Peter N. Bourque

The defendant was found guilty on December 12, 2017 of assault, breaches of recognizance, and criminal harassment.

He was placed on probation with a term prohibiting contact with the complainant.

Between December 25 and 27, 2017, the defendant sent the complainant a lengthy email and text messages in breach of the probation order.

The defendant was charged with three counts of breach of probation and one count of criminal harassment.

At trial, the defendant was self-represented and argued that his mental state and depression prevented him from forming the necessary mens rea.

The court found the defendant guilty of all charges, rejecting his evidence as unreliable and finding that he intentionally breached the probation order and engaged in conduct that caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her safety.

The defendant was found guilty after trial of two breaches of recognizance arising from a single event of being at a hotel overnight.

The Crown sought 30 days custody on each count served concurrently, while the defence sought a conditional discharge with probation.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with two years probation, reporting conditions, counselling as required, and community service, considering the defendant's strong employment and professional prospects as a professional engineer, the collateral consequences of a conviction on his career, and the fact that he had already spent the equivalent of five days in custody.

The defendant was charged with voyeurism, mischief, and breach of a common law peace bond following an incident at a Dollarama store in Richmond Hill on February 24, 2017.

The complainant believed the defendant had placed his cell phone between her legs and taken a picture up her skirt.

The Crown sought to prove the offence as an attempt to commit voyeurism under section 162(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the physical positioning of the parties suggested the defendant may have been contemplating such an activity, the totality of the evidence did not establish the essential elements of an attempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

No photograph was found on the defendant's phone, and the Crown could not prove the defendant had the necessary mens rea to commit the offence.

The defendant was acquitted of all charges.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol (over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood).

Paramedics observed a transport trailer truck weaving on the Queen Elizabeth Way and the 427 highway on February 22, 2017, and called 911.

Police located the defendant in the truck at a truck park in Vaughan.

The defendant was arrested and subjected to breath testing.

The Crown proved care and control of the motor vehicle, that breath tests were taken as soon as practicable, and that the breath readings (122 and 114 milligrams) were properly obtained and admissible.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with failure to provide a sample of breath (ASD refusal) following a motor vehicle accident.

The Crown sought conviction on the charge.

The defendant raised Charter applications challenging the validity of the ASD demand and alleging breaches of sections 7, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the ASD demand was valid based on reasonable suspicion of alcohol consumption.

While finding a technical breach of section 10(b) rights regarding access to counsel, the court determined no Charter relief was warranted under the Grant factors.

The court also rejected arguments of section 7 and 9 breaches, finding the detention and handcuffing, though uncomfortable, did not rise to the level of constitutional violation.

The defendant was found guilty of the ASD refusal charge.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving after being stopped for speeding.

The Crown relied on blood alcohol test results showing readings of 96 and 95 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, taken approximately three hours after the defendant was stopped.

A toxicologist provided expert evidence that the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the toxicologist's assumptions regarding elimination rates, plateau periods, breath-to-blood conversion ratios, and other factors.

The court found that while the defence raised hypothetical scenarios that could theoretically affect the calculations, there was insufficient case-specific evidence to create a reasonable doubt about the Crown's case.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and assault following an incident in which he allegedly groped and touched the complainant, a designated driver, without consent while she was driving him and a friend home from a bar.

The Crown alleged multiple instances of unwanted touching of the complainant's breasts and other parts of her body.

The accused testified that he was attempting to get the complainant's attention by touching her shoulder and side, and denied intentionally touching her breasts.

The court found that while the accused did touch the complainant without consent after being told not to do so, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the contact was sexual in nature.

The accused was acquitted of sexual assault but found guilty of assault.

The defendant appealed his conviction for stunt driving under s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, having been found guilty of operating a motor vehicle at 112 km/h in a 60 km/h zone.

The defendant raised arguments challenging the jurisdiction of the legislature to regulate motor vehicle operation, the jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace to hear the matter, and the constitutional validity of the stunt driving provisions.

The court rejected all arguments and dismissed the appeal, upholding the conviction.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine following an arrest by York Regional Police officers who were conducting surveillance on a suspected drug dealer.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent search of his vehicle.

The court found that the officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant.

The evidence relied upon by the arresting officer was based primarily on an unreliable observation by another officer who claimed to have witnessed a "hand-to-hand" drug transaction.

The court found the arrest and searches to be unlawful Charter breaches and excluded all evidence obtained subsequent to the breach under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was convicted after trial of impaired (by drug) driving causing bodily harm contrary to s. 255(2) of the Criminal Code and failure to comply with a demand for a urine sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was found stopped in a driveway while impaired and, when police arrived, his vehicle backed up slowly and struck a police officer, causing bodily harm to the officer's knee.

The defendant refused a lawful demand to provide a urine sample.

At sentencing, the Crown sought 7 months imprisonment and a 3-year driving prohibition, while the defendant sought a suspended sentence with a fine and increased licence suspension.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 60 days for the impaired driving causing bodily harm and 30 days for the failure to provide a urine sample, to run consecutively, plus a 2-year driving prohibition.

A police sergeant was charged with assault causing bodily harm after using force to arrest a highly intoxicated individual with a lengthy criminal history and known propensity for violence.

The sergeant employed a "grounding" technique that resulted in the arrestee's face striking the ground, causing a laceration to the cheek.

The court found that while the sergeant had reasonable grounds to arrest and was entitled to use necessary force, the force employed was unnecessary, disproportionate, and unlawful.

The arrestee had become compliant before the sergeant applied force, and the sergeant's stated justifications for the use of force were contradicted by video evidence.

The court convicted the sergeant of assault causing bodily harm, finding that the injury met the statutory threshold for bodily harm.

The self-represented accused was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

During the trial, the court raised a Charter issue regarding the accused's right to counsel of choice under s. 10(b).

The accused had requested to speak to a specific lawyer, but the arresting officer failed to properly facilitate this request due to a misunderstanding of the lawyer's name and firm.

The court found that the officer did not take sufficient steps to help the accused contact his counsel of choice before defaulting to duty counsel.

Concluding that the accused's s. 10(b) rights were infringed, the court applied the Grant framework and excluded the breath test results under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was found not guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving by drug causing bodily harm and refusal to provide a bodily substance sample.

The defendant drove his vehicle into a stranger's driveway and fell asleep at the wheel.

When police attended, the defendant's vehicle rolled backward, pinning an officer between the two vehicles and causing injury to the officer's knee.

A drug recognition expert concluded the defendant was impaired by cannabis and a central nervous system depressant.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired driving causing bodily harm and refusal to comply with a demand for a bodily substance sample.

The court rejected the defendant's Charter s. 10(b) application, finding his rights to counsel were properly upheld and that no second consultation with counsel was required before the bodily substance demand.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol.

A police officer encountered the defendant twice on the morning of May 20, 2016: first at 02:57 with no signs of impairment, and again at 04:35 when a roadside breath test was administered and failed.

The defendant was arrested and breath tests conducted at 07:02 and 07:24 showed readings of 170 and 150 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood respectively.

The Crown relied on a toxicologist's report to establish the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving, which was based on the presumption of no bolus drinking within 15 minutes prior to the incident.

The defence argued that the presence of an alcoholic beverage in the vehicle's centre console, combined with the rising odour of alcohol and the time gap between driving and testing, raised a reasonable doubt regarding bolus drinking.

The court found the defendant's testimony credible and accepted that she did not engage in bolus drinking, thereby accepting the toxicologist's report and finding the defendant guilty.

The Crown charged two members of the Men's Fire, a group within the Six Nations community, with assault for forcibly removing a lawyer from a meeting at the Haudenosaunee Development Institute offices.

The defendants claimed the defence of property under section 35 of the Criminal Code, arguing they were acting pursuant to traditional Haudenosaunee governance to remove the complainant from reserve territory.

The court found that while the defendants had a subjective belief they were acting in accordance with traditional governance, the defence of property did not apply because: (1) the defendants did not have peaceable possession of the property given the political conflict; (2) the complainant had a lawful entitlement to be present as an invitee of the HDI; and (3) the use of force was unreasonable in the circumstances, as there was no emergency, alternative remedies were available, and the action was politically motivated rather than necessary for community protection.

Both defendants were convicted of assault.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile while impaired and having a blood alcohol limit exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant's vehicle was found stuck in sand on the shoulder of a deserted road near Kleinberg.

The defendant was standing in a field approximately 50-60 feet from the vehicle, stating he was waiting for a ride.

The Crown sought to prove care and control based on circumstantial evidence and the defendant's proximity to the vehicle.

The court found that while the Crown established reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, it failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care and control of the motor vehicle at the time of police arrival.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with impaired care and control and driving with excess alcohol care and control following a dispatch report of an impaired driver.

An officer located the defendant's vehicle in her driveway with the defendant slumped over the steering wheel.

The defendant claimed she had entered the vehicle only to retrieve her purse after consuming two glasses of wine upon arriving home.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence and found she had entered the vehicle with intent to put it in motion.

The court also rejected a Charter s. 10(b) rights argument regarding a 20-minute delay before rights to counsel were provided, finding the delay justified by legitimate medical concerns regarding a possible diabetic emergency.

The defendant was convicted of both charges, with the excess alcohol charge provisionally stayed pursuant to R. v. Kienapple.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a roadside stop for driving without lights.

The defendant, a native Russian speaker with conversational English ability, challenged the admissibility of breath test results, arguing he was denied his Charter rights to counsel due to language barriers.

The arresting officer initially recognized language issues and called for a Russian-speaking officer, but subsequently decided not to use interpretation services.

The court found a serious breach of the defendant's section 10(b) Charter rights, as he was not meaningfully informed of his right to counsel and his subsequent request for legal advice was ignored.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court excluded the breath test evidence and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant was charged with nine counts of assault, threatening, and sexual assault against his wife spanning from 2003 to 2013.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the viva voce evidence of the complainant, who described a pattern of physical and sexual abuse during their marriage.

The defendant denied all allegations and testified that he would leave the house during arguments.

The court found the complainant's evidence largely uncorroborated, internally inconsistent, and lacking in credibility.

The defendant's evidence was forthright and not seriously shaken in cross-examination.

The court determined that the Crown failed to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the defendant on all counts.

The defendant was charged with theft of a complainant's money and possession of stolen property.

The defendant admitted to using the complainant's credit and debit cards to make purchases totaling $1,207.43, but claimed the complainant had consented and given her the cards as gifts.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence as implausible, finding that the timing, frequency, and nature of the card usage, combined with the significant age difference and the complainant's medical condition, demonstrated the defendant did not have consent.

The court found the defendant guilty of fraud and possession of stolen property but acquitted her of theft of the cards themselves due to insufficient evidence regarding how she obtained them.