45 total
Pre-trial motion determines admissibility of police expert evidence on money laundering, cocaine trafficking, and drug cartels.
The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to qualify three police officers as expert witnesses in a prosecution for cocaine importation and money laundering.
The court applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for admissibility.
The court admitted the general opinion evidence of the money laundering expert, excluding portions relating to methods not alleged against the accused.
The court fully admitted the evidence of the cocaine trafficking expert, including opinions on pricing and cell phone use.
However, the court excluded the proposed evidence regarding Mexican drug cartels, finding it irrelevant to the charges and highly prejudicial as bad character evidence.
Conviction appeal dismissed; no Browne v. Dunn violation and no error in jury instructions.
The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the rule in Browne v. Dunn was violated when he was not confronted with an alleged motive to fabricate, and that the trial judge erred by failing to give an Oliver instruction.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant testified after his co-accused and had ample opportunity to respond to the evidence.
Furthermore, an Oliver instruction was not requested at trial, and its absence did not amount to misdirection.
Crown application to review accused's pre-trial release on second degree murder charge dismissed.
The Crown applied for a review of a bail review judge's decision to release the accused pending trial on a charge of second degree murder.
The accused had initially been denied bail, but a bail review judge later granted release based on a material change in circumstances arising from evidence at the preliminary inquiry regarding the accused's intent and level of intoxication.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's application, finding no error in the bail review judge's conclusion that the new evidence materially diminished the strength of the Crown's case and that the accused's continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.
Section 178(1)(d) of the BIA requires the bankrupt to owe a fiduciary duty directly to the claiming creditor.
The appellant creditor sought a declaration that the bankrupt's judgment debt survived his discharge from bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the bankrupt owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant, even though he had breached a fiduciary duty to a third party.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 178(1)(d) applies only if the bankrupt owed a fiduciary duty directly to the creditor seeking the declaration.
An assistance order is sufficient to compel a telecommunications company to provide subscriber information.
The Crown obtained an ex parte transmission data recorder warrant and an assistance order compelling a telecommunications company to provide subscriber information for unknown phone numbers communicating with a target.
The company sought a review of the assistance order, arguing that a general warrant was required to obtain subscriber information due to privacy interests recognized in R. v. Spencer.
The Superior Court of Justice held that it had jurisdiction to review the order and concluded that an assistance order under s. 487.02 of the Criminal Code is sufficient to compel the production of subscriber information to give effect to a transmission data recorder warrant.