Robert L. Maranger

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault and one count of mischief, arguing that the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence and improperly used bad character evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to high deference, particularly given corroborating evidence such as an audio recording.

The court also determined that the trial judge's comments on the accused's behavior while intoxicated were findings of fact based on the totality of evidence, not improper propensity reasoning, and that the judge was aware of the limited use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The accused, C.R., was sentenced after being convicted of 10 counts of abuse against four of his children, including aggravated assault (tattooing), assault with a weapon (knife), assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and simple assault.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, C.R.'s personal circumstances, and aggravating and mitigating factors, with primary consideration given to denunciation and deterrence as mandated for offences against children.

The Crown sought 6-7 years incarceration, while the defence sought 2-2.5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years incarceration, crediting 35 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 3 years and 330 days in a penitentiary.

The sentence was broken down into concurrent and consecutive terms for the various counts.

The applicants sought to re-open the issue of the validity of a search warrant and rescind a Sending Order made under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act.

They relied on fresh evidence that a related search warrant in British Columbia, based on the same Request to Send from Belgium, had been set aside due to a misleading police affidavit.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Ontario police affidavit did not suffer from the same deficiencies as the British Columbia affidavit and that the Request to Send provided sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to believe an offence had been committed under Belgian law.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total time from the charges to the anticipated end of the second trial was 53 months.

The court deducted 10 months of defence delay and 11 months of delay caused by a mistrial, which was deemed an exceptional circumstance.

The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The court heard three motions arising from two related actions involving a former employee and his employer.

The employer moved to strike portions of the employee's constructive dismissal claim and for summary judgment on an outstanding employee loan, while the employee moved for the appointment of a case management judge.

The court declined to strike the pleadings but ordered them sealed, referred the matter for case management, and granted summary judgment for the loan balance of $45,119.05, with enforcement stayed pending the outcome of the constructive dismissal action.

The paternal grandmother and uncle brought an interim motion for access to their 13-year-old grandson and nephew following the death of the child's father.

The mother opposed the motion, citing the child's lack of interest in access.

The court applied the Chapman test, noting that deference should generally be given to the custodial parent's decision unless the parent is acting arbitrarily to imperil a positive relationship.

Finding that the mother was not acting arbitrarily and giving significant weight to the 13-year-old child's wishes, the court dismissed the motion for interim access.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss two actions arising from a motor vehicle accident in Ontario.

The defendant argued that because the deceased and the defendant were residents of Quebec, Quebec's no-fault automobile insurance regime and Civil Code should apply, precluding the tort actions.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the lex loci delicti rule from Tolofson v. Jensen.

The court held that Ontario substantive law applies to torts committed in Ontario, allowing the plaintiffs, including derivative claimants under the Family Law Act, to proceed with their actions.

During pre-trial motions for a first-degree murder trial, the court addressed the accused's refusal to participate, the role of amicus curiae, and the admissibility of a police statement.

The court expanded the role of amicus curiae beyond making legal submissions to ensure a fair trial, given the accused's complete non-participation.

The court also ruled that the accused's statement to police was voluntary.

Although the court found a technical breach of the accused's s. 10(b) Charter rights due to a five-hour delay in facilitating access to counsel, the statement was not excluded under s. 24(2) because the police acted in good faith and the accused ultimately exercised his right to counsel before giving the statement.

The offender was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of second-degree murder following a violent rampage against three women.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, emphasizing denunciation and retribution given the horrific and cold-blooded nature of the crimes.

The court ordered a 20-year period of parole ineligibility for the second-degree murder and directed that the periods of parole ineligibility for all three murders be served consecutively, resulting in a total period of 70 years without parole eligibility.

D.D. was convicted of eight offences, including aggravated assault, sexual assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and failing to provide necessaries of life, against his 11-year-old son.

The court considered aggravating factors such as breach of trust, extreme violence, sexualized nature of abuse, and starvation, and mitigating factors including D.D.'s lack of criminal record and mental health issues (PTSD, depression, anxiety, obsessive-compulsive and narcissistic personality traits).

The court found D.D.'s mental health explained his behaviour but did not cause it, thus prioritizing denunciation and deterrence over rehabilitation.

A global sentence of 15 years' imprisonment was imposed, with specific apportionments for each offence, and various ancillary orders.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $102,898.22 for an alleged breach of a lease agreement by the defendant.

The defendant contended that an early termination clause from the original lease was carried forward into a subsequent lease amending/extension agreement.

The court found that the early termination clause was a specific, time-sensitive provision that had expired and was not implicitly incorporated into the new agreement.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted.

The appellant, John Morrison, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm on two grounds: reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge and misapprehension of evidence.

The appeal court reviewed the trial judge's interventions during cross-examination of a vulnerable witness and her comment about 'setting up an appeal,' concluding that an informed person would not find a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Regarding the misapprehension of evidence concerning a defence witness's criminal record, the court found it was a factual error that did not impact the substantive issues or result in a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a financial advisor, pleaded guilty to 19 counts of fraud totaling over $2.8 million, primarily against senior citizens who were his trusted clients.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the magnitude, complexity, duration, number of victims, significant impact on victims, and breach of trust.

Mitigating factors included guilty pleas and expressed desire to repay.

General deterrence and denunciation were identified as primary sentencing principles for large-scale frauds.

The court imposed a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment, a restitution order for the defrauded amounts, a fine in lieu of forfeiture, and a prohibition order from managing others' property.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay and deducting defence-attributable delay.

The court found that, after attributing 7 months of delay to the defence, the total delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

Alternatively, even if the delay exceeded the ceiling, the case presented exceptional transitional circumstances due to its complexity and multi-accused nature, justifying a trial on the merits.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendants, Lakehead University and Gordon Hayman, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff, a PhD graduate, sued the university and his professor for breach of contract and negligence, alleging unreasonable delays in dissertation review.

The court granted the motion, striking the claim without leave to amend, on the basis that disputes between students and universities regarding academic matters are not subject to breach of contract or tort claims.

The applicants, Valdrin Basha and Anton Dokaj, jointly charged with drug and firearms offences, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

Applying the framework established in R. v. Jordan, the court found that the total delay for Basha (29 months and 10 days) and Dokaj (28 months) fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters.

The court determined that neither applicant demonstrated that the case took "markedly longer to conclude than it should have" or that the delay caused significant prejudice beyond the inherent nature of the charges.

The court also rejected Dokaj's argument regarding severance, finding that trying the co-accused together was in the interests of justice due to overlapping evidence and the risk of inconsistent verdicts.

Both applications for a stay of proceedings were dismissed.

The offender was sentenced for failing to provide the necessaries of life and assault with a weapon against her 11-year-old son.

While her husband committed horrific acts of torture and abuse against the child, the offender was convicted for her failure to protect the child and intervene over a six-month period.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing her to 3 years' imprisonment, less 19 months of pre-trial custody credit, resulting in 17 months left to serve.

The plaintiff tenant brought an action against the defendant landlord for wrongful termination of a commercial lease for a dry cleaning business.

The landlord brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and for judgment on its counterclaim for damages.

The court found that the tenant was on a month-to-month tenancy and had breached the lease by failing to comply with regulations governing dry cleaning businesses.

The court held that the lease was lawfully terminated, dismissed the plaintiff's claim, and granted the landlord's counterclaim for damages, reducing the claim for rent arrears.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the statement of defence and dismiss the counterclaim of the subject defendants due to their failure to pay prior costs awards and answer undertakings from discoveries.

The court declined to strike the pleadings immediately, opting instead to give the defendants one final opportunity to comply.

The court ordered a stay of proceedings until the defendants pay the outstanding costs and answer the undertakings by specified deadlines, failing which their pleadings will be struck without further notice.

The appellant appealed his conviction for committing an indecent act in a public place.

The appellant had masturbated in his workplace after hours, believing he was alone.

The trial judge convicted him on the basis of wilful blindness, finding he had a positive obligation to verify no one was present.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge erred in law by failing to apply the W.D. framework to assess the appellant's testimony, which negated a finding of wilful blindness.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.