Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention at a mental health centre with conditions, arguing he should have been conditionally discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight, medication non-compliance, and intimidation of his treatment team.

The court also rejected the argument that a recent appellate decision setting aside a prior conviction undermined the Board's disposition, as the Board relied on the appellant's own testimony regarding the underlying incident.

The moving party sought leave to appeal his fraud conviction under the Securities Act.

He had been acquitted at trial, but the summary conviction appeal judge entered a conviction, finding the trial judge erred in requiring proof of actual loss caused by detrimental reliance.

The Court of Appeal denied leave on the issue of the standard for causation for fraud, finding the law well-settled.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal on the question of whether the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Hodgson modifies the test for an appellate court to substitute a conviction for an acquittal in the context of a Provincial Offences Act prosecution.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Adeyanju Olaniyan’s application for bail pending appeal of his committal for extradition to the United States on fraud charges.

The court reviewed the statutory test for bail pending appeal in the extradition context, emphasizing the low threshold for the merits of the appeal but the heightened concern for flight risk due to Canada’s international obligations.

The court found that Mr. Olaniyan had not established he was not a flight risk, given his prior breach of bail conditions and the inadequacy of his proposed release plan.

The application was dismissed and the appeal was ordered expedited.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing the deceased, who had previously robbed him of a firearm.

On appeal, the appellant argued that administrative errors in compiling the 2022 jury roll violated his Charter rights to a representative jury and caused a miscarriage of justice.

He also challenged the trial judge's refusal to leave self-defence with the jury, the admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, the voluntariness of his police statement, and the fitness of his 13-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no appearance of unfairness in the jury roll process, no air of reality to self-defence, and no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or sentencing.

The self-represented appellant appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault and mischief charges.

The Crown conceded that the appellant was not advised of his right to request a trial in French pursuant to s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code at his first appearance.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant had expressed a choice for a French trial and never waived it in a free and informed manner.

The Crown failed to prove that the breach of language rights did not cause prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the NCR verdict was quashed, and a new trial in French was ordered.

The appellant, Justin Lozon, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing death.

The central issue at trial was whether the deceased's motorcycle headlight was on, which the trial judge found to be true.

The appeal argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge failed to apply the principles from *R. v. W.(D.)* regarding credibility analysis.

A fresh evidence application was also brought, claiming the motorcycle had mechanical difficulties, including the light.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable, the *W.(D.)* principles correctly applied, and the fresh evidence lacked cogency due to inconsistencies and the witness's credibility issues.

The appellant, William Cummins, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and unlawful confinement.

The appeal raised two main issues: the trial judge's mid-trial ruling allowing the Crown to use the appellant's prior testimony from a mistrial, and the application of constructive murder provisions under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision regarding the use of prior testimony, finding no error.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the "same transaction" test for constructive murder by stating that the unlawful confinement did not need a causal connection to the murder, which contradicted established jurisprudence.

Consequently, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and the matter was remitted for parole eligibility determination.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day for trafficking cocaine to undercover police officers on three occasions within a two-week period.

The appellant argued that the sentencing judge erred in principle by applying the parity principle without sufficient information regarding a co-accused's sentence.

The sentencing judge acknowledged the need for caution but proceeded to rely on the co-accused's sentence despite incomplete information.

The Court of Appeal found this constituted an error in principle that impacted the sentence and reduced the appellant's sentence to 12 months.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on the basis that he struck the complainant with a beer glass, causing multiple lacerations to the face and neck.

The appellant claimed self-defence, asserting that the complainant attacked him first.

The trial judge applied the amended self-defence provisions of the Criminal Code retrospectively and instructed the jury accordingly.

The Crown argued that if the appellant struck first, self-defence was not available.

The trial judge failed to correct this legal misstatement.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's assertion was legally incorrect, as self-defence can apply even if the accused struck the first blow, provided the accused reasonably believed force or a threat of force was being used against them.

The trial judge's failure to correct this error rendered the verdict unsafe.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 12 years imposed for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and breaches of court orders.

The appellant had sexually assaulted his teenaged step-granddaughter on an ongoing basis for one and a half years, including various forms of sexual abuse.

The appellant had a prior conviction for sexual interference with the same victim when she was 10 years old and had also been convicted of sexually abusing the victim's mother in the 1990s.

The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit and within the appropriate range.

The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the sentencing judge was functus officio when imposing a non-communication order approximately one month after the original sentencing, finding it was a permissible administrative correction.

Crown appeal against sentence imposed on a long-time cocaine distributor for a criminal organization.

The respondent was sentenced to seven years and 69 days imprisonment following guilty pleas to conspiracy to traffic cocaine, trafficking in cocaine, committing an indictable offence for the benefit of a criminal organization, possession of oxycodone, and multiple breaches of recognizance.

The Crown challenged three aspects of the sentencing: the application of pre-sentence custody credit to the criminal organization offence, the concurrent sentencing of breach and possession offences, and the fitness of the five-year sentence for the trafficking offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal while granting leave to appeal.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference in relation to his stepdaughter.

At trial, he testified and offered an innocent explanation for the touching, which he had not provided to police upon arrest.

Crown counsel cross-examined him extensively on his failure to provide this explanation earlier, suggesting he had a duty to do so and that his delay undermined his credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that while some cross-examination was justified because the appellant opened the door, the Crown exceeded permissible limits by violating his pre-trial right to silence.

The trial judge also failed to give a proper limiting instruction to the jury.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of importing cocaine after two pounds of the drug were found in her luggage upon returning from Panama.

She appealed her conviction and four-year sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding her credibility and seeking to admit fresh evidence of photographs to corroborate her story.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the fresh evidence application, finding it related to a non-essential aspect of her testimony.

The conviction and sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the trial judge made no errors in his credibility assessment and the sentence was within the acceptable range.

The appellant appealed her convictions for assault with a weapon and aggravated assault, as well as her sentence, following an incident where she punched her spouse, resulting in a ruptured spleen.

The appellant argued that the Crown failed to prove causation beyond a reasonable doubt based on the medical expert's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, noting that scientific proof of causation is not required and common sense inferences may suffice.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellants appealed their fraud convictions, arguing that a production order for bank documents violated their s. 8 Charter rights due to the non-disclosure of statutory declarations.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that while a s. 8 violation occurred regarding personal documents, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the officer's carelessness did not render the breach serious enough to warrant exclusion.

The court found the trial evidence overwhelming and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant previously appealed his sentence, which the Court of Appeal varied to four months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

The Court subsequently issued this supplementary endorsement to add three probation conditions that were inadvertently omitted from its original order, including a prohibition on associating with the complainant or persons under 16.

The variation was made on consent of both parties.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault of a young girl.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, applying the curative proviso to find that the appellant's brief absence from the courtroom and pre-charge conference caused no prejudice.

The Court granted the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by exceeding the Crown's recommendation of four to six months to ensure treatment without an evidential foundation.

The sentence was varied from nine months to four months' imprisonment, followed by two years' probation with a treatment condition.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's conclusions.

The appellant appealed his conviction and the finding that he was a dangerous offender.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on evidence of his assault on police officers at the time of arrest and failed to properly summarize the defence's position.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misdirection and noting the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge gave undue weight to an expert's opinion that relied on other experts not called as witnesses.

The Court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the expert was entitled to rely on the material and the dangerous offender finding was fully supported by the evidence.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder after the victim was brutally beaten and robbed in an underground parking garage.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred by excluding out-of-court statements from a deceased third party who had confessed to the murder, by misdirecting the jury on reasonable doubt, and by misdirecting the jury on the elements of first-degree murder based on unlawful confinement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the third party's hearsay statements lacked threshold reliability, the reasonable doubt instruction was adequate, and unlawful confinement in the course of a robbery can provide the basis for first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code.