Sarah Shaikh

The appellant, Cody Cuthbertson, appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in not classifying a Charter breach as more serious.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s assessment of the seriousness of the breach or in the balancing of factors under R. v. Grant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing opium after drugs were found in his luggage upon returning from India.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding his unrecorded out-of-court statements to police, the Crown's comments on his right to silence, and the scope of the W.(D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were functionally adequate, properly cautioned the jury on the right to silence, and correctly conveyed how to apply the burden of proof to the evidence as a whole.

The appellant was found guilty of possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The appeal challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, specifically the finding of constructive possession of fentanyl located in a backpack in the trunk of a car the appellant was driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's inference of guilt was reasonable, given the circumstantial evidence, the high value of the fentanyl, and the absence of an exculpatory explanation from the appellant.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Nathaniel Veltman, who was charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder following an incident where he drove his vehicle into a Muslim family.

The defence sought to exclude statements made to a 911 call-taker, spontaneous statements to arresting officers, and two videotaped statements to a police detective, arguing involuntariness and breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found all statements to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

While acknowledging some technical s. 10(b) Charter breaches by arresting officers due to exigent circumstances and delays at the police station, the court determined these were made in good faith and that a "fresh start" was achieved by the detective's thorough re-cautioning.

The court concluded that the accused had an "irresistible desire to speak" and would have made the statements regardless of the breaches, thus rendering them admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The offender was convicted by a jury of four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder after driving his truck into a Muslim family in London, Ontario.

The sentencing judge found that the murders constituted terrorist activity under the Criminal Code, as they were motivated by white nationalist ideology and intended to intimidate the Muslim community.

The offender was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence with no parole eligibility for 25 years for each murder, and a concurrent life sentence for the attempted murder, reflecting the extreme brutality and terrorist nature of the attack.

The accused brought a motion seeking leave to communicate with defence counsel between the completion of the Crown's cross-examination and the commencement of re-examination, contrary to the presumptive Ontario Rules of Professional Conduct.

The court granted the motion, finding that the constitutional rights to a fair trial and full answer and defence, coupled with the gravity and complexity of the charges (four counts of first-degree murder and one of attempted murder) and the extensive nature of the accused's testimony, justified a departure from the rule.

The ruling permits counsel and client to discuss both the decision to re-examine and the proper scope of re-examination.

The Crown sought a permanent publication ban on excerpts from the accused's "A White Awakening" manifesto and video footage depicting the incident, arguing public harm and inspiration for copycat crimes.

The media coalition opposed the ban, emphasizing the open court principle and the importance of public information.

The court dismissed the ban on manifesto excerpts, finding no serious risk from responsible media reporting, but ordered the unredacted manifesto sealed until trial conclusion and limited video access to exclude the moment of impact.

The appellant was convicted of possessing fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The police arrested him based on a mistaken identity, relying partly on observations from a warrantless covert hallway camera.

The Crown conceded breaches of the appellant's Charter rights (ss. 8 and 9) due to the unlawful camera installation and subsequent arrest and search, as well as a late Report to Justice.

The trial judge admitted the fentanyl evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the police acted in good faith based on their understanding of the law at the time.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the police's mistaken belief as to the appellant's identity did not, in itself, render the arrest unlawful, and that the s. 24(2) analysis for admitting the evidence was sound, particularly regarding police good faith.

This ruling addresses the editing of an accused's statements for admissibility at trial.

The court considered jointly proposed edits by the Crown and defence to remove irrelevant and prejudicial content, such as references to abortion clinics, political views, and Covid-19 vaccine opposition.

However, the court denied the defence's requests to excise statements where the accused asserted he would not plead insanity, characterized his actions as terrorism, and stated he was inspired by other mass killers.

The judge found these contentious statements highly probative and relevant to the Crown's case on mental state, intention, motive, planning, and deliberation, emphasizing that their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect, which could be mitigated by limiting instructions to the jury.

The accused, Nathaniel Veltman, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder with terrorism allegations, brought a pre-trial motion regarding the admissibility of ideological evidence found on his devices and expert testimony from Dr. Barbara Perry on right-wing extremism.

The court ruled that the ideological documents (including 'A White Awakening', Tarrant's manifesto excerpts, Breivik's manifesto cover, and mass shooting video existence) were admissible, subject to careful presentation and limiting instructions to the jury.

However, the expert testimony of Dr. Perry was deemed inadmissible, as it was not necessary to assist the jury and its potential prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, particularly given the accused's own explanations and the general notoriety of some concepts.

This ruling addresses the challenge for cause process in a high-profile criminal trial.

It outlines principles from R. v. Chouhan regarding screening for bias, balancing fair trial rights with juror privacy.

The court determined how to screen for potential juror bias related to the disturbing nature of the allegations, bias against those holding extremist views, and the impact of pre-trial publicity, including statements by public officials and participation in commemorative events.

The judge proposed specific questions for the challenge for cause.

The accused, facing charges of first-degree murder and attempted murder, applied for a mental condition assessment under s. 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code to explore a Not Criminally Responsible (NCR) defence.

The defence sought the assessment without disclosing specific grounds to the court or the Crown, and requested that the resulting report not be shared unless and until the defence decided to lead the evidence at trial, citing solicitor-client privilege and fair trial rights.

The Crown opposed on the basis of lack of grounds and security concerns regarding the accused's transfer to Ottawa.

The court granted the assessment, relying on counsel's assertion of grounds and the constitutional imperative of a fair trial, and ordered the report to be prepared but disclosed only to the defence, allowing them to decide whether to use it at trial, thereby protecting solicitor-client privilege.

The court also allowed the assessment to take place at a location of the psychiatrist's choice in Ottawa, balancing efficiency and security.

The accused, charged with four counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from a vehicle attack on a Muslim family, applied for a change of venue.

The accused argued that extensive media coverage, community events, and political commentary in London, Ontario, rendered it impossible to select an impartial jury there.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing that publicity was widespread and safeguards like challenges for cause were sufficient.

The court granted the application, finding that the saturation of local coverage and the community's sense of personal violation created a risk of subconscious bias that warranted moving the trial to ensure a fair and impartial jury.

The appellant, Ronald Burgess, appealed his convictions for drug trafficking (cocaine, MDMA, proceeds of crime) and sought leave to appeal his sentence for marijuana trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge impermissibly used inadmissible hearsay wiretap evidence, which tainted the credibility findings against the appellant on the non-marijuana counts.

Consequently, the court allowed the conviction appeal, deeming the verdicts unsafe, and ordered a new trial for those counts.

The court also granted leave and allowed the sentence appeal, remitting the matter for re-sentencing on the marijuana trafficking conviction.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence for importing five kilograms of cocaine, arguing the sentencing judge overemphasized general deterrence, leading to a disproportionate sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle, noting the sentencing judge thoroughly considered all factors and imposed a sentence significantly below the typical range.

The court also rejected fresh evidence regarding the appellant's mother's deteriorating health, finding it did not meet the Palmer test for admitting new evidence on appeal.

The applicant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 577 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the Attorney General's power to direct an indictment without providing reasons or a preliminary hearing violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, holding that binding precedent establishes there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing and that core prosecutorial discretion, including the decision to direct an indictment, is not subject to routine judicial review absent an abuse of process.

Djamila Panzo and Jeremy Bailey appealed their convictions related to heroin importation and trafficking.

Panzo appealed convictions for importing, conspiracy to import, possession for trafficking, and conspiracy to possess for trafficking.

Bailey appealed convictions for conspiracy to import, possession for trafficking, and conspiracy to possess for trafficking, having been acquitted of importing.

The appellants argued errors in jury instructions regarding party liability, the co-conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule, and motive, as well as unreasonable and inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal found significant errors in the jury instructions that rendered Mr. Bailey's convictions unreasonable and inconsistent, particularly due to a lack of evidentiary foundation for his involvement and improper application of aiding and co-conspirator rules.

Consequently, Mr. Bailey's appeal was allowed, his convictions set aside, and acquittals entered.

Ms. Panzo's appeal was dismissed, as the errors in the jury charge did not directly impact her, and sufficient evidence supported her convictions as a principal.

The media parties sought to terminate or vary sealing orders related to Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for search warrants in a high-profile murder and terrorism case.

The Crown and the accused, Nathaniel Veltman, sought to maintain significant restrictions to protect fair trial rights and privacy.

The court applied the Sherman test, finding a serious risk to fair trial rights and privacy due to widespread pre-trial publicity.

The court ordered a publication ban on broad swathes of evidence and a limited sealing order on highly sensitive personal and graphic information, concluding these measures were necessary and proportionate to balance open court principles with fair trial rights and privacy.

The appellant, Justice Okojie, appealed his convictions for importing and possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The primary ground of appeal concerned when the offence of importing is complete, particularly in controlled delivery scenarios, arguing it was complete before his involvement.

The second ground challenged the reasonableness of the verdict, asserting that his knowledge of the package containing a controlled substance was not the only reasonable inference.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, clarifying that importing is complete when the contraband is no longer under the control of customs authorities, and upholding the trial judge's finding of knowledge based on circumstantial evidence.

The appellant was convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking after a controlled delivery of a package from China.

On appeal, she raised several grounds, including errors in jury instructions on importing, circumstantial evidence, and after-the-fact conduct, as well as the unreasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds but allowed the appeal based on two errors: the trial judge improperly permitted the Crown to invite an adverse inference against the appellant for testifying after another defence witness, and the trial judge erred in dismissing the appellant's application to adduce evidence of a known third-party suspect.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.