Laura Anne O'Neill

The accused was convicted of defrauding No Panic Computing of over $91,000 through a sophisticated scheme involving forged documents and false pretences.

The scheme involved creating fake email accounts and impersonating employees of Encana to convince the victim company that a large computer sale had been made.

The accused was sentenced to two years less a day imprisonment, ordered to pay restitution of $342,447.59, and placed on three years probation with strict conditions including a monthly restitution payment of $3,000 and no contact with the victims.

The accused was tried on an 11-count information alleging various fraud offences.

The Crown stayed counts 6-11 at the conclusion of its case, and a directed verdict was granted on count 5, leaving counts 1-4 to proceed.

The accused filed two Charter applications challenging the validity of three production orders obtained by police to seize bank records.

The first application alleged that the first two production orders were obtained under the wrong section of the Criminal Code.

The second application alleged abuse of process, arguing that police and Crown used the accused's Charter application to discover a flaw in their case and obtain a third production order.

The court dismissed both Charter applications, finding no jurisdiction to entertain a leave to cross-examine application not grounded in a section 8 Charter violation, and finding no abuse of process where the police acted in good faith and disclosed the true purpose of the third production order.

The accused was charged with defrauding No Panic Computing over $5,000, using a forged document, obtaining merchandise by false pretence, and making a false statement in writing.

The Crown's case involved a fraudulent scheme whereby the accused, posing as a sales agent, fabricated a contract with Encana Corporation using a fictitious representative and fake email addresses.

The accused obtained over $91,000 in commissions from the victim company based on this fraudulent transaction.

The trial court found the evidence overwhelming and convicted the accused on all counts.

The accused brought a Charter Application alleging Crown impropriety in obtaining a third production order after the defence filed a Charter Application challenging the validity of the first two production orders.

The accused alleged that the Crown directed police to obtain the third production order to circumvent the defence Charter Application and that the affiant failed to make full, fair and frank disclosure.

The court dismissed the threshold portion of the application alleging Crown misconduct, finding that the allegations were frivolous and that the Crown was entitled to act on the defence Charter Application as a public court document to re-calibrate its case.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on July 9, 2016.

The defendant challenged the officer's reasonable suspicion to demand an Approved Screening Device (ASD) test and argued that the breath tests were not taken as soon as practicable.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion based on observed driving patterns and the defendant's admission of consuming alcohol.

The court also found that the timing of the breath tests complied with statutory requirements, including a reasonable delay for the defendant to speak with duty counsel.

The defendant was found guilty of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 140 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of charges for delay.

The charges comprised two separate series: firearms and drug offences laid on January 21 and 26, 2015, and conspiracy charges laid on November 19, 2015.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 237, which introduced presumptive ceilings for trial delay.

The court found that the Crown's decision to consolidate the separate charges and defendants into a single proceeding, combined with inadequate disclosure management and lack of urgency, resulted in unreasonable delay for the initial charges.

The court stayed 32 charges related to the firearms and drug offences but dismissed the application regarding the conspiracy charge, which fell just below the presumptive ceiling.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on September 8, 2012.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of his arrest and detention on Charter grounds, asserting violations of sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on observations of weaving, smell of alcohol, and a failed Approved Screening Device test.

However, the court found two Charter breaches: a section 8 violation regarding videotaping of the defendant using the toilet in custody, and a section 9 violation regarding arbitrary detention for approximately seven hours after the breath tests were completed.

While declining to grant a stay of proceedings, the court excluded the breath test results under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the cumulative effect of the breaches would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with Over 80 Operation following a Charter Application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

An off-duty police officer reported a possibly impaired driver to dispatch.

Police attended the accused's residence and questioned him at the doorway regarding his operation of the vehicle.

The accused subsequently failed an Alcohol Screening Device test and was arrested.

The court considered whether the police approach to the residence and questioning at the doorway constituted an unlawful search and whether the failure to provide language interpretation violated the accused's right to counsel.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

A Charter application was brought alleging a breach of the accused's section 10(b) rights (right to counsel).

The accused clearly and unequivocally requested to speak to his lawyer of choice but needed to contact his wife to obtain the lawyer's name and phone number.

The police failed to facilitate this contact and did not adequately explain the role of duty counsel.

The court found a serious breach of the right to counsel and excluded the breath samples pursuant to section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the dismissal of the charge.