Suhail A.Q. Akhtar

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, brought a Charter application to exclude text messages extracted from a seized cell phone, alleging multiple s. 8 breaches.

The court dismissed arguments that the police failed to file timely Reports to Justice, conducted an unlawful warrantless search during intake, and relied on a facially invalid warrant.

Although the Crown conceded a minor s. 8 breach because the police retrieved the phone from a locker 25 minutes after the warrant's time window expired, the court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was minimal and the evidence highly reliable.

The applicants, charged with human trafficking and related offences, brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 37 months.

The court deducted periods of defence-caused delay, bringing the net delay below the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

Furthermore, the court found that exceptional circumstances, including a complainant's disruptive conduct at the preliminary inquiry, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the overall complexity of the multi-accused case, justified the delay.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent on a charge of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent had struck and killed a cyclist after entering an intersection on a red light.

The preliminary inquiry judge found sufficient evidence of the actus reus but discharged the respondent, concluding that his 9-10 seconds of inattention was merely momentary and lacked the requisite mens rea.

The Superior Court found the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by misapprehending the law on mens rea, specifically by focusing solely on the brevity of the inattention rather than whether a reasonable person would foresee the risks, and by failing to consider the whole of the evidence.

The application was granted, the discharge quashed, and the respondent committed for trial.

The applicant sought bail pending an extradition hearing arising from allegations of online sexual communications with minors, extortion, and recorded sexual acts.

The court held that although the Crown's case was strong and the allegations were grave, strict release terms, house arrest, sureties, reporting, internet prohibitions, and prior compliance with similar bail conditions sufficiently addressed the secondary ground.

Applying the tertiary ground framework, the court found public confidence in the administration of justice would not be undermined by release, particularly given the applicant's earlier compliance on bail in related domestic proceedings.

Bail was granted on stringent conditions.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg, arguing her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached because noise in a police privacy booth prevented meaningful communication with duty counsel.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant told police she understood the advice and failed to diligently pursue her rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no error in finding no 'special circumstances' required police to re-advise her of her rights, and that the trial judge's comments about a lack of prior complaints regarding the booth were merely obiter.

The Crown sought certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the accused on two counts of indecent assault, and to compel the judge to proceed with the inquiry.

The preliminary inquiry judge had refused an adjournment requested by the Crown, which was necessary because the complainant was unwilling to testify remotely due to privacy concerns, and the judge erroneously believed he lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions or accommodate an in-person hearing.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors by failing to recognize his inherent powers to safeguard proceedings, relying on irrelevant factors (Crown's non-use of s. 545(1) of the Criminal Code), and misapplying the Darville adjournment test by introducing speculative future conditions.

The application was granted, the discharge order quashed, and the preliminary inquiry judge was directed to proceed.

David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, accused of first-degree murder, applied to deliver an opening address to the jury immediately after the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that such a request is a matter of judicial discretion, not a constitutional right, and should only be granted in special or unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances present, citing concerns about the defence's ability to commit to evidence not yet determined and the risk of the opening address straying into argument.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The appeal court found the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the complainant's testimony, misapplied the legal principles relating to consent by accepting implied consent, and erred in finding an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The trial judge's errors led to a finding of reasonable doubt where none should have existed.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Stefan Ryan, facing a multi-count indictment for assaults including attempted murder, sought to sever counts related to unidentified victims from those with named victims.

The alleged assaults occurred within a two-hour timeframe in close proximity.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding a significant factual and evidentiary overlap between the counts.

The judge determined that separating the counts would result in nearly identical, lengthy trials, impairing trial efficiency and the truth-seeking function.

The court also noted that the risk of prejudice was mitigated by the fact that the trial would be by judge alone.

The applicant, having been convicted of offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and having had her appeals dismissed, applied for a writ of habeas corpus alleging unlawful detention.

The court applied the two-part test from R. v. Olson and found no reasonable and probable grounds for the complaint.

The grounds raised had either been previously dismissed at trial and on appeal, or were the subject of a pending application to re-open her appeal.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail under s. 469 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed release on the secondary and tertiary grounds, citing the applicant's serious criminal record and the gravity of the offence.

The court found that the Crown's case was weak, relying entirely on recanted statements from an unsavoury witness obtained during a 'Mr. Big' operation, which contradicted objective evidence.

The court concluded the applicant met his onus on both grounds and granted release on strict house arrest conditions with sureties.

The accused, Muhammad Hassan, applied for a bail review after being detained on charges of possession of a loaded restricted firearm and cocaine for trafficking.

The application was based on a material change in circumstances, as prior drug-related charges had been acquitted or stayed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed sureties (brother-in-law and family friend) and electronic monitoring plan were insufficient to address the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court emphasized the seriousness of the current charges, the applicant's history of bail breaches while on prior release, and the limited effectiveness of electronic monitoring without strong supervision.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge refused to hold a voir-dire to assess the competency of a conditionally accredited Amharic interpreter.

The trial judge insisted that a fully accredited interpreter was mandatory and invited the Crown to call no evidence when one could not be provided.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that there is no constitutional right to a fully accredited interpreter, only a competent one, and that the trial judge was obligated to conduct a voir-dire to determine competency under section 14 of the Charter.

The Black Action Defence Committee applied for leave to intervene in a subpoena motion and procedendo application related to an ongoing criminal trial.

The accused, charged with human trafficking, alleged racial profiling and subpoenaed a police officer to testify.

The officer applied to quash the subpoena.

The proposed intervenor sought to make submissions on racial profiling.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that interventions in criminal proceedings are rare and the proposed intervenor would not offer a contribution beyond what the accused could already provide.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges, arguing the trial judge erred in excluding breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The respondent had fled a car accident and was found hiding in her parents' shed after police conducted a warrantless search of her own home next door.

The Superior Court of Justice upheld the trial judge's finding that the warrantless search of the respondent's home violated s. 8 and was sufficiently connected to the discovery of the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80 care and control' after being found asleep in his parked vehicle, which was blocking a commercial driveway.

The trial judge convicted him on the basis that the vehicle's position created a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, satisfying the third limb of the test for care and control.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the risk of danger.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought a Charter challenge against ss. 278.92, 278.93, and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

These provisions required the defence to disclose private records to the complainant and permitted the complainant to participate in the admissibility hearing.

The court found that the overbreadth of s. 278.92, the mandated disclosure of the accused's defence to the complainant, and the complainant's participation in the evidentiary process significantly impaired the accused's right to a fair trial and undermined the Crown's constitutional role.

The court declared ss. 278.92, 278.94(2), and 278.94(3) unconstitutional and of no force and effect under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The statements primarily concerned the accused's anger towards the deceased and the accused allegedly stealing the deceased's apartment keys.

The court applied the framework from Bradshaw and Khelawon to assess substantive reliability, using corroborative evidence where appropriate.

The court admitted the statements made to the deceased's sister, a close friend, the building superintendent, and the property manager, finding them reliable.

However, statements made to the deceased's boyfriend and another friend were excluded due to reliability concerns and unclear declarant identity.

During a trial for first degree murder, the defence applied to exclude utterances made by one co-accused to a friend, arguing they were more prejudicial than probative to the other co-accused.

The Crown also sought to admit text messages extracted from the co-accused's phone.

The court ruled that the utterances were admissible, as their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and juries are presumed to follow instructions limiting the use of such evidence against a co-accused.

The court also ruled that the text messages were admissible, finding that the Crown had met the modest threshold for authentication under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act through direct and circumstantial evidence.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, the applicant co-accused brought a pre-trial motion to adduce evidence of the respondent co-accused's prior discreditable conduct through Crown witnesses.

The applicant sought to introduce this evidence to support a cutthroat defence and explain her state of mind.

The court reviewed various proposed items of evidence, ruling some admissible (such as prior violence towards the applicant and possession of a firearm) and others inadmissible (such as drug use, out-of-court statements, and speculative intimidation) based on relevance and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.