Susan E. Healey

The appellant, found guilty of assault and mischief, appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The appeal was based on two grounds: ineffective assistance of trial counsel and the trial judge's refusal to reopen the hearing to allow the appellant to testify.

The court applied the test for ineffective assistance of counsel from R. v. Archer and R. v. G.D.B., finding that counsel competently advised the appellant regarding the risks and benefits of testifying, including potential perjury and bail breaches.

The court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision not to reopen the case, noting that the appellant's change of mind was a reversal of an earlier tactical decision, which did not warrant disrupting the orderly conduct of the trial.

Both grounds of appeal were dismissed.

The defence brought a motion seeking an order to declare Toronto as the proper venue for the trial and to transfer the indictment from Newmarket to Toronto, along with a declaration of mistrial.

The accused, Ashton Lawson, was charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent, with the alleged offences occurring in the City of Toronto.

The indictment, however, was filed in Newmarket, York Region, where all pre-trial proceedings had taken place.

The defence argued that the trial must be held in the judicial region where the offence occurred.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Crown was not strictly required to file the indictment in the Toronto region, and that Newmarket was a proper and permissible venue.

The court clarified that while the usual administrative practice is to file an indictment in the region of the offence, it is not an absolute requirement, and the Superior Court has province-wide jurisdiction.

The plaintiff successfully defeated the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion in a defamation action and subsequently sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the presumption against costs to a successful responding party under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to award costs, finding no compelling reason to depart from the statutory presumption and noting that awarding costs solely because the impugned comments lacked public interest could deter the use of anti-SLAPP legislation.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, sued the defendant, a community association board member, for allegedly spreading false rumours about her professional conduct and real estate licence.

The court found that while the broader community dispute regarding lot severances was a matter of public interest, the specific defamatory words complained of were mere gossip and personal attacks unrelated to that public interest.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendants were successful on a motion requiring the plaintiff to post security for costs in the amount of $130,000.

The defendants subsequently sought costs of that motion on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $26,530.69.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1), noting the complexity of the motion and the plaintiff's unsuccessful res judicata argument.

After stepping back to assess what is fair and reasonable, the court fixed the defendants' costs of the motion at $23,000 inclusive.

The applicant sought a stay of her 18-month driving prohibition pending the appeal of her convictions for dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The court applied the three-part test for a stay under s. 261(1) of the Criminal Code.

While the court found the appeal had arguable merit and the applicant would suffer hardship due to her self-employment, it concluded she failed to demonstrate she was not a danger to the public given her erratic driving on a busy highway.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, charged with criminal harassment, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The charge arose from an incident where the accused allegedly followed and watched a 13-year-old girl on her way to school, having previously followed her and a friend weeks earlier.

The court amended the indictment to conform to the evidence regarding the date of the offence.

The court dismissed the motion for a directed verdict, finding that there was sufficient evidence of 'watching' under s. 264(2)(c) of the Criminal Code upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably convict.

During a criminal trial, the Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow a witness to testify via Skype.

The witness was unable to attend court due to a high-risk pregnancy.

The defence objected, arguing the anticipated evidence was vague and bordered on bad character evidence.

The court found the evidence relevant to the issue of opportunity and held that trial fairness would not be undermined by the use of technology.

The application was granted, permitting the witness to testify remotely.

The Crown brought a motion to admit a 911 call placed by a complainant into evidence for the truth of its contents, arguing it fell under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule or the principled approach.

The court found the call inherently reliable but excluded it because its admission was not necessary, as the complainant was available to testify and had given a police statement containing the same facts.

The court also noted the recording's highly emotional tone would be overly prejudicial to the accused.

The accused, charged with armed robbery, brought a Charter application seeking to exclude a statement made to police, alleging breaches of his s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

The court found no s. 10(a) breach, as the accused knew the date and place of the robbery.

A s. 10(b) breach occurred when police questioned the accused at the roadside and seized his clothing before he could consult duty counsel.

However, the delay in facilitating access to counsel during the booking process was reasonable.

Under s. 24(2), the roadside statements and clothing were excluded, but the main interview statement was admitted as it was voluntary and followed a 'fresh start' caution.

The accused, charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and criminal harassment involving six different complainants, applied to sever counts 7 and 8 from the indictment.

The Crown applied to admit similar act evidence across the counts to assist in identifying the perpetrator.

The court held that the similar act evidence application was premature and should be decided during the trial.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding a strong factual nexus between the incidents and concluding that the benefits of a single trial outweighed the risk of prejudice to the accused.

The self-represented plaintiffs in a malicious prosecution action brought a motion to dismiss or stay a related Provincial Offences Act property standards prosecution, alleging it was an abuse of process and a SLAPP proceeding.

They also sought permanent restraining orders against the municipal defendants.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the request for a stay was res judicata as it had been previously dismissed by another judge.

The request for permanent restraining orders was also dismissed because such relief requires a full adjudication of rights and was not pleaded in the statement of claim.

On a default judgment motion in a negligence action, the court found that an unauthorized knee injection administered by a practitioner who held himself out as a medical doctor caused a septic knee infection, surgery, prolonged impairment, and ongoing functional limitations.

The court accepted expert orthopedic evidence establishing causation, breach of the standard of care, lack of informed consent, and the impropriety of intra-articular vitamin B12 injections.

Damages were awarded for pain and suffering, Family Law Act claims, past and future medical care, prejudgment interest, and costs.

Punitive damages were also awarded because the defendant deliberately misrepresented his qualifications and knowingly engaged in prohibited and unauthorized conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences.

The moving party (defendant) brought a motion to set aside a default judgment that ordered the sale of a property under the Partition Act.

The moving party argued that the property was held in trust for several family members who had contributed to its purchase and carrying costs, and that he missed the hearing due to confusion over an adjournment date.

The court applied the factors for setting aside a default judgment, finding that the moving party moved expeditiously after learning of the judgment, had a plausible explanation for the default, and presented an arguable defence based on a constructive trust and an oral agreement.

The court concluded that the interests of justice favoured setting aside the judgment, as the prejudice to the moving party and his family outweighed any prejudice to the responding party.

The motion was granted.

The Crown sought to admit a statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for sexual assault.

The accused argued his rights under ss. 7, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter were violated because he was not fully informed of the reasons for his detention, including that he was a suspect in several other similar sexual assaults and that the complainant was a minor.

The court found that the police failed to inform the accused of the full extent of his jeopardy, depriving him of the ability to make an informed choice about whether to speak to police or to obtain meaningful legal advice.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to set the action down for trial to avoid administrative dismissal under Rule 48.14.

The motion was adjourned to proceed as a status hearing.

However, before the dismissal deadline, the plaintiff filed a trial record and abandoned her motion.

The defendant argued this was an abuse of process and sought to proceed with the status hearing.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to file the trial record before the deadline, pre-empting the status hearing.

However, because the action was not actually ready for trial, the court struck it from the trial list to allow the defendant to complete discoveries.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against four defendants, the defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had commenced the action seeking damages for a severe brain injury sustained in an assault.

The court declined to award costs to the successful defendants, finding this to be a rare case where the plaintiffs' impecuniosity and exceptionally sympathetic circumstances justified a departure from the normal costs rules.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to dismiss the defendant insurer's upcoming summary judgment motion and to prohibit the calling of oral evidence at that hearing.

The plaintiff argued that conflicting evidence regarding his employment status and vehicle use created credibility issues requiring a trial.

The court dismissed these requests, finding it premature to dismiss the summary judgment motion before cross-examinations were completed.

The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to usurp the motion judge's authority under Rule 20.04 to decide whether oral evidence is necessary to resolve the dispute.

In an uncontested trial, the applicant sought imputed income, retroactive and ongoing child support, a permanent restraining order, damages for assault and battery, and a divorce.

The respondent failed to provide financial disclosure and did not attend the hearing.

The court imputed income to the respondent at $80,000 per annum, awarded retroactive child support of $61,134 and ongoing support of $1,172 per month.

A permanent restraining order was issued against the respondent due to a history of verbal and physical abuse and the applicant's reasonable fear for safety.

General damages of $75,000 were awarded for domestic assaults, recognizing the egregious breach of trust in a marital relationship.

A divorce order was granted, along with a nominal spousal support award of $1.00 per month.

Costs were awarded to the applicant on a full indemnity basis, fixed at $45,664.

The accused, Adam Kramshoj, was charged with making available and possessing child pornography.

The matter proceeded as a blended s. 8 Charter motion and trial.

The court found multiple s. 8 Charter breaches by the authorities, including a "Branton error" in the search warrant, an unauthorized pre-Spencer request for ISP subscriber information, failure to file a timely report to justice, and unreasonable search conduct (seizure of a personal notebook and loss of evidence regarding a Rogers letter's location).

Applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the seriousness and multiplicity of the breaches, coupled with the impact on the accused's Charter rights and compromised defence, warranted the exclusion of all evidence.

Consequently, an acquittal was entered.