Shaun O'Brien

The Respondent father moved to set aside Minutes of Settlement (MOS), arguing the Applicant mother fundamentally breached them by commencing a new defamation proceeding in Iran the day after signing the MOS, which was intended to consolidate all litigation.

The Applicant mother cross-moved to enforce the MOS and for the Ontario court to assume jurisdiction over parenting issues.

The court found that the Applicant's failure to disclose and refusal to withdraw the Iranian defamation claim constituted a fundamental breach of the MOS, as the agreement's core purpose was to terminate all multi-jurisdictional litigation arising from the marriage breakdown in favour of an alternative dispute resolution process in Ontario.

The court set aside the MOS, dismissed the Applicant's cross-motion, and declined to address the question of jurisdiction at that stage.

The plaintiff, a minor, suffered a severe traumatic brain injury in a boating accident when the tube he was being towed on struck another boat.

The plaintiff's father, who was operating the boat, was noted in default.

The court found the father negligent and reckless, but concluded he did not have knowledge that the loss would probably result, meaning the $1,000,000 liability cap under the Marine Liability Act applied.

Damages were assessed well in excess of the cap, but recovery was limited to $1,000,000 in aggregate for the minor and his mother.

The applicant father brought a motion to expand his parenting time with the parties' three-year-old child to include overnight visits, aiming for a 50/50 schedule.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, citing allegations of past family violence and requesting a mental health assessment of the applicant.

The court considered the best interests of the child under the Divorce Act, noting that while there was evidence of high conflict and some violence during cohabitation, there were no concerns regarding the applicant's parenting post-separation.

The court granted the motion in part, expanding the applicant's parenting time to include two overnights per week on an interim basis, but declined to order a 50/50 schedule to maintain stability for the child.

The applicant in a family law proceeding brought a motion to amend her pleadings to add her spouse's corporation as a third party, seeking repayment of alleged demand loans.

The corporation opposed the motion, arguing that the limitation period had expired because the original family law application constituted a demand for payment.

The court allowed the motion, finding it was not plain and obvious that the original application, which named only the spouse, constituted a clear and unequivocal demand to the corporation itself.

The applicant was permitted to amend her reply to add the corporation as a party.

The applicant, who had been declared a vexatious litigant after her claim for spousal support was dismissed, sought leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to appeal the trial judgment.

The court applied the conjunctive test under s. 140(4), which requires the applicant to show that the proposed proceeding is not an abuse of process and that there are reasonable grounds for it.

While the court found the proposed appeal was not an abuse of process, it concluded the applicant failed to show reasonable grounds, as she was attempting to re-litigate factual findings and introduce fresh evidence that did not meet the Palmer test.

The motion for leave was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The applicants, comprising raw milk producers and consumers, challenged federal and provincial prohibitions on the sale and distribution of unpasteurized milk, alleging violations of their freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and equality rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed all claims, finding that the applicants' belief in raw milk's health benefits did not constitute a profound moral dimension for freedom of conscience, the religious interference was trivial and insubstantial, and the equality claim lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis.

The court further held that even if Charter violations were established, they would be justified under section 1 due to the compelling public health objective of preventing milk-borne illnesses, which pasteurization effectively mitigates.

The plaintiffs' home was severely damaged by a fire while undergoing renovations.

The plaintiffs alleged the fire was caused by the spontaneous combustion of stain-soaked rags left by the defendant painting subcontractor, and sought to hold the general contractor vicariously liable.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove the cause of the fire on a balance of probabilities, accepting the painter's evidence that he did not leave rags in the home and noting that electrical arcing could not be ruled out as a cause.

The court declined to draw an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to call another fire investigator.

The action was dismissed, though damages were assessed at $1,348,939.91 in the alternative.

The plaintiff, an unsophisticated lender, brought a motion for summary judgment to recover unpaid loans made to the defendants.

The defendants argued the acknowledgment of debt was unconscionable due to a 60 percent interest rate and lack of legal representation, and denied fraudulent misrepresentation.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no unconscionability as the defendant had proposed high interest rates initially and refused legal counsel.

The court also found the defendant engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation regarding the company's finances to induce the initial loans, awarding the plaintiff the principal amounts plus 60 percent interest.

The plaintiffs brought a motion requesting the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider a previous decision that stayed their action in favour of arbitration.

The plaintiffs argued that the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 invalidated the arbitration clause.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the failure to consider the Consumer Protection Act was not a clear error that would have changed the outcome, as it was not obvious the plaintiffs were protected consumers or that their claims fell within the scope of the Act's protections.

Furthermore, the interests of justice did not compel reconsideration because the defendants had no notice of the statutory argument during the original motion.

The plaintiff brought a motion in writing for default judgment against his former employer for wrongful dismissal.

The court first determined that the action was not statute-barred because the limitation period was suspended under the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court noted the defendant in default and found the plaintiff was entitled to damages in lieu of reasonable notice.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court awarded a 20-month notice period, resulting in damages of $91,667.00, without deductions for mitigation income as the employer failed to meet its burden of proof.

The plaintiff franchisee brought a motion for summary judgment seeking rescission of a franchise agreement under the Arthur Wishart Act due to inadequate disclosure.

The franchisor's disclosure document failed to include recent financial statements, providing only unaudited statements from over two years prior.

The court found this deficiency amounted to a complete lack of disclosure, entitling the plaintiff to rescind the agreement under s. 6(2) of the Act.

The court also found the individual defendants to be 'franchisor's associates' and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

The defendants requested that the plaintiff's action be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff's claim alleged defamation, intentional infliction of mental distress, and intimidation arising from text messages and public misrepresentations by an immigration consultant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the statement of claim was confusing and poorly drafted, it contained the core of a legitimate complaint and did not exhibit the typical hallmarks of a Rule 2.1 case.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the supplier and local dealer of materials and design for a cottage, alleging negligence and breach of warranty due to significant wood rot.

The defendant supplier brought a motion to stay the action, relying on an arbitration clause in its standard form Purchase and Sale Agreement.

The court applied the competence-competence principle and the analytical framework from Haas v. Gunasekaram, finding an arguable case that the arbitration agreement existed, bound the parties, and covered the dispute.

The court rejected arguments that the arbitration clause was unconscionable or that the local dealer's filing of a defence precluded a stay.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed in favour of arbitration.

The Landlord (1617887 Ontario Ltd.) brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a crossclaim by the Estate of Greg Campbell.

The crossclaim alleged the Landlord was liable for the plaintiff's injuries due to failing to ensure the tenant tavern (Jessie's Café Bar & Grill) had adequate insurance and for failing to manage/supervise the premises, after the plaintiff was struck by a vehicle driven by Greg Campbell following intoxication at the tavern.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the Landlord did not owe a duty of care to manage or supervise the tavern, nor to ensure the tavern had public liability insurance, as there was no proximity or causal connection.

The motion for summary judgment was allowed, and the crossclaim against the Landlord was dismissed.

The plaintiff's claim against the Landlord was also dismissed as they had agreed to release the Landlord.

The statutory third party insurer brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the defendant driver was excluded from coverage because he was engaged in a 'race' or 'speed test' when he caused a fatal collision while driving up to 215 km/h.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that excessive speed alone does not constitute a race or speed test under the Insurance Act.

The court held that the driver lacked the intention to test the speed of the vehicle or engage in a contest, and therefore the insurer remained liable to compensate the plaintiffs.

The respondents brought a motion to set aside an order granted to the applicant during a telephone case conference that the respondents failed to attend.

The underlying dispute involved a commercial sublease and a $350,000 payment.

The court applied the factors under Rule 38.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the respondents failed to attend due to insufficient notice during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court also found that the respondents moved forthwith to set aside the order and had an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was granted and the order was set aside.

The parties made written submissions regarding the form of the Order following a judgment on an appeal and a costs endorsement.

The self-represented respondents approved the form of the Order but raised other concerns, including a schedule for the payment of costs.

The court found that the respondents' concerns did not relate to the form or content of the Order and signed the Order as drafted by the appellant, adding a provision that it is enforceable without formal entry.

The plaintiff, Voula Kardaras, sought long-term disability benefits from Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada due to major depressive disorder.

Sun Life discontinued benefits after Kardaras began a gradual return to work, asserting she was capable of full-time employment.

The court found Kardaras was entitled to "own occupation" benefits for approximately one year after discontinuation, as she was incapable of performing the essential duties of her occupation more than three days per week.

However, she was not entitled to "any occupation" benefits as her part-time work was reasonably commensurate in status and reward.

The court also awarded Kardaras $10,000 in mental distress damages due to Sun Life's breach of the duty of good faith in its handling of her claim.

The applicant sought to add the respondent's former counsel as parties to an application and compel them to disclose information regarding ongoing litigation pursuant to an assignment agreement.

The respondent had previously breached a court order to provide this information.

The court allowed the motion to add the law firms as parties, finding it legally tenable and necessary to adjudicate effectively.

The court ordered the law firms to disclose the factual information required by the assignment agreement, exercising its equitable jurisdiction to make orders against non-parties to prevent the facilitation of a party's defiance of a court order.

However, the court refused to order the disclosure of broader information protected by solicitor-client privilege, finding no implicit waiver of privilege in the assignment agreement.

The court, on its own initiative, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's statement of claim and additional submissions failed to set out a discernable cause of action against the named defendants.

Allegations related to employment, bullying, racism, and a toxic workplace in a unionized context were found to fall outside the court's jurisdiction, belonging instead to the Ontario Labour Relations Board or the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal.

Furthermore, the plaintiff sought systemic remedies and an investigation, which are not within the court's jurisdiction.

Consequently, the action was dismissed against all defendants.