Peter N. Bourque

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on July 9, 2016.

The defendant challenged the officer's reasonable suspicion to demand an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test and argued that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on observed driving patterns and the defendant's admission of consuming alcohol.

The court also found that the timing of the breath tests complied with statutory requirements, including a reasonable delay for the defendant to speak with duty counsel.

The defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 140 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was charged with care and control of an automobile with excess alcohol and impaired care and control following his discovery asleep in his vehicle in his driveway.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, arguing inadequate section 10 rights due to language barriers and lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found reasonable and probable grounds existed based on the totality of circumstances including erratic driving reports, the defendant's condition, and odour of alcohol.

While a Charter breach was found regarding the failure to provide rights to counsel in Tamil, the evidence was not excluded as the defendant received legal advice and the breach was minor.

The defendant was found in care and control of the vehicle and guilty of impaired driving.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on December 31, 2015.

The defendant challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for impaired driving and sought to exclude the breath test results.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including slow driving, driving without lights, a wide turn, failure to move to the side of the road when emergency lights were activated, and the smell of alcohol.

However, the court found insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired by alcohol.

The defendant was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol (160 mgs per 100 milliliters of blood).

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a roadside stop on May 25, 2016.

The defendant alleged several Charter breaches and sought to exclude breath test results.

The principal issue was the extent to which police must attempt to facilitate contact with counsel of choice before offering duty counsel as an alternative.

The court found no breach of the defendant's right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter, as the defendant had expressed willingness to speak to duty counsel if his preferred counsel could not be reached, and the officer made reasonable efforts to contact the preferred counsel before offering the alternative.

The breath test results were admitted into evidence, and the defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of charges for delay.

The charges comprised two separate series: firearms and drug offences laid on January 21 and 26, 2015, and conspiracy charges laid on November 19, 2015.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 237, which introduced presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that the Crown's decision to consolidate the separate charges and defendants into a single proceeding, combined with inadequate disclosure management and lack of urgency, resulted in unreasonable delay for the initial charges.

The court stayed 32 charges related to the firearms and drug offences but dismissed the application regarding the conspiracy charge, which fell just below the presumptive ceiling.

The defendant was charged with multiple offences arising from interactions with the complainant on October 20, 2015 and November 10, 2015, including assault, unlawful confinement, sexual assault, and threats.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence to be significantly undermined by contradictions, memory lapses, and inconsistencies regarding key details, particularly concerning the nature of contact (water versus spittle) and the sequence of events.

The defendant's credibility was also compromised by lies told to police, though his explanations for some events had a ring of truth.

The court found the defendant guilty of assault on October 20, 2015 (for holding and pushing the complainant into a car) and breach of recognizance on November 10, 2015.

The defendant was acquitted of unlawful confinement on October 20, 2015, and all charges arising from November 10, 2015 (sexual assault, assault, and unlawful confinement), as the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of breach of probation and was found not guilty of four additional counts following a three-day trial.

The defendant had been charged with child pornography offences in 2013 and 2014, and was released on conditions prohibiting attendance at public parks where children under 16 were present.

The breaches involved attending Canada's Wonderland, the Toronto Zoo, and a public park with his girlfriend's two children.

The Crown sought two years less a day; the defence sought 30 to 45 days.

The court imposed a sentence of five months imprisonment concurrent on each count, followed by 24 months probation with conditions including counselling and employment requirements.

The defendant was convicted of defrauding the Ontario government social assistance plan of $18,636.00 over three years and pleaded guilty to defrauding a Visa cardholder of $7,944.75 while awaiting trial on the first offence.

The defendant challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-10) that removed the conditional sentence option for offences with a maximum term of 14 years or life imprisonment.

The defendant argued this violated sections 12 and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the removal of the conditional sentence option does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The defendant was charged with seven counts of breach of probation.

He pleaded guilty to three counts involving attendance at public parks or swimming areas where persons under 16 years were present.

The trial concerned the interpretation of bail conditions, specifically whether the defendant breached paragraph 5 of his release order by attending the Toronto Zoo, Canada's Wonderland, a cottage in Thornbury, and a local park while in the company of T.M. and her children under 16 years of age.

The Crown argued the defendant could not be in the company of T.M. when she had children under 16 present.

The defendant argued that if he was in the company of any of the other named persons in the release order, the exception to house arrest would apply.

The court found the defendant not guilty of all four remaining counts, holding that paragraph 5 was a provision dealing with house arrest exceptions, not a general prohibition on being in the company of children under 16 years.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on September 24, 2015.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and sought to exclude breath test results on the grounds that his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(a) were infringed.

The court found that the officer lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving, as the observed driving infractions were minimal and the alleged signs of impairment (slurred speech, weaving) were not credibly established.

The court also found breaches of the defendant's section 10(a) and 10(b) rights due to a 14-15 minute delay in providing reasons for detention and access to counsel.

While the section 10 breach was found not to warrant exclusion of evidence, the section 8 breach was found to be serious and, combined with the lack of evidence of impairment, led to the exclusion of the breath test results.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The defendant was stopped for impaired driving and arrested for driving with excess alcohol.

The defendant challenged the arrest on Charter grounds, including lack of grounds for arrest, breach of rights to counsel, and failure to conduct breath tests as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable grounds to arrest based on observations of erratic driving, smell of alcohol, and admission of drinking, followed by a failed roadside screening device test.

The court rejected the Charter challenges, finding no breach of rights to counsel and that the breath tests were taken as soon as practicable despite cumulative delays.

The defendant was found guilty of driving with excess alcohol.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess alcohol and driving impaired on December 12, 2014, with the information sworn on December 30, 2014.

The applicant brought a motion under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to trial was 24.5 months.

After deducting defence delay totalling 12.5 months, the net delay was 12 months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the net delay did not markedly exceed what was reasonably required and dismissed the application.

The defendant was charged with drive with excess alcohol and drive impaired on May 14, 2015, with the information sworn on May 27, 2015.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 18 months and 2 days.

After deducting defence delay, the net delay was approximately 14.5 months.

The court applied the transitional provisions of the Jordan framework and found that the case had taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on September 8, 2012.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and detention on Charter grounds, asserting violations of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on observations of weaving, smell of alcohol, and a failed Approved Screening Device test.

However, the court found two Charter breaches: a section 8 violation regarding videotaping of the defendant using the toilet in custody, and a section 9 violation regarding arbitrary detention for approximately seven hours after the breath tests were completed.

While declining to grant a stay of proceedings, the court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the cumulative effect of the breaches would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant was convicted after a six-day trial of sexual assault and sexual interference with a child under fourteen years of age.

The abuse occurred over approximately three and one-half years, beginning when the defendant was fifteen years old and the victim was ten years old.

The defendant engaged in over one hundred meetings with the victim, including vaginal intercourse, oral sex, and fondling.

The Crown sought a three-year federal penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought five to eight months in provincial custody.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less two days in provincial custody, considering the defendant's youth at the time the abuse commenced, his lack of remorse, the severity of the victim's suffering, and his good prospects for rehabilitation.

The applicant brought a motion pursuant to Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with drive with excess alcohol and drive impaired on June 6, 2015, with the information sworn on June 12, 2015.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 16 months.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases.

Since the case fell below the ceiling, the burden was on the defence to demonstrate both meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court found that the delay was typical for drinking and driving cases in the jurisdiction and did not markedly exceed reasonable time requirements.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant corporation was convicted of operating a commercial motor vehicle in excess of its registered gross weight under section 125 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The original Justice of the Peace imposed a fine of $5,866.00 using the mandatory sliding scale.

The defendant appealed the conviction, which was dismissed, but was permitted to make further submissions on sentencing.

The court considered whether exceptional circumstances under section 59(2) of the Provincial Offences Act justified reducing the fine below the mandatory minimum.

The court found that a combination of errors—one by the Service Ontario office in issuing an incorrect licence and one by the defendant in failing to verify the licence—constituted exceptional circumstances warranting a 25% reduction in the fine.

The defendant, approximately 60 years old, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference upon a 5-year-old girl who was being babysat at his daughter's home.

The complainant alleged that the defendant touched her vaginal area under her clothing while she was sitting on his lap watching television.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the child's statement to police and statements made by the defendant to the child's parents during a confrontational meeting.

The defendant denied all allegations.

The trial judge found that while the child's evidence could support the allegations, the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements—including the coercive nature of the confrontation, language barriers, and translation difficulties—rendered those statements of minimal evidentiary weight.

Applying the test from R. v. W.D., the judge concluded that a reasonable doubt existed and acquitted the defendant of all charges.

The defendant was charged with driving while impaired and driving with excess alcohol on June 22, 2015.

He brought a Charter application under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed and seeking a judicial stay of charges.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 13 months and 8 days, falling below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the transitional framework and found that the case did not take markedly longer than it reasonably should have, considering the complexity of impaired driving cases and acceptable institutional delay under the previous Morin framework.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and refusal to take a breathalyzer test following a traffic stop.

The Crown withdrew the dangerous driving charge at trial.

The court found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the defendant for impaired driving and make a breath demand.

The officer's evidence contained significant discrepancies when compared to video evidence from the police cruiser, including mischaracterizations of the defendant's driving, minimization of the force used during the stop, and failure to account for the defendant's obvious language difficulties.

The court acquitted the defendant of the refusal charge, finding the breath demand was invalid.