Shaun O'Brien

The defendant brought a motion to set aside an ex parte Mareva order obtained by the plaintiff, which froze the proceeds of the sale of a property.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, specifically regarding a 'secret' trust agreement and the plaintiff's lack of assets to satisfy its undertaking as to damages.

The court agreed, finding that the plaintiff's failure to disclose that the trust agreement was not public and that the plaintiff was a shell company without assets constituted material non-disclosures.

The court set aside the ex parte order.

The defendants requested a review of the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim, which alleged the defendants attempted to sell land to the plaintiff that the plaintiff had already purchased, appeared frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on its face.

The court directed the registrar to give notice to the plaintiff that it is considering dismissing the action and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The applicant, Bovaird, purchased land from the respondent, Mattamy, with the intention of developing it for district retail use.

Mattamy agreed to indemnify Bovaird for all future obligations under a cost-sharing agreement.

Bovaird later changed its plans and developed the land for residential use, triggering an additional $2.8 million contribution under the cost-sharing agreement.

Bovaird sought indemnification from Mattamy.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the broad indemnity must be read in the context of the parties' agreement as a whole, which included a specific contractual commitment by Bovaird to develop the land for district retail use.

The court held that Bovaird could not rely on the indemnity to profit from its own breach of that commitment.

The plaintiff seller brought an action against the defendant buyer for forfeiture of a $250,000 deposit and damages after a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The buyer refused to close, alleging the seller failed to rectify an illegal third-floor residential conversion and a resulting city work order.

The buyer also brought a third-party claim against its real estate lawyer for professional negligence.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the buyer intentionally orchestrated the work order for leverage and failed to properly requisition the issue within the contractual deadline.

The court held the transaction was not unconscionable, denied relief from forfeiture, awarded the seller the deposit plus $6,645 in out-of-pocket damages, and dismissed the third-party claim against the lawyer, finding he met the standard of a reasonably prudent solicitor.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against her former corporate employers and their sole director for wrongful dismissal.

The court found the two corporations were common employers and awarded the plaintiff eight months' reasonable notice, unpaid wages, and vacation pay.

The court also awarded $30,000 in aggravated damages and $25,000 in punitive damages due to the defendants' bad faith conduct, which included failing to pay wages and unilaterally attempting to recharacterize her employment as an independent contractor relationship.

The sole director was held personally liable for the entire judgment under the statutory oppression remedy.

The plaintiff employers brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to enforce restrictive covenants against a former executive who resigned to join a competitor.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality clauses, and alleged the former employee misused confidential information by wiping a company laptop and using a USB device before returning it.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the restrictive covenants were enforceable, as they lacked a proprietary interest and the clauses were overly broad and ambiguous.

The court also found no serious issue to be tried regarding the misuse of confidential information, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the employee.

The appellant developer appealed an arbitral award that allowed the respondent purchasers to terminate their agreements of purchase and sale and receive a refund of their deposits.

The arbitrator had found that the developer's failure to check a yes/no box in the Tarion Addendum regarding Early Termination Conditions constituted a breach entitling the purchasers to terminate.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the arbitrator's decision unreasonable.

The court held that the failure to check the box was a minor, technical breach that did not justify termination, especially since the agreements clearly contained no Early Termination Conditions.

The arbitral award was set aside and the matter remitted to the arbitrator.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' Statement of Claim as an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs, two cancer researchers, had previously been investigated by the hospital for research misconduct, resulting in the closure of their lab.

They challenged these decisions through multiple administrative appeals and judicial reviews.

The court found that the civil claim, which alleged bad faith, conspiracy, and breach of contract, raised the same factual and substantive issues that were or could have been litigated in the administrative proceedings.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs, commercial landlords, brought a summary trial action against the defendant tenant claiming damages for breach of a five-year lease agreement.

The defendant argued the tenancy was month-to-month and proper notice was given before vacating.

The court found that the essential terms of the alleged long-term lease lacked certainty and the parties had not finalized an agreement.

Furthermore, any oral agreement was unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, and the doctrine of part performance did not apply as the acts were not unequivocally referable to a five-year lease.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff subcontractor supplied lumber for the construction of the defendant's home but was not paid.

The plaintiff dealt with an individual named 'Peter' representing the contractor, which was a shell company.

The court found that the defendant homeowner was 'Peter' and the controlling mind of the contractor.

The court held that funds drawn from the defendant's personal account and represented in a bank draft constituted monies received by the contractor, creating a trust under section 8 of the Construction Act.

The defendant was found personally liable for breach of trust under section 13 of the Act and ordered to pay the outstanding invoices.

The moving defendants sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against them regarding a three-vehicle intersection collision.

The collision occurred when a northbound driver made a left turn in front of a southbound driver (the moving defendant), causing a collision that subsequently struck the plaintiff's stopped vehicle.

The court found partial summary judgment appropriate and used its fact-finding powers to determine liability.

The court apportioned 90% liability to the left-turning driver and 10% liability to the moving defendant for failing to slow down when approaching the intersection with an obstructed view.

The defendant insurer, State Farm, brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of an unidentified vehicle's involvement in a motorcycle accident to trigger coverage under either the OPCF 44R Family Protection Coverage Endorsement or the standard O.A.P. 1 minimum limits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial on both coverage bases.

It held that physical evidence (motorcycle damage and a leg laceration) could constitute "other material evidence" under OPCF 44R, leaving its corroborative weight for a jury.

Furthermore, the plaintiff's credibility, despite some inconsistencies in statements, was not suitable for determination on a written record, thus precluding summary judgment under O.A.P. 1.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision allowing the respondents to select the appellants' in-house counsel as their representative for examination for discovery.

The in-house counsel also had carriage of the fraud action on behalf of the appellants.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while in-house counsel are not shielded from discovery, requiring counsel of record to attend would be oppressive as it would inevitably prevent him from continuing as counsel, thereby interfering with the appellants' choice of counsel.

The respondents were ordered to select another representative.

The defendant, John Hancock, brought a motion to dismiss or stay the action, arguing that a forum selection clause in the parties' agreement required the plaintiff, Infinite Media, to bring its claim in Boston, Massachusetts.

Infinite Media contended the clause mandated claims be brought in Ontario, specifically in the responding party's city or county within Ontario.

The court interpreted the clause holistically, considering the agreement's wording and factual matrix, and found that all claims were intended to be brought in Ontario, in the responding party's city or county.

The motion to dismiss or stay was dismissed.

The applicants sought a declaration that new condominium rules prohibiting transient or hotel-like use of units were invalid, arguing inconsistency with declarations allowing no minimum lease term.

The respondents contended the rules were consistent with provisions requiring units to be used as private, single-family residences.

The court found the respondents' interpretation reasonable, upholding the new rules, and granted the respondents' cross-application for compliance.

The plaintiff, Fadia Mohammad, sought summary judgment for payment of a life insurance death benefit following the death of her husband, Mahmoud Mohammad.

The defendant insurer, Manulife, denied the claim, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation by the deceased regarding his immigration status (by providing a Social Insurance Number, SIN) and his criminal past (non-disclosure) on the application form.

The court found that providing a SIN did not constitute a misrepresentation of immigration status.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no duty to disclose immigration status or criminal history because the insurer's application form did not ask questions to elicit this information, implying these facts were not material.

Even if material, the non-disclosure was not fraudulent.

The court emphasized that an insurer's failure to inquire about specific facts may indicate those facts are not material, and relying on non-disclosure in such circumstances can be contrary to the insurer's good faith duty.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the defendant's motion was dismissed.

The defendant, Alan Eugeni, a former pilot for Air Georgian Limited, brought a motion to dismiss a defamation claim under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

Air Georgian's claim stemmed from a self-published book by Eugeni, his website, and comments quoted in a Financial Post article, primarily focusing on the book.

The court found that Eugeni's expression related to a matter of public interest (aviation safety).

While Air Georgian demonstrated substantial merit to its defamation claim and Eugeni conceded he had no valid defence for the purpose of the motion, the court ultimately concluded that the harm suffered by Air Georgian was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting Eugeni's expression.

The book had limited sales (247 copies), and broader public concerns about Air Georgian's safety were already present in widely circulated media and government reports.

The court noted a significant power imbalance and indicia of a SLAPP suit, leading to the dismissal of Air Georgian's claim.

The applicants sought to transfer an application from the Mining and Lands Tribunal to the Superior Court of Justice under s. 107 of the Mining Act, arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction over patented mining claims and issues of private property and civil rights.

The respondent contended the Tribunal had exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

The court found that the Tribunal had at least concurrent jurisdiction, particularly regarding expenditures under s. 181 of the Mining Act, and that the issues fell squarely within the Tribunal's expertise.

The court dismissed the application to transfer the proceeding, emphasizing the Tribunal's specialized knowledge and efficient procedures for such matters.

The Plaintiffs, judgment creditors of 798839 Ontario Limited ("39"), brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that 39 held a valid and subsisting interest in mining claims under a 1988 option agreement with Great Lakes Nickel Limited ("GLN").

The Plaintiffs argued that 39 had acquired an 80% interest or, alternatively, a 60% interest, despite only expending approximately $1.6 million of the required $2 million.

The court, interpreting the plain wording of the option agreement, found that 39 was required to invest the full $2 million to acquire an 80% interest, failing which the option terminated and 39 acquired no interest.

The court dismissed the Plaintiffs' motion, granting summary judgment in favour of GLN on this issue, while declining to address other issues like limitations due to the partial nature of the summary judgment.

The plaintiff suffered injuries at a pub when another patron, allegedly intoxicated, fell on him.

The plaintiff sued the pub operators and the landlord, 2320152 Ontario Inc. The landlord brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was not an 'occupier' under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the landlord, operating under a 'completely carefree net lease' with limited involvement in the pub's operation, did not meet the definition of an occupier.

The action against the landlord was dismissed.