Susan E. Healey

The respondent brought a motion in a family law proceeding seeking interim child support, the addition of corporate and individual parties, third-party disclosure, questioning, and other procedural relief.

The court found that the applicant’s financial disclosure was unreliable and that corporate transfers to a family member raised legitimate concerns regarding income and asset concealment.

The court added the applicant’s brother and related corporation as parties and ordered document production and questioning of the brother, as well as limited third‑party disclosure from the applicant’s mother.

For interim purposes, the court imputed income to the applicant and ordered temporary child support based on shared custody.

Requests for interim disbursements and security for costs were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing witness credibility, taking judicial notice of weather conditions, and applying the modified objective test for dangerous driving.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, which included testimony from civilian motorists and a police officer regarding the appellant's erratic driving, excessive speed, and aggressive maneuvers on Highway 400.

The court upheld the finding that the appellant's conduct constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable driver.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 25.11(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike portions of a statement of claim as an abuse of process following a prior order that barred the plaintiff’s wrongful dismissal and long‑term disability claims due to delay.

The plaintiff issued a revised statement of claim that removed certain paragraphs but retained factual allegations the defendant argued were tied to the barred claims.

The court held that pleadings must contain material facts rather than evidence and should avoid irrelevant allegations that would delay a fair trial.

While most of the pleading was permitted to stand, the court found certain portions were not germane to the remaining causes of action and would unnecessarily complicate the proceeding.

The court ordered limited portions of the pleading struck while otherwise allowing the claim to proceed.

The respondent sought costs following the dismissal of the appellant's motion to set aside a registrar's order dismissing the appeal for delay.

The court declined to award costs for the underlying Small Claims Court action, as the respondent had prior opportunities to seek them.

Applying the principle of proportionality, the court reduced the respondent's claimed hours and fixed costs of the motion at $1,900 inclusive of HST.

The appellant tenant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her claim for the return of prepaid rent and deposits.

The tenant had signed a lease that explicitly exempted the premises from the Tenant Protection Act but also contained a schedule stating the Act would prevail in the event of a conflict.

When the tenant attempted to sublet and the landlord failed to respond within seven days, the tenant terminated the lease in accordance with the Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the lease patently ambiguous.

Applying the principle of contra proferentem, the court construed the ambiguity against the landlord who drafted the document, holding that the tenant was entitled to rely on the termination provisions of the Act.

The appellants were successful on appeal from a Small Claims Court judgment and sought costs for both the trial and the appeal.

The court considered whether the 15% cap on costs under s. 29 of the Courts of Justice Act limits the 'double costs' provision under Rule 14.07 of the Small Claims Court Rules when a party beats their offer to settle.

The court held that s. 29 does not cap costs in these circumstances, as doing so would undermine the purpose of encouraging reasonable settlements.

The appellants were awarded $3,411.30 for the trial and $5,000 for the appeal.

The respondent subcontractor supplied building materials to a general contractor for the construction of a cottage on the appellants' property.

When the general contractor failed to pay, the subcontractor sued the appellants for unjust enrichment, having chosen not to shelter under a construction lien.

The trial judge found the appellants liable.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the judgment, holding that the contract between the appellants and the general contractor provided a juristic reason for any enrichment, and that the subcontractor's proper remedy was against the general contractor or through the Construction Lien Act.