Russell G. Juriansz

This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a former wife's application for spousal support and equalization of net family properties under the Family Law Act.

The motion judge had dismissed the application, finding that a Lebanese annulment of the marriage deprived the Ontario court of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in law, clarifying that a "former spouse" under s. 7 of the Family Law Act is not restricted to those divorced in Canada, and foreign corollary relief proceedings do not remove the Ontario Superior Court's jurisdiction over equalization claims.

The appellant withdrew her claim for spousal support.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Superior Court for consideration of the equalization claim.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against a Human Rights Tribunal Vice-Chair under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action sought damages for alleged misconduct during a human rights hearing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the respondent was immune from suit as the claim disclosed no cause of action.

The court also found no breach of fairness in dismissing the claim without submissions, given the action's inability to succeed.

This is a Crown appeal concerning entrapment in an undercover police operation (Project Raphael) targeting individuals seeking sexual services from juveniles online.

The trial judge initially dismissed the respondent's entrapment application but later granted a stay of proceedings after the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ahmad.

The Court of Appeal examined whether the police conducted a bona fide inquiry and properly applied the entrapment doctrine in virtual spaces.

The court found the police had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on Backpage and that the investigation's scope was sufficiently narrowed, despite a large number of "innocent" persons being virtue-tested.

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the stay of proceedings.

This appeal arose from convictions for child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, stemming from Project Raphael, an undercover police investigation targeting demand for juvenile sexual services.

The appellant, Temitope Dare, appealed his convictions on two grounds: that the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding the mental element of belief (linking it to reading text messages) and that the trial judge erred in dismissing his entrapment application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the jury instructions, when read holistically, were not misleading regarding the requirement of belief, and rejecting the entrapment argument based on reasons provided in a related case.

This is an appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant, Muhammad Abbas Jaffer, was convicted of child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, stemming from an undercover police operation (Project Raphael).

He appealed on grounds of entrapment, arguing both opportunity-based and inducement-based entrapment, and that his sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the police operation did not constitute entrapment and that the trial judge's sentence was fit, adequately considering aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant, Erhard Haniffa, appealed his convictions for child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, arguing entrapment, misapplication of the Kienapple principle, and s. 11(b) Charter delay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding conviction, Kienapple, entrapment, and s. 11(b) applications.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, setting aside the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a stayed count and remitting the matter for sentencing on the correct count.

The appellant appealed an order striking his application challenging an Ontario Securities Commission regulation that allows individuals to purchase stocks in the "exempt market" based on minimum income and net worth thresholds.

The appellant argued that "economic class" should be recognized as an analogous ground under s. 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The motion judge struck the application, finding the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, agreeing that the appellant failed to plead sufficient facts to establish "economic class" as an analogous ground, as it lacked the characteristics of immutability or constructive immutability, and the group had not suffered historic disadvantage or stereotyping.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This case involves a motion to quash an appeal in a mortgage priorities dispute.

The appellant, a second mortgagee, sought to appeal an application judge's determination regarding the enforceability and priority of charges under the first mortgage.

The respondent, the first mortgagee, moved to quash the appeal, arguing the order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the order was interlocutory because the "very subject matter" of the litigation, specifically the enforceability and priority of the mortgage, had not been finally determined, as a trial of an issue regarding fraud was still pending.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed.

The defendants (appellants) appealed a motion judge's order that dismissed their motion to dismiss a solicitor's negligence action for lack of legal capacity.

The plaintiff (respondent) had sued the appellants in his personal capacity, alleging negligence in an appeal they handled for his late brother's Estate.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error by not addressing who retained the appellants; it was the Estate, not the plaintiff personally.

Therefore, the plaintiff lacked the personal capacity to bring the solicitor's negligence claim.

The appeal was allowed, and the action dismissed.

The appellant, JC, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and extortion, which arose from allegations that he threatened to post a sexually explicit video of the complainant (HD) if she did not continue a sexual relationship with him.

JC had been acquitted of initial sexual assault and voyeurism charges related to the video's creation due to reasonable doubt about HD's capacity to consent.

On appeal, JC argued the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypes to reject his testimony about seeking consent and his theory that HD fabricated allegations to protect her relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed material errors by using ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypes to discredit JC's evidence on consent, and by mischaracterizing and rejecting JC's motive theory based on stereotypical reasoning and the complainant's willingness to endure trial.

The errors were deemed material and not harmless.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

Her Majesty the Queen appealed the acquittals of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the statutory prerequisite of "reasonable steps" in ascertaining consent, as required by s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, when assessing the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittals, and ordered a new trial, as the trial judge's reasons lacked sufficient clarity on factual and credibility findings to permit entering convictions.

The appellant, Shawn Orange, appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The primary ground of appeal was that the transcript of the trial judge's oral reasons was uncertified due to alleged substantive changes by the judge.

The Court of Appeal rejected this, finding the transcript accurate and the judge's edits permissible within the scope allowed for trial judges.

The court also dismissed alternative grounds of appeal, finding the trial judge's factual and credibility findings amply supported by the evidence.

The appeal from convictions was dismissed.

The appeal from sentence was allowed by consent to subtract time spent on bail pending appeal from the driving prohibition.

The appellant, S.H., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The core issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misapplied the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis regarding reasonable doubt in credibility cases, despite correctly citing the principles.

The Court of Appeal found that, reading the trial judge's reasons as a whole, it could be inferred that the judge rejected the appellant's exculpatory testimony entirely, rendering it incapable of raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, N.K., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, criminal harassment, and uttering threats, and his global sentence of five years and 11 months incarceration.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) principle, assessment of credibility, and calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or application of the W.(D.) principle.

However, the appeal from sentence was allowed in part; the pre-sentence custody credit was varied from five months to six months and one day, and the victim fine surcharge of $800 was set aside.

The appellant appealed convictions for attempted murder, assault of a police officer with intent to resist arrest, and firearm offences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for attempted murder and assault police, finding the trial judge erred in inferring specific intent for attempted murder given the circumstances (distance, lack of motive, possibility of unintended target) and erred in convicting for assault police based on recklessness rather than specific intent.

The firearm convictions were upheld.

The aggravated assault charge, previously stayed, was remitted to the trial judge for conviction and sentencing.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondents, Floriano Daponte and Vivian Hamilton, who were charged with drug and weapon offences.

The trial judge had found a s. 11(b) Charter right infringement based on a 30.5-month net delay, exceeding the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The Crown argued that a 3-month delay caused by the respondents' certiorari application should have been deemed an exceptional circumstance and deducted, bringing the delay below the ceiling.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge erred by focusing on the Crown's position on only one count of the certiorari application.

With the deduction, the delay was 27.5 months, placing the onus on the respondents to show unreasonable delay.

The Court found the respondents failed to demonstrate that the case "markedly exceeded its reasonable time requirements," despite their diligence and some Crown disclosure issues and local resource shortages.

The appeal was allowed, and the stay set aside.

The appellant appealed his conviction for break and enter and theft, which was based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the evidence, while suspicious, was equally consistent with the appellant becoming involved with the stolen vehicle after the break-in and thefts had occurred.

The court determined that the inferences necessary to prove possession of the vehicle or participation in the initial crimes could not be reasonably drawn, and therefore, the trier of fact could not reasonably be satisfied that guilt was the only reasonable conclusion.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault and appealed both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's similar fact evidence ruling or credibility assessment.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, deeming the 14-month concurrent sentence fit given the serious nature of the crimes against very young victims.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years, less credit for pre-sentence custody, received after convictions for impaired driving, dangerous driving, failing to stop while pursued by police, and driving while disqualified.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to fully apply Gladue principles when considering his criminal record, suggesting previous sentences established an artificially high baseline.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the sentence, noting the trial judge carefully reviewed the Gladue report, considered systemic factors, and that the "step up" principle was not applied.

The paramount consideration was the protection of other road users.

The appeal was allowed only to the extent of setting aside the victim surcharge; in all other respects, it was dismissed.

The appellant sought to overturn the denial of an interlocutory injunction aimed at preventing the enforcement of a trespass notice issued by the respondent university.

The notice was impeding the appellant's studies and jeopardizing his student visa status, pending a Human Rights Tribunal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the application judge's assessment of evidence or misapplication of the interlocutory injunction test.

The court upheld the finding that the balance of convenience favored the university, given the serious threats perceived and the inadequacy of the medical information provided by the appellant.