Ontario Court of Justice
Between:
Her Majesty the Queen
— AND —
Frankie Corsi
Before: Justice P.N. Bourque
Reasons for Judgment on Appeal
Released on April 13, 2018
Counsel:
- O. Pankou for the Crown
- D. Pfeiffer for the defendant
BOURQUE J.:
Overview
1The applicant was found guilty of stunt driving, pursuant to s. 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act (the "Act") after a trial on December 12, 2017. The defendant was also found guilty of speeding but that charge was stayed under the principle in R. v. Kienapple.
2The facts of that matter (which have not been disputed by the appellant) was that the defendant had been operating a motor vehicle at a rate of speed of 112 kilometres an hour in a 60 kilometre an hour zone. That excessive speed over 50 kilometres an hour falls within one of the definitions of "stunt driving" in the Act.
3The defendant did not argue any issues as to whether this was a strict liability or absolute liability offence or whether he was or was not allowed to raise those issues. His arguments are more fundamental to the whole system of justice surrounding the implementation of laws to control behaviour while and during the operation of motor vehicles, the jurisdiction of a Justice of the Peace to try the offences, and whether indeed the offence of stunt driving was constitutional.
4The defendant filed a notice of demand for dismissal and argued from that document that I should allow this appeal and enter a finding of not guilty to the charge.
Jurisdiction as to a Course of Conduct
5The appellant did not describe himself in any particular fashion, however some of the arguments raised lead me to believe that they are similar arguments used by persons who describe themselves as "Freemen of the Land". Essentially, this person asserts that no law can affect or seek to control his behaviour unless he has actually caused someone actual harm. He disputes that regulating the speed at which he can operate a motor vehicle is an issue that anybody has any jurisdiction over, unless in doing so, he has caused some harm.
6I reject this argument. I will not go into detail how the legislatures of this country and this province have been given authority (derived from the consent which flows from people in a democratic society) to regulate aspects of human affairs and this includes their operation of motor vehicles.
7I will simply state that there has been no argument raised on this issue that I can respond to. I deal with the law as promulgated by the constitution, the legislatures and the various appellate courts to which I must look for direction and guidance. No argument raised on this issue makes any reference to any of these avenues of legal direction. I therefore summarily dismiss the argument that there is no authority for the Provincial Legislature to enact legislation regulating the operation of automobiles by individuals on a highway.
Jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace
8The defendant raises the argument that the Justice of the Peace has no authority to adjudicate upon this matter. He of course cites no authority for that proposition, other than the vague statement that the Justice of the Peace is some type of administrator and therefore cannot hear these matters.
9I also disagree.
10The Justice of the Peace derives her authority from the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C.43. Specifically, section 39(2) states that "A Justice of the Peace may preside over the Ontario Court of Justice in a proceeding under the Provincial Offences Act."
11Section 1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. P.33 defines "Justice" as a "Provincial Judge or a Justice of the Peace".
12There is no merit to this argument.
Section 172 of the HTA is ultra vires
13The defendant argues that by authority of the decision in R. v. Drutz, 2009 ONCJ 537, the stunt driving provisions have been declared ultra vires and of no force and effect. As an initial matter, the decision cited is from the Ontario Court of Justice, which does not have the power to make declarations of the constitutional invalidity of a section but only to deal with it in the particular case before that court. It is therefore not binding upon me.
14However, there is a more pressing reason why I cannot accede to this argument. This issue has been dealt with subsequently by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Raham, 2010 ONCA 206. The court deals in great detail with the arguments of whether the defence of due diligence is available to the defendant. It rules that it is available and in doing so, upholds the constitutionality of the section. The court specifically cites that the R. v. Drutz decision came to a different conclusion.
15The defendant made argument that the court of appeal acted incorrectly in looking at the French language version of the legislation, and this somehow is invalid. As the Court pointed out in its footnotes, both the English and French versions of the legislation have equal authority under the Legislation Act, 2006 S.O. 2006 c. 21.
Conclusion
16The appellant in his argument alluded to the court and the police participating in some sort of fraud and the assertion that the defendant had his property taken from him "at gunpoint". The defendant also asserted that no law against him can be asserted in a court without his "consent". These arguments were forcefully raised by this appellant in his civil suit against a police officer and the Crown. They were summarily dismissed by Justice Di Luca on September 25, 2017. There is no need to deal with them further here.
17Having rejected the arguments raised by the appellant, I dismiss this appeal.
Released: April 13, 2018
Signed: "Justice P.N. Bourque"