentary in the accident report, ruling it was inadmissible opinion evidence beyond the officer's expertise.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident action moved to admit several 911 calls into evidence under the principled approach to hearsay.

The plaintiff suffered a head injury and had no memory of the collision, and the callers were either unavailable or had impaired memories, establishing necessity.

The court found the calls possessed threshold reliability as they were made contemporaneously with the events to emergency services without motive to fabricate.

The motion was granted, and the 911 calls were ruled admissible.

The moving parties (third parties in the main action) sought costs against the responding party (defendant/third party plaintiff) after the responding party discontinued the third party claim.

During the litigation, the responding party had made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The trustee in bankruptcy subsequently sold and assigned the third party claim back to the responding party, who then filed a Notice of Discontinuance.

The court held that because no judgment or costs order was made prior to the bankruptcy, the costs were not a provable debt in bankruptcy.

The court further held that the assignment of the claim by the trustee did not change the character of the matter or revive the costs liability.

The motion for costs was dismissed.

Following a summary judgment motion determined in favour of the third parties, the plaintiff sought costs of $2,815.00 from the defendant for preparation and attendance.

The court found that the plaintiff's counsel provided no satisfactory explanation for late service of materials and failed to comply with the agreed timetable.

Consequently, the court awarded reduced costs to the plaintiff, fixed at $763.00 on a partial indemnity scale, covering only the estimated time for attending the motion.

Following a jury trial, the accused was found guilty of four counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

One week after the jury was discharged, a juror sent a letter to the court expressing doubts about her verdict and describing feeling pressured during deliberations.

The accused applied for a mistrial based on this letter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the contents of the letter were inadmissible under the common law rule of judicial secrecy, as they related to the internal deliberation process rather than extrinsic influences.

Furthermore, the court held it was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after the verdict had been recorded and the jury discharged.

The moving party, Pruna, sought summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him, discharge a construction lien, and vacate a certificate of action.

The motion was dismissed due to multiple triable issues, including the supply and installation of paving stone, the commercial relationship between the plaintiff and co-defendant Lansbridge, the nature of Pruna's contractual relationship with Lansbridge, the amount of holdback, and the identification of the party with contractual liability.

The court found that summary judgment would not provide a fair and just adjudication, as credibility was a primary issue requiring oral evidence.

The Third Parties moved for summary judgment to dismiss claims against them arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Defendant, Samra, brought a cross-motion to amend her Third Party Claim to allege the Plaintiff, Juneja, was the driver.

The court found no genuine issue for trial regarding the Third Parties' liability, concluding Samra was solely responsible for a precipitous left turn.

The summary judgment motion was granted, dismissing the Third Party Claim, and Samra's cross-motion was dismissed as moot.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully opposing a motion by the defendant, The Corporation of the Township of Severn, to compel production of an unedited videotaped witness statement.

The court found the plaintiffs' offer to settle, made four days before the motion, did not comply with Rule 49.10 but was a genuine effort to settle and should be considered under Rule 49.13.

Considering the offer, the medium-high complexity of the motion, its unnecessity, and the importance of litigation privilege, the court awarded the plaintiffs substantial indemnity costs from the date of the offer, fixed at $9,500.

The defendant, Rajeev Henry Balendra, brought a motion for a directed verdict on four counts of an indictment: fraudulent possession of credit card data, conspiracy to commit fraud, possession of identity information with intent to commit an indictable offence, and possession of forged credit cards.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, including a USB drive with over 2,000 credit card numbers found on the accused, counterfeit driver's licenses, and financial institution affidavits detailing losses.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, determining whether sufficient evidence existed for a jury, properly instructed, to convict.

The court found ample evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer the accused's knowledge and intent, satisfying the elements of all remaining counts.

The motion for a directed verdict was dismissed.

The defendant applied to exclude evidence obtained from searches of a USB drive and a vehicle, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court found the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the USB drive but not the vehicle.

The search of the USB drive was deemed a lawful search incident to arrest, as it was conducted for a valid purpose connected to the arrest and was reasonable in scope.

The court also determined that a subsequent review and printing of the USB drive's contents did not constitute a new search.

Consequently, the application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Dustin Klammer was found guilty of trafficking in fentanyl, possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of currency obtained by crime.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the quantity and strength of fentanyl, continued drug use, and a prior trafficking conviction while on bail.

Mitigating factors included no prior record at the time of the offences, expressed remorse, and efforts to address addiction.

The court emphasized general deterrence and denunciation due to the dangers of fentanyl, alongside specific deterrence given the offender's continued involvement in drug culture.

A sentence of 33 months in custody was imposed concurrently on all counts, along with a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The defendant, Kara Darnley, an Ontario Provincial Police officer, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of breach of trust.

She applied for a stay of proceedings for one conviction, alleging entrapment by police undercover operations.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to initiate the investigation and the "integrity plays" (undercover scenarios).

The court concluded that the police conduct did not go beyond merely providing an opportunity for the commission of the crime and did not induce the offence, thus failing to meet the test for entrapment.

The Lewis cousins were found guilty of aggravated assault following a jury trial, resulting from an attack that left Ryan Turcotte with a severe brain injury.

This decision outlines their sentences.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the unprovoked group attack, Turcotte's defenselessness, the high likelihood of serious injury, the extent of the injury, and the offenders fleeing the scene.

Mitigating factors included their youth, lack of prior criminal record, solid academic and work histories, strong family and community support, and the out-of-character nature of the offence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as paramount sentencing objectives, imposing a sentence of two years less a day incarceration followed by three years probation for each offender, along with ancillary orders including a 20-year firearm prohibition, DNA sample provision, and no-contact orders.