Administrative Law - SCJ

The applicant sought judicial review of a housing cooperative's decision that she was no longer eligible for a Rent-Geared-to-Income subsidy after refusing an offer for a one-bedroom unit.

The applicant argued the cooperative lacked the delegated authority to make this determination.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the service manager had expressly delegated the authority to determine eligibility and consider extenuating circumstances to the cooperative.

The court also found the cooperative's decision that the applicant failed to establish extenuating circumstances was reasonable.

The applicant, a candidate in the 44th General Election, applied for a judicial recount under section 301 of the Canada Elections Act after losing by 76 votes.

The court found that the threshold for a recount is low and based on a benchmark of accuracy.

Evidence showed numerous errors on the Statements of the Vote, including uncounted unused ballots and numbers that did not balance.

The court granted the application and ordered a judicial recount.

The applicant, the lowest bidder on a municipal construction contract, sought judicial review of the City of Toronto's decision to award the contract to a competing bidder.

The applicant brought the application before the Superior Court of Justice without seeking leave under section 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

The court declined jurisdiction, holding that applications for judicial review must be brought before the Divisional Court in accordance with the Act and the Consolidated Practice Direction.

The application was dismissed for being brought in the wrong forum.

The applicant brought an application for a permanent injunction against the respondents, a plumber and his corporation, for holding themselves out as legal practitioners.

The individual respondent used a fake law firm name to send demand letters to plumbing customers and maintained a website offering legal services.

The court granted the injunction, finding the respondents' actions violated the Law Society Act, and ordered the corporation to change its name to remove any reference to legal services.

The plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario and several of its employees, alleging various torts and Charter breaches related to his disciplinary proceedings.

The LSO defendants brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the LSO defendants were protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act and that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts to support his claims of bad faith, misfeasance in public office, Charter breaches, intrusion upon seclusion, and defamation.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process as a collateral attack on the disciplinary tribunal's decisions.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment for schizophrenia and confirming his involuntary admission.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board made palpable and overriding errors by concluding the appellant lacked capacity simply because he denied having schizophrenia, and by ignoring evidence that he appreciated the consequences of treatment.

The Court also found insufficient evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the appellant's mental disorder would likely result in serious physical impairment due to missed dialysis appointments.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's decision was quashed, and the appellant was ordered released from hospital.

The applicant developer sought declarations and mandatory orders alleging the respondent municipality breached a Costs Sharing Agreement by failing to construct municipal services with sufficient capacity for a proposed high-density residential development.

The municipality argued the application was premature because the proposed development was not permitted under current zoning and capacity studies were ongoing.

The court dismissed the application, finding it premature and lacking practical utility, as the meaning of 'full development' in the agreement could not be determined while zoning appeals and municipal processes were still pending.

A motion to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding a finding that he was incapable of consenting to a Community Treatment Plan and confirming a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant argued that his capacity to consent to the plan should be assessed based only on his understanding of its administrative consequences, separate from his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

He also argued that the likelihood of substantial mental deterioration required for an order must occur within its six-month lifespan.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the therapeutic aspects of a plan cannot be ignored in the capacity test, and that the legislation does not require a precise temporality of within six months for the likelihood of mental deterioration.

The applicant, a candidate in the 2019 federal election, applied for relief under s. 477.7 of the Canada Elections Act from the consequences of the late filing of his electoral campaign return.

The applicant's official agent failed to file the return by the deadline and subsequently resigned and passed away.

The court found that the late filing occurred without the applicant's knowledge or acquiescence, satisfying the criteria under s. 477.7(a).

The application was granted, relieving the applicant from the consequences of the late filing.

The applicant municipality brought an application for an injunction to restrain the respondent from growing cannabis on his property in contravention of municipal by-laws.

The respondent brought a motion to stay the application, arguing that the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether his cannabis cultivation was a 'normal farm practice'.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the Board's jurisdiction is limited to issues of disturbance and does not extend to broad land-use planning and zoning by-law compliance, which form the core of the municipality's application.

The City of Kenora brought an application for a closure order and injunctive relief against the owners of an illegal boarding house that had become a public nuisance due to extensive criminal activity, fire hazards, and property standards violations.

The owners did not oppose the application, but an intervening legal clinic argued that the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) gave the Landlord and Tenant Board exclusive jurisdiction to terminate tenancies, thereby ousting the court's jurisdiction to issue a closure order.

The Superior Court held that the RTA regulates landlord-tenant relationships, whereas the Municipal Act empowers the municipality to protect the broader public interest.

The court concluded that a closure order under the Municipal Act is not a termination order under the RTA, and granted the closure order effective April 1, 2019.

The appellant, suffering from schizoaffective disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

During the Board hearing, the appellant discharged his counsel and represented himself despite experiencing significant delusions.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the appellant had a constitutional right to represent himself, the Board denied him procedural fairness by failing to appoint his discharged counsel as amicus curiae to assist the Board in ensuring a fair hearing.

The applicants, owners of the Glen Abbey Golf Course, brought an application to quash five municipal by-laws enacted by the respondent Town.

The by-laws aimed to preserve the property's use as a golf course following its designation as a cultural heritage property.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the application and quashed the by-laws, finding them ultra vires the Town's authority under the Municipal Act, as they improperly required the provision of services related to recreation and culture.

The court also found the by-laws were enacted in bad faith to thwart the applicants' redevelopment plans and were void for vagueness.

Following an application regarding the interpretation of a municipal zoning by-law and legal non-conforming use, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The applicant, a public interest litigant, had partial success but the main issue was decided in favour of the respondents.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $40,000 to the respondent Picton Terminals.

The court declined to award costs to the respondent County, finding that its failure to recognize the trans-shipment use in its 2006 zoning by-law generated the uncertainty that led to the application, and recognizing the applicant as a public interest litigant.

The appellant physician appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision that rescinded the respondent's involuntary psychiatric admission.

The respondent had revoked his power of attorney while involuntarily detained, making his estranged wife his substitute decision maker instead of his mother.

The physician, believing the respondent lacked capacity to revoke the power of attorney, relied on the mother's consent to continue the detention.

The Board found it lacked jurisdiction to determine capacity to revoke a power of attorney and that the physician could not unilaterally disregard the revocation without a formal assessment under the Substitute Decisions Act.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was correct and that the physician should have sought the wife's consent or brought a Form G application if she refused.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that required it to contribute to the maintenance and repair costs of a haul route in a neighbouring municipality as a condition of its quarry licence.

The moving party argued the OMB lacked jurisdiction under the Aggregate Resources Act, the Municipal Act, and related regulations to impose such a condition.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of its home statutes and related legislation was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The respondents brought a motion to strike out two applications challenging the constitutionality of the Global Adjustment under the Electricity Act, 1998.

The responding party argued that the Global Adjustment was an unconstitutional tax that violated s. 53 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court applied the Lawson and Westbank tests, concluding that the Global Adjustment is a regulatory charge tied to a complex regulatory scheme, not a tax.

The court found it plain and obvious that the applications could not succeed and granted the motion to strike.

The applicant, representing local ratepayers, brought an application to interpret a municipal zoning by-law, arguing that a deep water port facility's trans-shipment operations contravened the by-law.

The respondents argued the operations were protected as a legal non-conforming use.

The court interpreted the historical zoning by-laws and applied the framework for pre-existing uses, finding that the general historic use of the property for trans-shipment of bulk commodities had not fundamentally changed.

The court held that the current operations constituted a reasonable expansion of earlier activities and remained protected as a legal non-conforming use.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming incapacity to consent to treatment for schizophrenia under a community treatment plan.

The court refused to admit proposed fresh evidence, holding that the pregnancy-related testing and competing psychiatric letter failed the Palmer criteria for relevance, credibility, due diligence, and likely effect on the result.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the Board’s application of the statutory capacity test, the court held that the Board properly relied on corroborated evidence, including hearsay, and reasonably found that the appellant could understand treatment information but could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that revocation of the community treatment order did not extinguish the community treatment plan.

A federal inmate sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid challenging his reclassification and involuntary transfer from a minimum security institution to a medium security institution.

The court applied the habeas corpus framework and held that the correctional authorities provided an adequate gist of the confidential information relied upon, while properly withholding identifying details of informants.

The court found no breach of procedural fairness because the applicant received notice, disclosure sufficient to know the case to meet, and an opportunity to make submissions, which he waived.

The transfer decision was also reasonable given the applicant's extensive escape history, intelligence indicating current escape planning, and the statutory priority of public safety.

The application was dismissed and modest costs were awarded to the respondent.