G. Brown

The plaintiffs brought a motion requesting the court to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to reconsider a previous decision that stayed their action in favour of arbitration.

The plaintiffs argued that the Consumer Protection Act, 2002 invalidated the arbitration clause.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the failure to consider the Consumer Protection Act was not a clear error that would have changed the outcome, as it was not obvious the plaintiffs were protected consumers or that their claims fell within the scope of the Act's protections.

Furthermore, the interests of justice did not compel reconsideration because the defendants had no notice of the statutory argument during the original motion.

The plaintiffs commenced an action against the supplier and local dealer of materials and design for a cottage, alleging negligence and breach of warranty due to significant wood rot.

The defendant supplier brought a motion to stay the action, relying on an arbitration clause in its standard form Purchase and Sale Agreement.

The court applied the competence-competence principle and the analytical framework from Haas v. Gunasekaram, finding an arguable case that the arbitration agreement existed, bound the parties, and covered the dispute.

The court rejected arguments that the arbitration clause was unconscionable or that the local dealer's filing of a defence precluded a stay.

The motion was granted and the action was stayed in favour of arbitration.

The owner of leased commercial premises moved under the Construction Lien Act to declare three construction liens invalid and to discharge security posted to vacate them, arguing the lien claimants failed to correctly identify the owner in their claims for lien.

The court considered whether the naming errors constituted non‑compliance with s. 34(5) of the Act or merely a failure to strictly comply curable under s. 6.

The evidence showed the tenant owner had used multiple corporate and unregistered names and had not registered certain business names, contributing to confusion about the proper legal entity.

The court held that the errors—misplacing the owner’s name in the electronic form or naming related Equinox entities—were failures to strictly comply but not fatal defects, and no prejudice was established.

Motions to discharge the liens were dismissed and the lien claimants were permitted to amend pleadings to correctly name the tenant owner.