Property Tax Assessment - SCJ

A municipality sought a declaration that it was not bound by an arbitration clause in a 1993 participation agreement governing a landfill operation, arguing that an amended environmental compliance approval issued in 2019 voided the agreement.

The respondent municipality moved to stay the application in favour of arbitration.

The court applied the two-part framework from Peace River Hydro Partners v. Petrowest Corp. and found that the technical prerequisites for a mandatory stay were met and that neither of the exceptions raised by the applicant—undue delay or suitability for summary judgment—applied on a clear case standard.

The court granted the stay and ordered the matter to arbitration.

The City of Mississauga brought a motion for interim statutory and quia timet injunctions to restrain respondents from contravening the City's Nuisance Gathering By-law 0211-2023.

The motion concerned unsanctioned large-scale gatherings at Ridgeway Plaza scheduled for August 13-14 and 19, 2025, coinciding with Pakistan Independence Day and Afghanistan Independence Day celebrations.

The court granted an interim quia timet injunction against all respondents but declined to grant a statutory injunction against the condominium corporations, finding they were not engaged in ongoing by-law contraventions.

The court balanced the serious public safety risks from overcrowding against Charter rights to freedom of association and peaceful assembly.

The City of Toronto sought partial summary judgment to dismiss the action against it, relying on section 42(4)(b) of the City of Toronto Act, which bars actions for damages caused by the condition of an "untravelled portion of a highway." The court found that the area where the plaintiff was injured was not intended for ordinary or normal use, nor commonly or additionally used by the public, and therefore fell within the statutory bar.

The action against the City of Toronto was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the City.

The trial concerned a third-party claim by the defendant, Cristy Mitton, against the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) and its contractor, Carillion Canada Inc., alleging negligent winter maintenance of Highway 41.

Mitton had previously settled the main action with the plaintiff, Ronald Busch, admitting 1% liability.

The court found that Highway 41 was in a state of non-repair due to being partially snow-packed, and this condition caused Mitton to lose control.

However, the MTO successfully discharged its onus by proving its winter maintenance operations were reasonable, including the decision to use salt despite low temperatures, as it was a judgment call aimed at achieving bare pavement.

The court dismissed the third-party claim, finding no liability on the MTO.

The Town of Milton brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a negligence claim by the plaintiffs, who alleged catastrophic injuries from a motorcycle accident caused by a pothole.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court ruled that the plaintiffs failed to prove non-repair or causation, and that the Town met the minimum maintenance standards for the road.

The motion was not premature despite incomplete discoveries, as the plaintiffs had ample opportunity to pursue discovery.

Costs were awarded to the Town of Milton.

The plaintiff, a condominium resident, sought statutory and tort-based injunctive and declaratory relief against the defendant, an underground venue operating in his building.

The plaintiff alleged the venue was operating as an unlicensed nightclub, causing severe noise and vibrations constituting a nuisance.

The court found that the defendant was indeed operating as an "entertainment establishment/nightclub" without the proper license, based on its functional activities (e.g., providing dance facilities, minimal seating, ancillary food sales) despite being licensed as an "eating or drinking establishment." The court granted a declaration to this effect and issued both a statutory injunction requiring the defendant to cease operations in contravention of its licensing status, and an interim/interlocutory injunction based in tort, prohibiting the emission of sound audible beyond the lot limit between 10:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.

The defendants, the City of Richmond Hill and two employees, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim without leave to amend under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, or alternatively, to dismiss the action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d).

The plaintiff alleged harassment, threats, family division, damage to reputation, and malicious prosecution related to zoning contravention charges against his family members.

The court found that the alleged torts were not recognized in Ontario law or were improperly pleaded without sufficient material facts.

Furthermore, the claims against individual municipal employees failed due to statutory immunity under the Municipal Act, 2001, as bad faith was not adequately pleaded.

The court also determined the action constituted an improper collateral attack on concluded Planning Act proceedings against the plaintiff's family members, to which the plaintiff was a stranger.

Both branches of the motion were granted.

The Estate of John McKinlay sought summary judgment against the Municipality of Chatham-Kent for a declaration that the Municipality was responsible for maintaining a drainage tile (Drain) on the Estate's property and for reimbursement of repair costs and crop losses.

The Drain was installed under an easement granted by the Estate's predecessor to the Province, which was later transferred to the Municipality's predecessor.

The court found that the easement granted the Municipality the right to maintain the Drain but did not impose a positive obligation to do so.

Therefore, the claim for declaratory relief was dismissed.

However, the court declined to grant summary judgment dismissing the entire action, noting that the Estate's amended statement of claim pleaded facts capable of supporting a claim for damages in nuisance, which was not fully canvassed during the motion.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, allowing the nuisance claim to proceed to trial.

The Chief Building Official of the City of Cambridge issued an emergency order for the immediate demolition of the designated heritage Preston Springs Hotel due to its unsafe structural condition and persistent trespassing.

The CBO applied to the court to confirm the reasonableness of this order and to recover demolition costs from the owner, Haastown Holdings (Preston) Inc., who consented to both orders.

The Architectural Conservancy of Ontario (ACO) intervened, challenging the reasonableness of the demolition order, arguing that the CBO failed to consider relevant factors (heritage status, appeal to CRB, alternative remediation options) and considered irrelevant factors (cost of remediation).

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the CBO's decision was well-informed by expert reports and his own inspections, and that the building posed an immediate danger that necessitated demolition.

The court confirmed the emergency order and the recoverability of demolition costs from the owner, dismissing the ACO's challenge and alternate relief requests as moot or unsupported.

The Municipality of Mississippi Mills brought an application seeking a declaration that Steven Maynard is a vexatious litigant under ss. 140(1)(a) & (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

C.43, due to his persistent and groundless court proceedings and vexatious conduct.

The Municipality sought orders to stay pending actions and prevent further proceedings without leave.

Maynard denied his actions were vexatious, claiming to act as a responsible citizen ensuring municipal compliance with planning laws.

The court granted the application, finding Maynard to be a vexatious litigant, and imposed orders to stay existing proceedings and require leave for future actions, with a specific exclusion for a slip-and-fall small claims case.

The Barge Respondents (Temagami Barge Limited and Dashiel Lowery Delarosbel) brought a motion to transfer an application from Toronto to North Bay.

The applicant, Corporation of the Municipality of Temagami, opposed this transfer, advocating for Haileybury due to significantly shorter hearing delays.

The court, applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissed the motion to transfer to North Bay.

Instead, the court ordered the application to be transferred to Haileybury, finding it more geographically appropriate for the community and witnesses, and crucial for securing the just, most expeditious, and least expensive determination of the proceeding by avoiding further delay.

Costs were awarded to the Municipality of Temagami.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent their neighbours from removing an existing fence and constructing a new one on a municipal laneway.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions (serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, balance of convenience).

The court found no serious issue to be tried as the respondents had no current intention to interfere with the fence, especially after the City clarified its policy against new encroachments.

The court also found no irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed, though leave to amend the Statement of Claim was granted.

The applicants sought an order compelling the respondents to reduce the height of a fence to comply with a municipal by-law, after the municipality declined to enforce it.

The court considered whether it could intervene in a municipality's discretionary decision not to enforce a by-law.

Relying on established jurisprudence, the court found that it could only intervene if the municipality acted unreasonably or in bad faith.

As no such evidence was adduced, and the municipality provided articulable reasons for its decision, the application was dismissed.

The Township of Amaranth sought declarations and a permanent injunction against Vidhya Ramdas for contravening its Site Alteration By-law and a Stop Work Order by performing unauthorized fill activities on her property.

Ramdas failed to file responding materials despite multiple adjournments and court orders.

The court found deliberate and continuing breaches of the by-law and the orders, granting the Township's application for declarations, a permanent injunction, remedial orders for property restoration, and costs.

The applicant, a land developer, sought an order under the Partition Act for the sale of a co-owned 8.5-acre undeveloped property in Stoney Creek, which it held as tenants in common with the respondents.

The respondents, retired spouses, opposed the sale, preferring to retain their half-interest for recreational farming and proposing a partition of the property.

The court dismissed the respondents' proposed partition, finding it legally untenable as it would violate subdivision control provisions of the Planning Act.

The court also denied the respondents' request for a stay or adjournment to seek municipal consent for partition, citing lack of diligence and uncertain prospects of success.

Finding no malice, oppression, or vexatious intent by the applicant, the court ordered the property to be sold at fair market value and awarded costs to the applicant.

The Corporation of the Town of Caledon brought a motion for directions regarding an appeal by Joseph Michael Bozzelli and Amanda Bozzelli under the Building Code Act, 1992.

The motion sought clarification on the proper procedural rule (Rule 61, 38, or 62 of the Rules of Civil Procedure) and whether the appeal would be a de novo hearing allowing viva voce evidence.

The court determined that Rule 62 was the appropriate procedural rule, supplemented by Rule 38 by analogy, and that the appeal would proceed as a hearing de novo.

However, the court ruled that the hearing would be on a paper record, without viva voce evidence, limiting additional evidence to affidavits concerning compliance time for the underlying property standards order.

The plaintiff, Catherine Patrick, was injured in a single-car accident in February 2014.

She initially sued Southwest Middlesex, but later sought to add The Corporation of the County of Middlesex ("Middlesex County") as a defendant.

Middlesex County moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide timely statutory notice under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act, 2001, and that her claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that Patrick did not establish a "reasonable excuse" for the more than two-year delay in notifying Middlesex County, particularly for the initial 16-month period of inaction before retaining counsel.

As satisfying the "reasonable excuse" prong of s. 44(12) is mandatory, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action against Middlesex County.

The applicants sought to rescind a conditional foundation building permit issued by the City of London to the respondent numbered company and Mr. Lavie, arguing non-compliance with applicable law regarding site plan approval and zero-metre setbacks.

The court dismissed the application, finding that site plan approval was not a prerequisite for a conditional permit issued under s. 8(3) of the Building Code Act, unlike a regular permit under s. 8(2).

The court also determined that the zero-metre setback complied with the City's Downtown Area (DA) zoning bylaw, specifically for the DA2 zone.

The decision emphasized that a Chief Building Official's decision, when compliant with statutory requirements, is entitled to deference and should not be influenced by broader land use planning or public policy considerations.

Gemterra Developments Corporation sought a refund of $408,400 from the City of Toronto, alleging overpayment of park levies.

The central issue was the interpretation of "development site" under the City's Park Levy By-law, specifically whether Gemterra's two-phase residential project on a 1.3-hectare parcel constituted one or two development sites.

The levy rate was 10% for sites less than one hectare and 15% for sites between one and five hectares.

Gemterra argued that each phase, for which separate building permits were issued, should be treated as a distinct site, qualifying for the lower 10% rate.

The City contended it was a single development site.

The court dismissed Gemterra's application, finding that "development site" is a fact-based determination, and in this case, the two phases comprised a single development site, irrespective of phased construction or separate building permits.

The City of Sarnia applied for a declaration that it held legal title to the "Mitton site" properties in trust for Bluewater Health, either as a bare trust or a constructive trust, and sought an equitable right to indemnity for ongoing maintenance costs.

The court dismissed the application, finding no certainty of intention to establish a bare trust from the relevant statutes (1920 Act and 1989 Act) or the parties' conduct.

Furthermore, the court found no basis for a constructive trust, as the City was seeking to impose a burden (decommissioning costs) rather than remedy an unjust enrichment or condemn a wrongful act by Bluewater.

The court emphasized that constructive trusts are typically used to provide a proprietary remedy for a party's loss or to prevent wrongful gain, not to transfer liabilities.