Reasons for Sentence

MARANGER, J. (Orally):

D.D. is the father of A.D. He together with his spouse S.D. stood trial on a multi-count indictment for the following offences committed against A.D.: D.D. and S.D. stood jointly charged that between September 1, 2012 and February 12, 2013, they committed three counts of aggravated assault and one count of forcible confinement.

D.D. was further charged that between those same dates he committed sexual assault causing bodily harm, failed to provide the necessaries of life, assault with a weapon namely handcuffs, assault with a weapon namely a wooden stick, assault with a weapon namely a barbeque lighter, careless storage of a firearm, and careless storage of ammunition.

S.D. was further charged of between the same dates she failed to provide the necessaries of life, and committed assault with a weapon namely a wooden spoon.

On November 21, 2016 following several weeks of trial spread out over 10 months, I found S.D. not guilty of the unlawful confinement charge and of the aggravated assault charges. I found her guilty of failing to provide the necessaries of life and guilty on the count of assault with a weapon.

I found D.D. guilty of eight offences including two counts of aggravated assault, one count of assault with a weapon, one count of sexual assault causing bodily harm, one count of unlawful confinement, one count of failing to provide the necessaries of life and two counts relating to the improper storage of ammunition and a firearm.

D.D. is now being sentenced for these offences.

The evidence presented at trial was difficult to sit through, what happened to the victim was outrageous. An 11-year-old boy beginning in the late summer or early fall of 2012 through to mid-February 2013 was at various times shackled and chained to a post in the basement of the family home, naked, starved, tortured with a barbeque lighter (including the burning of his genitals) and beaten. It was his father who tortured, beat and starved the child. The mother stood idly by when she clearly should have done something to stop what was happening. Her crimes in this case were crimes of omission.

At paragraphs 10 and 11 of the trial decision I noted: the evidence presented by the prosecution at this trial to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the child A.D. was abused, confined, burned, beaten, assaulted and starved was unequivocal and overwhelming. What became the central issue for the court to adjudicate was the degree of blame, the degree of criminal responsibility, if any, for the atrocities visited on this defenceless boy.

On January 18, 2017 S.D. was sentenced in a separate hearing to three years' imprisonment. In that decision, I noted: It is important to highlight, in no uncertain terms, that when it comes to the degree of responsibility for what happened to A.D., S.D. and D.D. are worlds apart. Her role in this terrible crime, while not inconsequential, pales in comparison to his.

Position of the parties:

The Crown and defence are very wide apart in terms of the range of penalty they sought to be imposed upon D.D. The Crown submitted that a total sentence of 23 years' imprisonment together with an order under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code where D.D. must serve at least 10 years of his sentence before he is eligible for parole is the appropriate disposition.

Counsel for D.D. submitted that a fit and just sentence would be between five to seven years’ imprisonment with no order for parole ineligibility under s. 743.6.

Sentencing Principles:

As previously stated in the S.D. decision, the amount of media attention this case has generated and the public anger fueled by the notion that a parent could commit such crimes against their own child was in truth difficult to ignore.

A judge’s responsibility however when deciding a proper and just sentence is far more complex than simply to exact vengeance upon a persons convicted of crimes.

As Justice David Paciocco of the Ontario court of Justice now the Court of Appeal eloquently put it in a case of R. v. P.V., 2016 ONCJ 64, at paragraphs 13 to 15:

My task in arriving at a fit sentence is not to choose between these two polarized positions, nor is it a simple exercise in mathematics. Sentencing is a complex exercise to be guided by settled principles of law and precedents.

Specifically, I have to gain a measure of the gravity of the offences and D.D.’s degree of responsibility including any personal factors that might aggravate or mitigate his sentence. Having done so, I am to identify the appropriate priorities the sentence is to be given among the purposes of sentencing identified in s. 718 of the Criminal Code. I am then to craft a fit sentence in light of those objectives and the guiding principles of sentencing with careful regard to the range of sentencing approved in the case law.

This is not a precise exercise, but it is a systematic one that is meant to lead to a fair, just, but humane and purposeful outcome.

Section 718 of the Criminal Code states the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute along with crime prevention initiatives, respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:

(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;

(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;

(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and

(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.”

With respect to the sentencing of offences committed against children the Criminal Code accounts for this under s. 718.01. When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of 18 years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.

In that this was clearly a crime against a child by a parent, the primary consideration in determining the appropriate penalty is denunciation and deterrence. And thus, these two objectives were at the forefront of my mind in deciding a fit and just sentence in this case.

The gravity of D.D.’s offences:

D.D. was convicted of six separate counts directly related to the extreme abuse he perpetrated on his son. At paragraphs 108 to 112 of the trial decision, I made the following findings of fact concerning what was done to A.D. by his father:

The evidence considered as a whole leads me to conclude that A.D. was subjected to corporal punishment including cold showers, being struck and being confined to the basement prior to September of 2012. Following the trip to Florida in September 2012, his father, as a means of punishing him for his “sexualized behaviour,” burned his penis with a barbeque lighter for the first time. From September 2012 to the end of December 2012, as a means of punishing him, A.D. was at various times forced to sleep in a basement and was handcuffed by the wrists and by the legs and shackled to a post to prevent him from being able to leave the basement for extended periods of time. That during this timeframe, he would have been hit by his father and deprived of food.

The level of abuse reached a climax in January and February 2013. I have no doubt that the area of A.D.’s genitals including his inner thigh and testicles were burned with a barbeque lighter on multiple occasions.

During that timeframe, it is clear to me that he was severely deprived of food particularly in the period January 3 to January 27, 2013. The cellphone video evidence demonstrates this unequivocally. He was struck with a wooden object, a board Exhibit 20. He was punched in the face causing a previously broken tooth to break again and with such severity that D.D. injured his own hands. He was handcuffed, shackled by the wrists and by the ankles. When that method of restraint was no longer successful his hands were bound with plastic ties. He sustained long-lasting injuries to his wrists and to his ankles as a result of the use of handcuffs and shackles.

The fact is the level of abuse perpetrated on A.D. by his father D.D. was at the furthest end of the spectrum of cases of this type.

The unequivocal language used by the veteran medical professionals and veteran police officers to describe what they saw when they first witnessed the unclothed, battered 51-pound body of A.D. such as: “a concentration camp survivor”, “horrifying”, “shocking” and “worse case of child abuse I’ve ever seen support this finding.

While there was evidence, both during the trial and at the sentencing hearing to support the proposition that D.D. at various times in his life suffered from anxiety, depression and post traumatic stress disorder. These difficulties will be considered in mitigation of penalty but they do not absolve him of the very high degree of moral blameworthiness in this case. He over the course of six months effectively engaged in a campaign of physically and mentally torturing his 11-year-old son.

I now turn to D.D.’s personal circumstances and which factors I found to be mitigating and aggravating factors in this case.

Mitigating factors:

D.D. like S.D. has no criminal record and has never been involved in the criminal justice system before. In fact, as an RCMP officer he was part of the investigation and enforcement of our criminal justice system. The absence of a criminal record forms a considerable mitigating factor on its own. Exhibit 2 contained a series of reference letters from various people who have known D.D. over the years. The letters seem genuine and heartfelt and are very supportive of him. In general, they seem to indicate that he in their view is a good person. Exhibit 3, filed on behalf of D.D. were documents from his employment including the RCMP, which served to demonstrate that at various points in his life he was a dedicated, hard-working, productive member of society.

With respect to his personal life history in the trial decision at paragraph 136, I made the following observations:

The basis for a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder stems from D.D.’s evidence about his difficult and tumultuous life history. The main highlights of that evidence can be summarized as follows:

D.D. was born in Lebanon in 1971. Lebanon was in a state of war for much of his childhood until the time he left Lebanon at age 16. He witnessed and was a victim of the atrocities of war: beheadings, bombings. He testified that their family home was destroyed by bombings on three occasions. He was seriously injured when a bomb hit their home at the age of 15 resulting in his being hospitalized for one month and a half. During his childhood, D.D. was sexually assaulted on a number of occasions. Between the age of eight and nine he was molested by a teenage neighbour. He was also molested by a young teenager on a school bus. He was molested by two soldiers shortly after that. At the age of 11, he was violently raped by one of his teachers named Pierre. That same night, the teacher had supper with his parents. A priest who was also a family friend attempted to sexually assault him. D.D. recounted Hisham, a troublemaker in D.D.’s class who became the favourite student of the teacher named Pierre. He discovered that during washroom breaks that teacher would follow Hisham so that he would perform oral sex on the teacher. D.D. recounted that at one point he saw Hisham performing oral sex on three or four other students. He detested Hisham. He testified that the memory of this particular boy has always stayed with him, that later on he would equate Andrew with Hisham.

D.D. described his life in Canada and how he adjusted quite well, enjoyed success in the music industry. He then proceeded to describe the tumultuous relationship he had with A.D.’s mother Maryse. He explained how he met her when he was 19 and that she was eight years older than him and how she was sickly and that he had to care for her and financially support her.

D.D. is described how in 1998, he left Canada to pursue his music career in Dubai for two years. He still continued to assist Maryse financially. Upon his return in 2000, after working at a variety of jobs until 2001, he applied to become an RCMP officer.

He described taking care of Maryse while studying to be an RCMP officer, the birth of A.D., how he discovered that she was taking oxycontin while pregnant, how this ended the relationship.

He described his marriage to, to S.D. in 2003 and how her parents did not accept him. He chronicled the custody and access battles over A.D. that he had with Maryse and how he spent over $100,000 in legal fees. He described how he, she made false allegations about his abusing both A.D. and her, how the stress of it all led to the point of giving up custody of A.D.

D.D. described how he became an RCMP officer and how he was treated unfairly by superiors, how he transferred to Ottawa to be part of the anti-terrorist group in 2007. He explained how he grieved some of the wrongdoings and how he ultimately went on sick leave due to the stress. He explained how he then returned and changed divisions.

He described the death of Maryse and getting custody of A.D. in 2009.

After considering these highlights I observed the following at paragraph 138:

It is fair to say that the life story of D.D., the events he lived through and endured, lend themselves to a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder.

In my estimation, the single most important issue for my consideration in terms of a mitigating factor, is the mental health of the offender and how it impacted on the commission of the offences.

During the sentencing hearing two forensic psychiatrists testified.

Dr. Helen Ward who initially examined D.D. between the dates of June 18, 2013 and July 30, 2013 after D.D. had been charged for the present offences, for the purposes of dealing with: “both criminal responsibility and sentencing should it be applicable. And Dr. Bradley Booth, who was court appointed who interviewed D.D. between February 2nd and February 10th, 2017 following his conviction for these offences.

Dr. Ward concluded that two mental disorders contributed substantially to the commission of the offences: PTSD and depression. At page 16 and 17 of her report she indicated the following:

It is my opinion that during the period of the alleged offences D.D. was suffering from two mental disorders both post traumatic stress disorder and a depressive episode.

It is further my opinion that during the three years leading up to (September 2012 - February 2013), D.D.’s view of his son, A.D., had become increasingly distorted. I base this on the apparent discrepancy between what school teachers reported (on report cards and subsequently in police interviews) and what D.D. believed he saw and experienced.

At some point prior to September 2012 D.D. developed full blown cognitive distortions. (Definition: exaggerated or irrational thought pattern that perpetuates the effects of depression and anxiety) with respect to A.D. This included the perception that A.D. was behaving in a deliberate and calculating manner in his refusal to do homework or follow rules without consideration of other alternatives. The refusal on A.D.’s part led to an escalation in D.D.’s behaviour, with increasingly harsh punishment, containment and confinement from October 2012 to February 2013. When A.D. resisted, or outwitted these measures D.D.’s psychological response was to react to him as if he were a predator whom he needed to protect his family from or a threat to be vanquished.

By this time, D.D.’s post traumatic stress disorder and depression were in full force. He was sleeping poorly, and when he did, was experiencing nightmares. He did not feel pleasure or enjoyment in anything. He could not concentrate and he could not eat. He was irritable and hypervigilant. All of these contributed to his tunnel vision and sense of being locked into a battle which he had to win. In my view D.D.’s post traumatic stress disorder and depression contributed substantially to the commission of these offences.

Dr. Ward testified at the sentencing hearing and went so far as to say that the “crime would not have occurred but for post traumatic stress disorder.”

In cross-examination, she accepted the proposition in Dr. Booth’s report that D.D. also had traits of a narcissistic personality disorder.

Dr. Bradley Booth testified and prepared a 40-page report. While his conclusions were similar to Dr. Wards, he did not ascribe the same degree of causality to D.D.’s mental health issues of post traumatic stress disorder and depression in the commission of these offences. Some of the highlights from his report at page 36 indicated the following:

The evidence suggests D.D. had a clear diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder. There was evidence of this on his MMPI-2 in 2000 and he continues to show evidence of this disorder.

At the time of the offences, his post traumatic stress disorder was at a mild to moderate severity. D.D. did have some tendency in recent testing to over-report the severity of illness. However, I think looking at the evidence available that this likely was a factor in at the time of the offences. Over the years, he has had chronic flashbacks and nightmares.

D.D. reported that A.D.’s behaviour reminded him of the young boy in his school, Hisham. He was worried that A.D. would progress to being a sexual predator like the individuals who sexually abused D.D. D.D. and his wife did express this fear to Dr. Plaus in 2009, 2010. Of note, he was working fulltime around that time and reported that he was happy with the change in work suggesting that his mental health symptoms were fairly stable.

As D.D. became increasingly fixated on this idea he got a “confession” from A.D. that he had indeed engaged in promiscuous behaviours. This confirmation could also have triggered distressing memories about his own abuse. That said, D.D. suggested that he suspected inappropriate behaviours for some time. Further, these behaviours were one of the many things that angered D.D. He appeared equally upset about A.D. not doing homework and escaping his lock. Post traumatic stress disorder may also have contributed as a general factor for increasing overall irritability and anger. Although he was able to work in the RCMP for many years without this becoming a major issue, at least when not depressed.

Dr. Booth also discusses certain personality traits that he observed in D.D. that could explain the commission of the offences at page 38:

Regarding his personality makeup, D.D. has some obsessive-compulsive personality traits. This is a character makeup in which individuals are preoccupied with “orderliness, perfectionism and mental and interpersonal control at the expense of flexibility openness and efficiency.”

They often decide the rules in life based on their own analysis and expect others to abide by these rules.

Mr. D confirmed that others observed him as being rules-oriented. He had a rigid attitude around colleagues’ behaviour in the workplace. In the evaluation, he was somewhat pious and rigid in his thinking. He was over inclusive and controlling in the interview. He became irritable when I ran the interview how I thought rather than allowing him to control things.

Dr. Booth concludes his report by saying at page 40:

While D.D. did have depression, post traumatic stress disorder active at the time of his offences, I would note that some less intensive behaviours occurred when pervasive psychiatric issues were not present suggesting a non-psychiatric origin.

D.D. noted relative stability in his mood around the time he was reporting with Dr. Plaus. He was doing well at work. Despite this, he was focused on inappropriate behaviours in his son and concerns that A.D. would become a sexual predator. Further, he was using extreme punishments prior to the index offences.

D.D. said he was raised in a religious setting with hyper-religious beliefs that would be considered “on the fringe.” He approaches life in a pious manner around behaviour. This likely combined with his rigid personality in a dysfunctional manner.

Anger at A.D. separate from psychiatric diagnosis also appeared to be an issue. This was likely worsened by depression and anxiety.

D.D. said he felt somewhat trapped in that there was family pressure, internal pressure to not place A.D. under CAS care. He had advocated to have A.D. under his care and it would have been a failure to have him leave. He does appear to have wanted a relationship with his son and likely did feel that having him under care would have disrupted this.

I have considered both of these reports and the evidence of each of the forensic psychiatrists. Dr. Booth’s finding that the post traumatic stress disorder at the time of offences was of mild to moderate severity seems to correspond to the evidence heard at trial.

One of the most telling pieces of evidence in this trial was the video evidence taken in January 2013 of the victim in the basement being tortured by his father. The offender in that video, far more reflects someone with an obsessive-compulsive narcissistic personality disorder than someone suffering from post traumatic stress disorder. They depict a calm, cool, cruel interrogator certainly unafraid of A.D. and seemingly obsessed with his own sense of right and wrong.

Where an accused can demonstrate that there was a causal link between his mental illness and the commission of the offence, courts have tended to adjust sentencing in favour of the principle of rehabilitation instead of denunciation and deterrence. However, the central issue is whether there is a causal link between the mental illness and criminal behaviour, or whether the mental illness merely provides an explanation for the accused’s behaviour. Establishing a causal link will make mental illness a stronger mitigating factor at sentencing than if the accused’s mental health only serves to explain the accused offending behaviour. See R. v. Babin, 2016 ONSC 2862.

This distinction is captured well in R. v. To, 2015 ONSC 1169, 2015 CarswellOnt 2640 where Durno J explains at paragraph 24:

Where this is a demonstrated link between an offence and a mental health issue, the sentence may be reduced as rehabilitation can play a more prominent role in the sentencing and general deterrence may play a less prominent role where there are mental health issues that caused or contributed to the commission of the offence. In addition, the offender’s moral culpability would not be as high as other persons committing the same offence without a link to a mental illness.

D.D.’s situation is captured by Fradsham J in R. v. A.W.S., 2009 CarswellAlta 1320 at paragraph 39 where he says:

If the disorder effectively compelled the accused to commit the offence, then the court should conclude that the degree of responsibility of the offender is significantly reduced. If, however, the disorder does not in essence compel the commission of the offence, but simply provides an explanation as to why the accused was more vulnerable than others to commit the offence, then the accused’s degree of responsibility is reduced from the high end, but the accused is not absolved from accountability for his or her actions.”

I am of the view that D.D.’s mental health provided some explanation for his behaviour, however it did not cause him to act the way he did.

Based on the above, I am not inclined to make rehabilitation the focus of crafting D.D.’s sentence instead of denunciation and deterrence.

In fact, given the context of the abuse of a position of trust between father and son, in this case denunciation and deterrence must play and will play a preeminent role in sentencing.

That being said, the mental health of the offender, the post traumatic stress disorder, depression, anxiety are factors that I consider to be of moderate weight in mitigation of penalty.

Aggravating factors:

This was a breach of the highest position of trust, a father and his child. The offender at the time of the offence lived in an affluent neighbourhood. He and his spouse had employment and income that would place them in the upper-middle class range of society. He was an educated, intelligent man. He was a police officer. If anyone should have known better it was D.D.

The offences took place over a six-month period. They only ended because of the inner strength and courage of the victim in managing to escape the basement of the family home. It seems most likely that the offences would have continued had he not escaped.

The nature of the offences was aggravating: the systematic use of extreme violence, the sexualized nature of some of the violence, the psychological and physical degradation perpetrated on this child was beyond comprehension.

The child was starved almost to death in a home where food was in abundance and where his two little brothers were receiving all they could ever need or desire.

Finally, A.D. defended his father in the initial stages of the police investigation. The love he had for him was at one time clearly the unconditional love of a son for his father. What he would soon come to realize is the terrible truth that his father stole from him the precious gift of the memories of his childhood and of a family.

Victim impact evidence:

Exhibit 9, filed on behalf of D.D. contains certain observations taken from an affidavit that was filed in child protection proceedings. On the affidavit dated January 10, 2017 it was indicated in part the following:

A.D. was doing really well and adjusted nicely to his new environment. It further indicated that A.D. had positive things to say about his placement. He expressed being happy about his school placement, that he was welcomed by his peers, he was able to make friends easily, that he had a good home routine, that everyone in the home was adjusting well to his integration.

This evidence seems to support my ultimate conclusion in the trial decision that A.D. seems to have risen above what his father did to him. However, I again surmise that despite that courage and inner strength that seems to be a part of the content of his character, he will nonetheless doubtlessly struggle at various points in time and with varying degrees of severity with the memory of a lost childhood and with the physical and mental scars that he must shoulder for the rest of his life.

I have taken into account the victim impact statement of Ms. Lucie Turcott who sat, listened and watched the evidence as it was presented day in, day out of this very painful trial. In her statement, she said the following to D.D.:

We will forever wonder what more we could have or should have done and we could never forget that while A.D. endured unimaginable atrocities, his family was literally a car drive away. Although he has come a long way, the fact that he is a beautiful, funny and intelligent boy makes it dangerously easy to fall into that foggy, comfortable state of denial where everything is okay and the nightmare is over. Au contraire, the internal, invisible damage will take a lifetime to heal.

When this is over everyone will go on with their lives and this nightmare will be but an unpleasant memory. Except A.D. From now until the end of his days, A.D. will live with the hundreds of news articles, television reports and twitter feeds that are archived and accessible to all forever. It would be foolish to think that this curious, highly intelligent boy has not already read these reports and witnessed the complete and total absence of remorse on the part of his father. The lasting reminder to him that in his father’s eyes he is nothing.

Jurisprudence for this type of offence:

The Crown and defence both filed books of authorities. The range of penalty for cases of extreme child abuse such as this one vary widely. Some of the jurisprudence provided by counsel representing Mr. D such as R. v. Brown, [1992] N.J. 348 (Nfld C.A.), R. v. Dinn, 1993 NLCA 8 and R. v. Sundh, [1989] O.J. No. 509 (ON CA), where in cases of fairly serious child abuse, offenders received sentences as low as one to two years’ imprisonment have in my estimation, very little application to this case.

On the other hand, some of the cases filed by the Crown such as R. v. Cheddesingh, 2004 SCC 16, [2004] S.C.J. No. 15, being a manslaughter conviction or R. v. Klair, 2004 ONCA 8965, [2004] O.J. No. 2320 (ON CA) where an arson caused severe injury to a four-year-old do not assist me to any great extent in this case.

Defence counsel did provide the following cases that I found noteworthy. R. v. B.W., [2005] N.J. No. 404. In that case, involving an extreme case of child abuse, Barry J opened his reasons for sentence in the following manner:

Some say we employ the concept of evil to explain the inexplicable. A mother breaking her daughters’ bones and leaving the two little girls bound hand and foot by masking tape in a cold bedroom night after night defies explanation. In this case, the extreme physical abuse and neglect of two children by their mother led to convictions following guilty pleas on the following charges: criminal negligence causing bodily harm by failure to provide the necessaries of life; unlawful confinement; assault with a weapon, specifically with a belt and a broom; and common assault. The defence in mitigation points to similar abuse she experienced as a child.

In that specific case a global penalty of six years in prison was imposed. Defence counsel also provided the case of R. v. Henderson, 1993 BCCA 1989, 36 BCAC 230, where in a case of severe child abuse, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia imposed a global penalty of four years’ imprisonment.

The Crown referenced the case or decision of R. v. M. (C.A.), 1996 SCC 230, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500. The facts of that case disclosed the most extreme form of child abuse against numerous children including sexual abuse, severe beatings inflicted upon children over a period of several years. The sentence imposed was 25 years’ incarceration.

In the case of R. v. L.K.W., 1999 ONCA 3791 the accused was convicted of 20 out of 25 counts regarding sexual and physical abuse against his step-daughters and his three biological sons. Justice Moldaver described the facts in that case in the following manner at paragraph 108:

There is no need to dwell upon the gravity and seriousness of the offences for which the appellant was convicted. Suffice it to say that over the course of two generations he systematically brutalized his step-children and natural children subjecting them to acts of violence, degradation and cruelty of unspeakable proportions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the global penalty of 18 and a half years in that decision.

It seems to me that in the present case, given that there is a mandatory minimum penalty of five years for the sexual assault count alone, coupled with a finding that the level of child abuse here was at the furthest end of the spectrum, the appropriate range of penalty here is between 12 to 20 years of imprisonment.

After applying the mitigating factors, primarily the mental health issues of the offender and the aggravating factors, the father’s position of trust and the extreme abuse, I conclude that a fit sentence for all of the offences committed by D.D. is 15 years’ imprisonment.

The accused will be credited with 22 months of pre-sentence custody leaving 13 years and two months to be served. The warrant of committal will reflect that amount of imprisonment.

I would apportion the sentence in the following manner:

A) Seven years, two months for the count of sexual assault causing bodily harm;

B) six years for the count of forcible confinement to be served consecutively;

C) five years for the count of failure to provide the necessaries of life to be served concurrently;

D) three years for the count of assault with a weapon to be served concurrently; three years for the two counts of aggravated assault to be served concurrently;

E) 60 days for each of the weapons offences to be served concurrently.

I have considered the request by the Crown for an order under s. 743.6 of the Criminal Code where the offender would have to serve a minimum of one half of his sentence prior to being eligible for parole.

The Crown has not satisfied me that this is a case where a 743.6 order is required. The accused is a first-time offender. There is no doubt he suffered from some forms of psychiatric difficulties at the time of the commission of these offences and a term of imprisonment of 15 years while a just sentence in this case is also very severe and adequately satisfies the principles of deterrence and denunciation.

There will also be the following ancillary orders: There will be a DNA order under s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code; a weapons prohibition order for 10 years pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code; an order under s. 161(a)(1) of the Criminal Code providing for a lifetime prohibition of D.D. from being within a two-kilometre radius of A.D.; an order pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Criminal Code prohibiting D.D. from communicating directly or indirectly with A.D. or any of his current family members during the custodial portion of his sentence. The Crown will furnish whatever names it deems necessary in this regard. Finally, there will be a victim fine surcharge as suggested by the prosecution of $100 per count.

Finally, I would be remiss if I did not thank counsel, both the Crown and both the defence for their excellent work and professionalism in the conduct of this very difficult trial. I also wish to commend the two lead investigating officers in this case Tracy Butler and Joanne Marelic. Their work was exemplary. Thank you.

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

v.

D.D.

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE R. MARANGER

on April 12, 2017 at OTTAWA, Ontario

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN CANNOT BE PUBLISHED, BROADCAST OR TRANSMITTED PURSUANT TO SECTIONS 486.4 AND 486.5 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA BY ORDER OF JUSTICE R. MARANGER, SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE, DATED SEPTEMBER 8, 2015

APPEARANCES:

M. Dufort Counsel for the Provincial Crown

R. Carew Counsel for D.D.