Analee J.M. Ferreira

The applicant property owner sought an order prohibiting the respondent neighbours from parking on a shared right-of-way.

The respondents argued they had acquired a prescriptive right to park there and cross-applied to restrict the applicant from using the right-of-way to launch marine vehicles.

The court dismissed the application, finding the respondents had established an absolute and indefeasible right to park on the right-of-way through over 40 years of continuous use.

Furthermore, the court held the applicant's easement rights were limited to foot access to the beach and enjoined the applicant from operating motorized vehicles or building ramps on the unpaved portion of the right-of-way.

The applicants sought to rescind a conditional foundation building permit issued by the City of London to the respondent numbered company and Mr. Lavie, arguing non-compliance with applicable law regarding site plan approval and zero-metre setbacks.

The court dismissed the application, finding that site plan approval was not a prerequisite for a conditional permit issued under s. 8(3) of the Building Code Act, unlike a regular permit under s. 8(2).

The court also determined that the zero-metre setback complied with the City's Downtown Area (DA) zoning bylaw, specifically for the DA2 zone.

The decision emphasized that a Chief Building Official's decision, when compliant with statutory requirements, is entitled to deference and should not be influenced by broader land use planning or public policy considerations.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court decision that quashed a building permit issued by the Chief Building Officer (CBO) for an accessory building on a lakeside residential property.

The property was a non-complying lot because it did not border a street, making the determination of lot lines and setbacks under the zoning by-law ambiguous.

The CBO reasonably interpreted the by-law to conclude that all lot lines were side lot lines, and issued the permit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the appeals judge erred by applying a correctness standard of review and improperly considering land use planning principles from the Official Plan.

The CBO's decision was restored as it was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The Court of Appeal issued a costs endorsement following a successful appeal by the appellant municipality.

Based on the agreement of the parties, the court awarded the appellant $8,000 for the costs of the appeal.

The court also awarded the appellant $50,000 for the costs of the underlying application, as submitted by the respondents.

The respondents sought to bypass the Planning Act by claiming a creek running through their property was a navigable stream under the Beds of Navigable Waters Act, which would vest the creek bed in the Crown and naturally sever their lot.

The application judge agreed, finding the creek navigable based on historical dimensions and downstream use.

The Court of Appeal allowed the municipality's appeal, holding that navigability requires not just physical capacity but also potential practical public utility, including points of public access.

As there was no evidence of public access or practical public use of the creek on the respondents' property at the time of the 1831 Crown grant, the creek was not navigable.

The Appellants appealed a municipal drainage report (the Spriet Report) under s. 48(1) of the Drainage Act, seeking to have it set aside and replaced with their own private drainage works.

The Tribunal found that the Appellants' private works were undertaken without authorization and did not provide a benefit commensurate with the estimated costs to the watershed.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the municipality's drainage engineer over the Appellants' civil engineer, concluding that the Spriet Report provided a sufficient outlet and met design standards.

The appeal was dismissed and the Spriet Report was adopted.

The applicants sought declarations and injunctive relief concerning a 15‑foot-wide strip of land subject to express rights of way benefiting four adjacent cottage properties in a Lake Huron subdivision.

The respondents, who had acquired ownership of the strip, erected a fence and locked gate to deter alleged trespass by other residents.

The court held that the easement, granted “for all purposes,” was among the broadest possible forms of right of way and had historically been exercised without restriction.

The installation of a fence and locked gate requiring keys substantially interfered with the applicants’ ability to exercise the easement conveniently and was not justified by the respondents’ evidence of trespass concerns.

Mandatory and prohibitory injunctions were granted requiring removal of the fence and prohibiting future obstructions without authorization, and the respondents’ counter‑application seeking validation of the barrier was dismissed.

A municipality brought a motion seeking directions regarding service of a notice of application for a declaration under the Beds of Navigable Waters Act concerning whether a stream crossing the respondents’ property was navigable at the time of the original Crown grant in 1831.

The respondents asserted that the stream created a natural severance of their land and that the stream bed was unpatented Crown land.

The court held that the only issue in the application was whether the waterway was navigable at the time of the Crown grant, which affected only the parties to the proceeding.

Upstream and downstream landowners would need to litigate the issue independently based on their own Crown grants.

Accordingly, no additional parties were required to be served, and directions were provided regarding the order of proof at trial.