Peter C. Wardle

The appellant purchased a commercial property that was contaminated by hydrocarbons that had migrated from an adjacent former gas station property.

The respondents moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, arguing that the appellant knew or ought to have known of the contamination more than two years before commencing the action.

The motion judge granted the motion, finding that the appellant had knowledge of the claim by March 9, 2012, or alternatively by March 30, 2012.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by equating the appellant's suspicion of contamination with actual knowledge of contamination, and by failing to consider the relevant circumstances of the multi-property transaction and the waiver of conditions.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's action for indemnity under a share purchase agreement.

The action was based on alleged breaches of a tax representation and warranty.

The defendants argued the action was statute-barred and that the plaintiff's claim for "loss of use of funds" was limited by contract.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the action was statute-barred because the six-year limitation period began when the plaintiff knew the material facts of the breach and the resulting "claim" (Revenue Canada's reassessment), not upon a demand for indemnity or its refusal.

The court also dismissed the claim for loss of use of funds beyond the contractually agreed prime rate.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a declaration of oppression and the appointment of an inspector under ss. 161 and 248 of the OBCA to investigate the defendants' companies involved in two condominium development projects.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under s. 161 as they were not beneficial shareholders, and failed to establish a prima facie case of oppression under s. 248.

The court also held that appointing an inspector was inappropriate as the costs would significantly outweigh the benefits, and the plaintiffs already had access to extensive financial information.

This costs endorsement followed an appeal by the defendants regarding a Master's decision on production of documentation for damage claims.

The appeal was partially successful in obtaining some documentation but failed on the principal issue of 'flow-through costs.' The plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing their settlement offer would have avoided costs.

The court found Rule 49.10(2) inapplicable to appeals but considered the plaintiffs' offer and the defendants' own costs submissions.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $33,000 in partial indemnity costs, finding them fair and reasonable given the case's complexity, importance, and the parties' conduct.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that the defendant law firm, Aylesworth LLP, was vicariously liable for the alleged professional negligence of a solicitor, Welsh.

Welsh had a 'counsel' relationship with Aylesworth but operated his own independent practice in Oakville, through which he provided legal services to the plaintiffs regarding a fraudulent investment scheme.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court held that Aylesworth was not vicariously liable because it did not materially enhance the risk of wrongdoing, had no knowledge or control over Welsh's independent files, and did not hold Welsh out as its agent to the plaintiffs.

The moving defendants sought leave to appeal orders refusing to compel production of agreements between the plaintiffs and their content providers in satellite signal piracy litigation.

The defendants argued that documents showing programming acquisition costs were relevant to calculating the plaintiffs’ lost profit damages.

The court applied the tests under r. 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found no conflict with the cited Quebec decision and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge’s ruling.

Evidence indicated that any recovered amounts would flow through to content providers or SOCAN, making the requested documents irrelevant to the damages calculation.

The issues were fact‑specific and not of sufficient importance to warrant appellate review.

The plaintiff brought an action against 39 defendants, including lawyers, police officers, and private investigators, seeking $20 million in damages for various torts including abuse of process, negligent investigation, and conspiracy.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court found the action was a collateral attack on previous court orders finding the plaintiff in contempt of court.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and alternatively struck the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

Substantial costs were awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff, a former member of the Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers, sued the College, its external counsel, the complainant, and witnesses for damages arising from the revocation of her registration following a disciplinary hearing.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the College and its counsel were protected by statutory immunity under the Social Work and Social Services Work Act, 1998, and that the complainant and witnesses were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The court also struck claims relying on evidence rendered inadmissible by statute and claims lacking sufficient material facts, granting leave to amend only certain specific claims.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action alleging that Air Canada improperly collected U.S. transportation taxes on tickets purchased in Canada and between Canada and the U.S., thereby giving extra-territorial effect to U.S. tax laws.

The motion judge found the Ontario court had jurisdiction but stayed the claims of passengers who paid in the U.S. on the basis of forum non conveniens.

On appeal and cross-appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while Ontario courts have jurisdiction to determine if a foreign law is being enforced extra-territorially, the entire action should be stayed on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The principle of comity requires that the interpretation of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code be undertaken by U.S. authorities first.

Following the dismissal of a motion challenging Ontario’s jurisdiction simpliciter and asserting forum non conveniens, the successful party sought costs on a partial indemnity basis of approximately $38,000.

The court considered the reasonableness of the claimed preparation time and whether costs should include fees for both senior and junior counsel.

While acknowledging the value of mentoring junior counsel, the court held that the circumstances did not justify indemnifying the successful party for two counsel on the motion.

After assessing the complexity and importance of the motion and the reasonable expectations of the unsuccessful party, the court reduced the requested amount.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $30,000 all inclusive.

The appellant purchaser appealed the dismissal of her application for the return of a $100,000 deposit after a real estate transaction failed to close.

The purchaser had discovered an open building permit, but the application judge found this requisition could be satisfied by title insurance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the vendors were ready to close and the purchaser's failure to respond to the vendor's proposal regarding title insurance caused the transaction to fail.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs commenced a proposed class action alleging that the defendant airline improperly charged United States transportation taxes on ticket purchases.

The defendant moved to dismiss or stay the action for lack of jurisdiction and on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court held that Ontario had presence‑based jurisdiction because the defendant carried on business in Ontario and there was a real and substantial connection to the dispute.

The revenue rule did not bar adjudication because the action did not seek to enforce foreign tax laws but rather challenged the defendant’s collection of charges from customers.

The motion was dismissed with respect to claims relating to tickets paid for in Canada but granted in relation to tickets paid for in the United States, which were stayed as U.S. courts were the clearly more appropriate forum.

The plaintiffs sued their former lawyers for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of loyalty, alleging the lawyers facilitated a Ponzi scheme and failed to disclose the plaintiffs' interests during an Ontario Securities Commission investigation while representing other clients.

The defendant lawyers moved to strike portions of the statement of claim, arguing their statements and omissions before the OSC were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it is not plain and obvious that absolute privilege immunizes a lawyer from a client's claim for breach of loyalty based on statements made while representing different clients in a quasi-judicial proceeding.

The applicant, a unitholder in an income fund, sought an order requiring the fund's trustees to call a special meeting of unitholders to vote on a proposed transaction involving the restructuring of preference shares and secured notes.

The court found that the proposed transaction was objectively 'materially adverse' to the unitholders because it postponed payments on the secured notes.

Consequently, under the Declaration of Trust, the trustees lacked the authority to vote the fund's common shares in favour of the transaction without unitholder approval.

The court ordered the special meeting of the company to be adjourned pending a unitholder vote.

The Peel Regional Police received a complaint regarding historical sexual assaults allegedly committed by a former police officer in 1981 or 1982.

The Special Investigations Unit (SIU) commenced an investigation, and the police force challenged the SIU's jurisdiction on the basis that the officers had retired and the alleged offences occurred prior to the SIU's creation in 1990.

The application judge dismissed the jurisdictional challenge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that section 113(5) of the Police Services Act grants the SIU jurisdiction to investigate alleged criminal offences committed by persons who were serving police officers at the time of the conduct, regardless of their current employment status.

The Court also held that the provision is procedural in nature and therefore applies retrospectively to offences committed before 1990.

In a proposed securities class action alleging misrepresentations in the primary and secondary markets, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling defendants to deliver statements of defence and requested that the certification motion be heard together with a leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The defendants opposed delivering defences before certification and sought a sequence of motions beginning with the leave motion, followed by Rule 21 motions and then certification.

The court held that pleadings should generally be completed before certification and that ordering the delivery of a statement of defence was not contrary to law or due process.

However, the court limited the requirement to defendants who filed affidavits under s. 138.8(2) of the Securities Act, while permitting other defendants to plead voluntarily without losing the ability to bring Rule 21 motions.

The court further ordered that the leave motion and certification motion be heard together to avoid delay, inefficiency, and serial appeals.

The defendants, lawyers and a law firm, sought leave to appeal a motion judge's refusal to strike paragraphs in a Statement of Claim.

The plaintiffs, victims of a Ponzi scheme, sued the defendants for negligence based on statements made during an Ontario Securities Commission investigation.

The defendants argued the statements were protected by absolute privilege.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision to leave the issue of absolute privilege to the trial judge, and that the application of absolute privilege is a matter of significant importance.

The appellant, a former employee of a Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) member, appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) which upheld a ruling by Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS).

The OSC found that the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) were enforceable against the appellant for conduct that occurred during his employment, despite his subsequent resignation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it reasonable for the OSC to conclude that the TSE validly adopted the UMIR and that RS had jurisdiction to discipline former employees for misconduct committed while they were employed by a TSE member.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a guarantee and mortgage given as security for legal fees exceeding $350,000.

The appellants had admitted signing the security documents after receiving independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there was no genuine issue for trial, noting that an outstanding claim against the law firm was not a defence to the enforcement of the guarantee and mortgage.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay.

The underlying appeal concerned an assessment of unpaid legal fees owed to the responding party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay after retaining counsel, failed to perfect the appeal within an agreed-upon extension, and took no steps to perfect the appeal in the months following the dismissal.