Peter N. Bourque

The defendant was charged with four counts of breaching a probation order and possession of scissors for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The Crown alleged that the defendant possessed scissors as a weapon based on his admission of suicidal ideation and thoughts of harming group home staff.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the scissors with the intention to use them as a weapon.

The defendant was acquitted of counts 1 and 2 (weapon-related charges) but convicted of counts 3, 4, and 5 (breaches of probation for failing to reside where directed, failing to keep the peace and be of good behaviour, and communicating with persons with criminal records).

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and interference of a young girl between September 13, 2005 and June 30, 2006.

The complainant testified that she engaged in a prolonged sexual relationship with the defendant, who was approximately five years older, beginning when she was approximately 10 years old.

The defendant denied all allegations, claiming he barely knew the complainant and only saw her occasionally on the street.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated by several key details, including her knowledge of the defendant's basement layout, the ring with inscription given by his girlfriend, and the nature of a telephone conversation between them in 2012.

The defendant was found guilty on all charges.

The Crown brought an application to permit a non-accredited interpreter to provide simultaneous translation in Visayan for a defendant charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The defendant, an elderly man from the Philippines with a grade 3 education, required interpretation to exercise his section 14 Charter rights.

The proposed interpreter was an intelligent and accomplished woman with extensive multilingual experience and prior court interpretation work, but lacked formal accreditation in Visayan and had not taken certification exams in that language.

The court found that while the interpreter possessed competence in the language, the Crown failed to discharge its burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that she could meet the constitutional standard required for a lengthy, complex trial involving simultaneous translation of all courtroom proceedings.

The defendant corporation appealed its conviction under section 121 of the Highway Traffic Act for operating a commercial motor vehicle in excess of its registered gross weight.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty based on weigh scale evidence showing the vehicle weighed 31,510 kg against an authorized gross weight of 8,043 kg.

The defendant challenged the reliability of the weigh scale, arguing it required calibration.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, holding that weigh scales constitute prima facie evidence of accuracy under the principle established in R. v. Bland, and that merely raising the issue of calibration without evidence of actual inaccuracy does not create reasonable doubt.

The court dismissed the appeal but allowed the defendant to present sentencing submissions before pronouncing sentence anew, as the trial judge had imposed sentence without hearing from the defence.

The defendant was charged under the Compulsory Automobile Insurance Act and Highway Traffic Act.

Following a trial before a Justice of the Peace, concerns arose regarding the defendant's capacity to conduct her own defence due to disorganized and incoherent statements.

The court referred the defendant for psychiatric assessment.

A psychiatrist concluded the defendant was unfit to stand trial, presenting with a psychotic disorder and being unable to meaningfully participate in legal proceedings or communicate with counsel.

The court found on the balance of probabilities that the defendant was unfit to stand trial and suspended the proceedings.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following an incident on August 25, 2015.

A civilian witness reported erratic driving behavior including crossing the centre line, driving on and off the road shoulder multiple times, and nearly striking another vehicle.

Police responded and observed the defendant with a smell of alcohol, unsteady gait, and slow movements.

The defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 140 and 136 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant testified he consumed only three beers and attributed his driving errors to construction confusion and texting, and his unsteady gait to tiredness.

The court found the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired by alcohol and exceeded the legal blood alcohol limit.

The accused was charged with sexual assault upon a young man on January 1, 2014.

The complainant alleged that while intoxicated and under the influence of drugs at a New Year's Eve party, the accused performed fellatio upon him while he lay on a futon in the living room.

The Crown relied on viva voce evidence from the complainant and DNA evidence found on the complainant's underwear.

The defence presented the accused's testimony denying the assault and evidence from the accused's daughter regarding the events of that evening.

The court found that the complainant's evidence was tainted by his extensive drug use that evening and by embellishments added to his initial police statement.

The DNA evidence was found to be inconclusive due to the possibility of secondary transfer from blankets and furniture in the accused's home.

The court applied the proper burden of proof and the W.D. framework, ultimately finding reasonable doubt and acquitting the accused.

The defendant was arrested for impaired driving and care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol reading of 160 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

At the police detachment, the defendant was subjected to a search that resulted in the exposure of her breasts and buttocks.

The court found that the police conducted an unjustified strip search in breach of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court determined that the circumstances did not warrant such an invasive search and that the police failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the search.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The applicant was charged with impaired care and control and care and control with excess alcohol on May 4, 2014.

She brought a motion under section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging that her right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The total delay from charge to trial completion was 20 months.

After analyzing the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, the court found that 13 months of delay was attributable to Crown actions and institutional factors, exceeding the guideline period of 8-10 months.

The court concluded that the applicant's Charter rights had been infringed and granted a judicial stay of the charges.

The defendant pleaded guilty to robbery, aggravated assault, and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence arising from a home invasion on February 18, 2014.

Five masked men invaded the home of Stanley and Kathleen Benson in Richmond Hill, Ontario, tasering Kathleen and severely beating Stanley, who suffered a broken ankle, collapsed lung, and other injuries.

The defendant was arrested in October 2014 after 561 days in pre-trial custody.

The Crown sought 8 years imprisonment; the defence sought 4 years and 4 months.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, considering the defendant's youth, remorse, guilty plea, and rehabilitation potential, while balancing the serious nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol on June 18, 2014.

The accused did not deny the essential elements of the offence but raised the defence of necessity, arguing he was fleeing from an imminent threat of serious bodily harm.

After being assaulted at a social gathering by another guest, the accused ran to his vehicle and drove a short distance before losing control of his keys.

The court found that all three elements of the necessity defence were established: there was clear and imminent peril from the assault, no reasonable legal alternative existed given the circumstances and the speed of events, and the harm inflicted by the brief impaired driving was not disproportionate to the harm avoided.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm, assault, impaired driving, and driving with excess alcohol following a road rage incident.

The defendant claimed self-defence.

The Crown's evidence consisted of testimony from the two complainants and police officers.

The defendant testified that he was struck first and acted in self-defence.

The court found the complainants' evidence inconsistent and unreliable, particularly regarding who initiated the altercation and their departure from the scene.

The defendant's serious facial injuries supported his version of events.

The court also found a breach of the defendant's Charter rights under section 10(b) regarding the right to counsel, as police failed to provide meaningful advice to a non-native English speaker who was concussed and injured.

The blood test results were excluded as evidence.

The defendant was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was charged with assault, assault causing bodily harm, impaired driving, and driving with excess alcohol arising from events on May 7, 2013.

The accused brought a Charter section 11(b) motion alleging his right to trial within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The trial commenced on March 9, 2015, and the accused renewed the 11(b) motion at the conclusion of trial on January 18, 2016.

The court found total delay of approximately 32 months from charge to trial completion, with 15 to 16 months of institutional delay.

Despite the seriousness of the charges and the substantial delay, the court initially dismissed the motion at the outset of trial.

Upon renewal, the court found the delay constituted a breach of section 11(b) rights and stayed all charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving (third offence), assault with intent to resist arrest, driving while disqualified, and related offences arising from incidents on December 10, 2013 and December 16, 2015.

The accused had a significant criminal record including two prior impaired driving convictions and two prior dangerous driving convictions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 362 days in custody, reflecting the seriousness of the offences, the accused's recidivist nature, and the need for general deterrence.

The court also imposed a lifetime driving prohibition and a ten-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol after being stopped leaving a licensed establishment in Markham in the early morning hours of October 23, 2014.

The accused failed a roadside screening device test and subsequently provided breath samples at the police station showing readings of 153 and 139 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test evidence on Charter grounds, arguing breaches of section 10(b) (right to counsel) and section 9 (protection against arbitrary detention).

The court rejected both Charter applications and found the accused guilty of the offence.

The applicant brought a Charter application under Section 11(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The applicant was charged with driving with excess alcohol on October 23, 2014, and the trial was not completed until December 11, 2015—a total of 13 months and 19 days.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin, considering the length of delay, waiver, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the accused.

The court found that while the delay exceeded Morin guidelines by approximately 10 months and 19 days (after accounting for neutral intake and preparation time), the actual and inferred prejudice was insufficient to establish a Charter breach.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown charged the defendant with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample following observations by a civilian witness of erratic driving on January 26, 2013.

The defendant admitted to the impaired state but claimed it was caused by doubling his prescribed dose of Celexa (citalopram), an antidepressant medication, combined with consuming only a few beers the evening before.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence regarding minimal alcohol consumption, finding that his admissions of being drunk, physical signs of impairment (red eyes, slurred speech, unsteadiness), the consistent smell of alcohol detected by multiple officers, and the nature of his driving were all consistent with alcohol impairment.

The court also rejected the defendant's claim that he lacked mens rea for the refusal charge, finding that his words of refusal were clearly spoken and intentional.

The defendant was convicted on both charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop.

The defendant challenged the arrest on the grounds that the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds and that his Charter rights to counsel were breached due to his status as a non-native English speaker.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of observations including erratic driving, signs of impairment, and admission of alcohol consumption.

The court also found no breach of the right to counsel, determining that the defendant had adequate English proficiency and was properly informed of his options.

The defendant was convicted of both offences.

The defendant was charged under section 149(2) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act with willfully failing to inform the WSIB of a material change in circumstances affecting his benefit entitlement.

Following a workplace accident in 2006 resulting in a temporal bone fracture, the defendant received benefits that were subsequently denied on appeal, leaving him subject to a potential repayment obligation exceeding half a million dollars.

During trial, the defendant collapsed in court, prompting a referral for fitness assessment under section 44 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The court found the defendant unfit to stand trial based on psychiatric evidence of conversion disorder and chronic post-traumatic stress disorder, and ordered the proceedings suspended.

The Crown appealed a decision by a Justice of the Peace who granted a stay of a careless driving charge under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The appeal was conducted as a review under section 136 of the Provincial Offences Act.

The court found that the delay of approximately 12-13 months from the notice of intention to appear to trial completion significantly exceeded the guidelines established in R. v. Morin.

The Crown's argument that the defence was not ready for trial because it did not request disclosure until June 24, 2014 was rejected.

The court found that the inferred prejudice from such delay outweighed any societal interest in prosecution of the highway traffic offence, and the appeal was dismissed.