Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant appealed a child protection judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, emphasizing that the best interests of children require child protection matters to proceed expeditiously.

The court noted that permitting the appeal to proceed would delay final resolution contrary to policy imperatives, and that the appeal had very little merit.

The Special Investigation Unit (SIU), a non-party to the civil action, appealed an order requiring it to produce an unedited copy of its investigation file, specifically the SIU Director's Report to the Attorney General.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in determining the report was relevant.

The court held that the information in the report was derivative of other sources in the file, and the Director's legal analysis and lead investigator's assessment were not relevant to any material issue in the action.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic cocaine and oxycodone, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, and failing to comply with probation orders.

He was sentenced to a global term of seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of parity with a co-accused's sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and that the sentence was fit given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the differences in his offences compared to the co-accused.

The appellants, three physicians, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable in negligence for the delayed diagnosis and death of a patient from infective endocarditis.

The trial judge found the emergency room resident breached the standard of care by failing to review a SARS form containing critical clinical history, and held the supervising physician vicariously liable.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the supervising physician, as vicarious liability was neither pleaded nor argued at trial.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal regarding the resident's breach of the standard of care and the trial judge's causation findings, concluding that the evidence supported the determination that a timely diagnosis would have prevented the patient's death.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the Crown's improper cross-examination rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the Crown improperly and repeatedly cross-examined the appellant about his co-accuseds' motives to fabricate their testimony.

The trial judge failed to provide an adequate correcting instruction and instead reinforced the improper questioning in his summary of the evidence.

As credibility and identification were central to the case, the court found an appearance of unfairness and inferred actual prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a wrongful dismissal judgment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact that there was no consideration.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred regarding mitigation, as ongoing litigation alone did not justify the respondent's refusal to accept a recall to work, absent evidence of a poisoned workplace.

The Court declined to consider promissory estoppel as it was not raised at trial.

The appeal was allowed in part, reducing the notice period to eight months, with costs of the appeal awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision regarding the administration of an estate, and the respondent cross-appealed seeking the removal of the estate trustee.

The Court of Appeal varied the judgment to provide that all remaining funds be held back until the final passing of accounts, but otherwise dismissed the appeal.

The cross-appeal was dismissed as it was impractical to insert a new estate trustee on the eve of the passing of accounts.

The appellants appealed a decision setting aside a stay of proceedings granted by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the officer's conduct might have justified a finding of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not the only remedy available.

The court emphasized that a stay is a prospective remedy of last resort, and lesser remedies, such as disregarding the officer's testimony or addressing disclosure issues, were sufficient to remove any prejudice.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for uttering threats to cause bodily harm and to damage property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was supported by testimony and extensive audio recordings.

The court also refused leave to appeal the sentence of one month imprisonment and three years' probation, finding it fit.

The appellant appealed her sentence, arguing it was harsh and excessive.

The sentencing judge had imposed a custodial sentence and a lifetime driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the appellant's appalling record for related offences and the danger she posed to the public.

However, the Court held that under s. 259(2)(c) of the Criminal Code, the driving prohibition had to be limited to three years.

The appeal was allowed in part to reduce the driving prohibition to three years, and dismissed in all other respects.

The appellants appealed their convictions for an armed robbery of a restaurant.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellants' proximity to the getaway van shortly after the robbery.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge could infer the appellants were in the van, concluding they were the robbers was not the only rational inference.

Evidence showed at least three people were in the van, and DNA from other individuals was found inside.

The trial judge erred by failing to consider other possible combinations of perpetrators.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals were entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge misapplied the standard of proof, subjected the complainant's evidence to a different standard of scrutiny, and failed to consider his mistaken belief in consent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge provided detailed reasons, properly scrutinized both parties' evidence, and correctly concluded there was no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief in consent.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order, arguing he faced a serious risk of torture if returned to Arkansas due to solitary confinement and potential sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister's decision to extradite without assurances was not unreasonable as the applicant presented no evidence to support his claims.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that a special jury instruction was required for his post-offence conduct and that simple possession should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that possession was a continuing offence and there was no air of reality to the simple possession theory.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle by refusing a conditional sentence.

The appellant, Tarion Warranty Corporation, appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that allowed the respondent's appeal from convictions and sentences imposed at an ex parte trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the appeal judge erred by allowing the appeal on grounds not raised by the respondent and without giving the appellant an opportunity to address concerns regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence.

However, because there were serious gaps in the evidentiary record regarding the admissibility of business records, the Court of Appeal declined to restore the convictions.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment of the appeal judge was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Provincial Offences Appeal Court for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, assaulting a police officer, failing to comply with a recognizance, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended inconsistencies in the police officers' evidence and failed to properly address allegations of police collusion and fabrication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately addressed the inconsistencies and reasonably concluded that the officers did not fabricate their evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting the identification evidence of a police officer who identified him from a store video.

The officer had interacted with the appellant on the night of his arrest, taking photos and paying attention to his features.

The Court of Appeal found no error, holding that the officer's prior acquaintance with the appellant, though not lengthy, was sufficient for admissibility, with its duration going to weight.

The court also found no unfairness regarding the photos and noted that minor inconsistencies in the officers' evidence were matters for the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

This was a sentence appeal from the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness in sentencing because the trial judge imposed a sentence considerably above the Crown's submission without inviting further submissions and refused to allow the appellant to speak before sentence.

The Court of Appeal found it sufficient to resolve the appeal on those two issues.

Given the time already served and the appellant's continuing commitment to treatment, leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was reduced to time served, with probation terms remaining in force subject to any future variation application.

The appellant appealed a murder conviction arising from a circumstantial case centred on bloody palm prints found on a garage wall near the deceased's body.

He argued that an extract from his post-arrest police statement should have been admitted as a prior consistent statement to rebut alleged recent fabrication or, alternatively, under the spontaneous reaction exception recognized in Edgar.

The court held that the Crown's cross-examination alleged only that the appellant was lying because he was the perpetrator, not that some later event created a motive to fabricate, so the traditional exception did not apply.

The statement was also inconsistent with the appellant's trial account on the critical timing of the light switch and there was no evidentiary foundation to establish spontaneity or that it was made when first confronted with the accusation.

The court also rejected the complaint about instructions concerning an alternative suspect, finding no evidence connected that witness to the killing.

The young person appellant was arrested for possession of stolen property and gave a videotaped statement to police.

During the interview, the appellant began discussing unrelated and more serious offences, including break and enter and theft of marijuana.

The police continued questioning without re-advising the appellant of his right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal held that while the initial caution complied with the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the police violated the appellant's section 10(b) Charter rights by failing to re-advise him when his jeopardy increased.

The appeal was allowed in part, and a new trial was ordered for the more serious charges.