Robert L. Maranger

This decision provides the reasons for various pre-trial and trial motions in a criminal case where the accused, Alam Buoc, was ultimately convicted of two counts of second-degree murder and one count of attempted murder after a 12-week jury trial.

Key rulings included the refusal to discharge a juror despite pre-trial publicity, the allowance of remote witness testimony due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the dismissal of a s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, with significant delay attributed to the accused's conduct and the pandemic.

The court also admitted hearsay statements under the res gestae exception and detailed the extensive role of amicus curiae in assisting the self-represented accused throughout the complex proceedings, which included a mistrial due to the pandemic.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for damages arising from childhood sexual abuse, arguing the claim was barred by a prior settlement and consent order in Family Court.

The plaintiff argued she was a party under disability at the time and the settlement did not comply with Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prior settlement was not approved by a judge as required by Rule 7.08, was improvident, and lacked proper supporting materials.

The court held that strict compliance with Rule 7.08 is necessary to protect parties under disability, and therefore the prior order did not bind the plaintiff or bar her action.

The appellant appealed his sentence for mischief under $5000 after pleading guilty to vandalizing an 87-year-old woman's vehicle.

The sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months of probation, rejecting the appellant's request for a conditional discharge.

On appeal, the appellant argued the judge failed to apply the principle of restraint.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was fit and within the judge's discretion given the need for denunciation.

The two accused were charged with multiple firearms and driving offences following a drive-by shooting and subsequent high-speed police chase.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, as the accused were arrested in the suspect vehicle shortly after the shooting, and gunshot residue was found on their hands.

The driver testified that two unknown passengers committed the shooting and fled the vehicle before the police stopped them.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, applying the W.(D.) and Villaroman frameworks, and found both accused guilty of the firearms offences and the driver guilty of the driving offences, but acquitted the driver of resisting arrest due to inconsistent police testimony.

The Crown applied to designate the respondent a dangerous offender following his convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, choking, and unlawful confinement.

The court reviewed the respondent's extensive criminal history, institutional behavior, and psychiatric assessments.

The court found that the respondent met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of repetitive and persistent aggressive behavior.

However, noting some recent improvements and the possibility of managing his risk in the community, the court imposed a determinate sentence of 15 years and 9 months, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order, rather than an indeterminate sentence.

The applicant, a retired television broadcaster charged with criminal harassment, sought a publication ban on his name, arguing that publication would violate his rights under sections 7 and 11(d) of the Charter and cause irreparable damage to his reputation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the Charter does not protect a privacy interest to prevent media publication of an accused's name, nor does publication compromise the presumption of innocence.

The court also held that the common law Mentuck test was not met, as the applicant's concerns were purely personal and lacked a public interest component.

This decision concerns a bail application by Isaah Picody-Naveau, who is charged with second-degree murder and other criminal code offences, including domestic violence.

The applicant sought bail under sections 515 and 522 of the Criminal Code, while the Crown applied under section 524(8) to cancel his prior release.

The court considered the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention.

Despite the applicant's history of breaching release orders and violent temper, the court granted bail.

Key factors influencing the decision included the significant time spent in custody (over 315 days), a compelling Gladue report highlighting intergenerational trauma and a difficult upbringing, a strong proposed release plan relying on family sureties and GPS monitoring, and the perceived weakness of the Crown's second-degree murder case, particularly regarding the mens rea element.

The court emphasized the presumption of innocence and the right to reasonable bail as articulated in R. v. Antic.

The accused, Alam Buoc, applied for a mistrial in his ongoing jury trial for two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder.

The trial, which began in February 2020, was adjourned in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Subsequent delays, juror discharges due to age and health concerns, a juror's injury, another juror's employment issues, and new government restrictions in Ottawa due to a second wave of COVID-19, cumulatively impacted the fairness of the trial process.

Despite the Crown's opposition, the court declared a mistrial, finding no other remedy for the fundamental flaws that had arisen.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from a stabbing at a wedding reception.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in applying the law of self-defence.

The Superior Court of Justice found the trial judge correctly applied the three-part test for self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code and reasonably concluded the appellant's response was disproportionate and not a justified act of self-defence.

The appeal against conviction was dismissed, though the victim fine surcharge was set aside.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter by a jury for his role as an aider and abettor in a shooting death.

The Crown sought a sentence of 6 to 8 years and a Long-Term Offender (LTO) designation.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew about the firearm prior to its use.

The court sentenced the accused to 4 years imprisonment, which was satisfied by pre-sentence custody, followed by 3 years of probation.

The LTO application was dismissed, as the court was not satisfied the accused posed a substantial risk to violently reoffend.

The accused stood trial for dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after his tow truck collided with a car at an intersection, killing the driver and injuring the passenger.

The Crown alleged the accused was speeding and ran a red light.

Based on eyewitness testimony, physical evidence, accident reconstruction, and event data recorder information, the court found the accused was driving between 95-110 km/h in a 40 km/h zone and entered the intersection on a red light.

The court concluded this conduct was a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The Crown appealed a sentence of 90 days intermittent imprisonment and two years' probation imposed on the respondent for assault causing bodily harm.

The respondent and a friend had assaulted the victim under the mistaken belief that the victim was breaking into vehicles.

The Crown argued the sentencing judge misapprehended the victim's brain injury, improperly treated the respondent's 911 call as mitigating, and erred in applying the principle of proportionality.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the sentencing judge's factual findings or application of principles, and concluding the sentence was within the judge's discretion and entitled to deference.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Court of Justice's decision to confirm the revocation of his firearms license by a Chief Firearms Officer.

The revocation was based on five incidents, including two from his youth (one involving a diversion program) and three from adulthood.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a reasonableness standard of review, upheld the lower court's decision.

The court found that even if the youth diversion record was inadmissible under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the remaining adult incidents were sufficient to support the reasonableness of the revocation.

The appeal was dismissed, but the court suggested a remedial program for future license restoration.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking a final order for primary residence of the two children, specified access for the respondent mother, and an adjustment of Family Responsibility Office (FRO) support payments with an imputed income of $50,000 for the mother.

The respondent mother resisted the change in parenting time and requested a family assessment.

The court granted the father primary residence, ordered access in accordance with the children's expressed wishes, and allowed the father to register the children in counselling without the mother's consent.

The court imputed an annual income of $35,000 to the mother for child and spousal support calculations from January 2018 onward, adjusting support arrears and payments accordingly.

The mother's request for a family assessment was denied.

This case concerned the validity of Annie Doris Wotton's 2010 will, challenged by her son's litigation guardian on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity.

The applicant, a beneficiary and alternate estate trustee, sought to validate the will.

The court found suspicious circumstances, shifting the onus to the applicant to prove capacity.

After weighing a retrospective neuropsychological assessment against the contemporaneous solicitor's notes and testimony, the court concluded that the testatrix possessed testamentary capacity at the time of execution.

The 2010 will was declared valid, and the applicant was named Estate Trustee.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking an order for three consecutive weeks of summer holiday time with his daughter, including permission to travel to Germany.

The respondent mother opposed the motion, arguing for a delay pending a clinician's report from the Ontario Children's Lawyer (OCL) and a suspension of summer access.

The court denied the father's request for international travel and restricted summer access to one-week non-consecutive periods, pending the OCL report.

The decision was based on the child's best interest, considering the high level of parental acrimony, conflicting affidavit evidence regarding the child's relationship with the father, and a recent incident during an access visit.

The court emphasized the value of the OCL report in ascertaining the truth and guiding decisions on parenting time.

The applicant father brought a motion for a finding of contempt against the respondent mother for allegedly failing to abide by an access order concerning their child.

The mother sought an adjournment to obtain a Voice of the Child Report.

The court granted the adjournment, ordered a Voice of the Child Report, and directed the parties to attend reintegration counselling.

The court declined to order immediate face-to-face access, emphasizing the need for more information and the potential detriment of forcing the child's hand at this stage.

The court also referred the matter to a case management justice.

A father's motion for interim access to his four-year-old daughter was granted after a 22-month denial of access by the mother, who alleged chronic severe violence.

The court, prioritizing the child's best interests and the risk of relationship extinguishment, ordered joint custody with primary residence to the mother, and a gradual, supervised access schedule for the father, transitioning to unsupervised.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer was appointed for an assessment.

The accused, Hamze Abdi Ahmed, was charged with assault with a weapon and aggravated assault.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused stabbed the complainant, Jared Kakegamic, or if the complainant stabbed himself during an altercation.

The court found the Crown witnesses credible and rejected the defence's version of events, including the accused's testimony and that of his witnesses, due to inconsistencies and lack of corroboration.

The court relied on the complainant's immediate 911 call, the paramedic's testimony, and Tracy Hultquist's account.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The applicants sought a temporary stay of a Sending Order issued under section 15(1) of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, requesting the imposition of terms and conditions to protect trade secrets and intellectual property.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants failed to demonstrate a serious question to be tried or irreparable harm.

The court reiterated that the Act is a complete code for mutual legal assistance proceedings and that the existing treaty provides sufficient protection, thus precluding additional submissions to the Minister of Justice for further conditions.