Paul A. Renwick

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80 mg/100 ml) following a traffic stop on Highway 401.

The Crown relied on Intoxilyzer breath test results showing readings of 104 and 99 mg/100 ml.

The accused challenged the admissibility of the breath test results on Charter grounds, alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that while the accused's right to silence under section 7 was breached when the breath technician misinformed him about the scope of that right, the breach did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under section 24(2).

The court found the officer had reasonable grounds to make the breath demand based on the accused's erratic driving and physical signs of impairment.

The court rejected arguments regarding the reliability of the Intoxilyzer machine and the alcohol standard solution used for calibration.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing his credibility by using his post-arrest silence regarding post-driving alcohol consumption and by misapplying the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by drawing an adverse inference from the appellant's silence, which violated his constitutional right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter.

The court also found an error in the application of the Browne v. Dunn rule.

Given that credibility was central to the trial's outcome, these errors were deemed serious and not harmless.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

Other grounds of appeal, including alleged Milne/Coutts/Orbanski error, lack of privacy during counsel call, and insufficient grounds for arrest/breath demand, were dismissed.

The appellant, Winsome Hurditt, appealed a finding of not criminally responsible (NCR) for criminal harassment and mischief, following a trial where she was found guilty.

The trial judge, after ordering an NCR assessment, made an NCR finding but provided insufficient reasons, which the appellant argued prevented meaningful appellate review.

The respondent conceded the deficiency but sought to apply the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice, Summary Conviction Appeal Court, allowed the appeal, ruling that the absence of comprehensible reasons for an NCR finding constituted a substantial wrong, making the proviso inapplicable.

The court set aside the NCR finding and convictions and ordered a new trial before a different judge.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and assault with a weapon following a stabbing incident at a restaurant.

At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to introduce two statements made by the accused during police interviews.

The court found that the second statement, which comprised virtually the entire Crown case, was not made voluntarily.

The statement was obtained through interrogation techniques characteristic of the Reid technique, including the presentation of fabricated evidence, manipulation of the accused's mental illness, and oppressive conditions including extended questioning without adequate food or rest.

The accused, who suffered from schizophrenia, was subjected to approximately nine and a half hours of questioning over a twelve-hour period.

The court found a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness and excluded the statement.

Without the statement, the Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence to commit the accused for trial, and the accused was discharged on all counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation under s.253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code involving the operation of a Davinci Scout e‑bike, and also appealed the sentence of six months’ imprisonment, probation, and a lengthy driving prohibition.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s credibility findings under the W.(D.) framework and argued that an e‑bike was not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of s.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that a device capable of propulsion by non‑muscular power qualifies as a motor vehicle for purposes of the offence, regardless of whether it could also be propelled by muscular power.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s application of the W.(D.) analysis or factual findings and determined the sentence was fit given the offender’s extensive impaired‑driving record.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The applicant brought a Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay in bringing serious firearms and drug charges to trial.

The court analyzed multiple periods of delay totaling approximately 57 months from arrest to the anticipated trial start, allocating time among inherent case requirements, defence delay, Crown delay, and institutional delay.

Although the applicant had been incarcerated for most of the period and experienced prejudice to liberty and security interests, the court found that most delay resulted from defence actions or inherent case complexity, including counsel availability and pre-trial litigation.

Institutional and Crown delay totaled approximately 11.5 months, falling within the acceptable Morin guidelines.

The court concluded that the delay was not unreasonable and that the applicant’s right to a fair trial had not been prejudiced.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving, impaired driving, and driving with blood alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit.

The trial addressed five key issues: whether dangerous driving was proven; whether the arrest and breath demand were lawful; whether the right to counsel was violated; whether evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter; and whether impaired driving was proven.

The court found the defendant guilty of dangerous driving and excess blood alcohol concentration, but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding whether the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, despite a blood alcohol concentration of 2.5 times the legal limit.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an “over 80” impaired driving charge, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable under the Criminal Code presumption of identity.

The trial judge had identified an unexplained 20‑minute delay between arrival at the police station and the commencement of the booking process and concluded the Crown had not proven the requirement beyond a reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the court held that whether the Crown had provided sufficient evidence to establish the “as soon as practicable” requirement was primarily a factual determination.

Applying the deferential standard of review for factual findings, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge’s reasoning.

The acquittal was therefore upheld and the Crown appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving following a trial where he had been acquitted of failing to provide a breath sample but convicted of impaired operation.

The appellant argued the trial judge made unreasonable and inconsistent findings, including misapprehending evidence regarding his dexterity, drawing inferences from unsuccessful breath attempts, and misstating that he had testified he was “high.” The appeal court held that the trial judge’s factual findings were entitled to deference absent palpable and overriding error.

The court found that any misstatement in the reasons was not material and did not affect the reasoning process leading to the conviction.

The conviction for impaired driving was supported by strong evidence and the appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a blood sample following a motor vehicle collision.

At the hospital, the accused asserted his right to counsel of choice.

The police left a message for the lawyer but demanded a blood sample only three minutes later, which the accused refused.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that the police violated the accused's right to counsel by acting with unnecessary haste and failing to provide a reasonable opportunity to contact his lawyer.

However, applying binding appellate authority, the court held that the refusal constituted the actus reus of the offence and could not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed, though the court noted a sentence reduction could be considered if the accused is found guilty.

The accused was charged with perjury under s. 131 of the Criminal Code for allegedly falsely testifying at a preliminary inquiry that he suffered from a medical condition affecting his memory and that he was receiving treatment from doctors for that condition.

The Crown relied on inconsistencies between the accused’s testimony at the preliminary inquiry and at a later murder trial, as well as medical evidence from physicians who had treated the accused shortly before the preliminary inquiry.

The defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the falsity of the statements or that the accused knew them to be false, emphasizing that heavy marijuana use can affect memory and that the accused may have believed his symptoms were medically related.

The court found that although the accused appeared to be a reluctant witness and may have exaggerated memory loss, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not believe he had a medical condition affecting his memory.

As that essential element of the indictment was not proven, the charge of perjury could not stand.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving, assault with a weapon, wilful damage to property, and uttering a death threat arising from a road rage incident involving a dump truck and a pickup truck on a highway.

Evidence from an independent witness established that both drivers engaged in aggressive driving, including cutting each other off, braking to obstruct the other, and throwing objects.

The court rejected the accused’s testimony and found that his operation of the dump truck constituted a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver under s. 249(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of assault with a weapon, mischief causing damage, or uttering threats.

The accused was convicted of dangerous driving and acquitted on the remaining counts.