Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Baba Ouedraogo, appealed the imposition of a long-term supervision order following convictions for two serious sexual assaults on strangers.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the sentencing judge’s assessment, including expert evidence, justified the long-term offender designation and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, D.R., appealed convictions for sexual assault, assault with a weapon, assault, and uttering threats, as well as the imposition of a lifetime SOIRA order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s reasoning or credibility assessments.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the evidentiary record was insufficient to substitute a 20-year SOIRA order for the lifetime order.

The appellant retains the right to apply to the Superior Court to vary the SOIRA order’s length.

The appellant, Clifton Vassel, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable regarding planning and deliberation, and that the jury instructions on this element were flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude planning and deliberation, and that the trial judge's instructions adequately outlined the relevant evidence, even if not exhaustive.

The appellant, J.P., appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appellant argued the jury's verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony and contradictions with other evidence, including her mother's testimony and forensic findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that it was for the jury to assess credibility and weigh evidence, especially considering the complainant's age.

The court found that the trial judge's post-verdict factual findings for sentencing (limiting the proven facts to a single incident of touching) did not render the jury's initial verdict unreasonable, as there was no demonstrable deliberate lie by the complainant.

The appellant, Preston Darnell Scott, appealed his conviction for robbery and his sentence.

The Crown alleged he acted as the getaway driver in a home invasion.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's inference of knowledge regarding the co-accused's masks and the sufficiency of reasons, as well as the fitness of the six-and-a-half-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's inference of knowledge was reasonable despite an "unfortunate" choice of words, and that the reasons were sufficient.

The court allowed the sentence appeal only to grant credit for pre-sentence custody, reducing the sentence by 23 days.

The appellant appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition finding him to constitute a significant threat to public safety and ordering his continued detention at a forensic psychiatric hospital.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding it reasonable based on the appellant's mental health condition (Bipolar Affective Disorder with psychotic symptoms), history of violent offences involving weapons, documented noncompliance with medication, substance abuse issues, and concerning conduct while detained including the discovery of "to do" lists containing weapons.

The court rejected arguments that a conditional discharge should have been considered, noting the appellant had only recently begun substance abuse programming.

The appellant appealed his conviction on several drug trafficking charges arising from Project Dolphin, a joint forces investigation into drug trafficking in Thunder Bay.

The central issue concerned the admissibility of evidence extracted from the appellant's Blackberry device, which was seized incident to an arrest that was later found to be arbitrary.

The trial judge found Charter breaches but admitted the evidence under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework for admissibility of constitutionally-tainted evidence.

The court also upheld the admission of hearsay evidence from a deceased co-conspirator and evidence from a co-conspirator's guilty plea under the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a loaded firearm and assaulting police, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated during a traffic stop.

The trial judge found that while the appellant was arbitrarily detained, he initiated an unjustified assault against the police using excessive force, making the subsequent search that revealed a handgun reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, her conclusion that there was no opportunity to provide right to counsel, or her refusal to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference but acquitted of invitation to sexual touching and sexual assault in relation to a single incident with a young complainant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdicts were inconsistent and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdicts were supportable based on the trial judge's instructions, which directed the jury to consider each charge separately and distinguished between the 'touch' requirement for sexual interference and the 'force' requirement for sexual assault.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and choking to assist in the commission of an indictable offence.

He argued the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and erred in drawing an adverse inference regarding the late disclosure of an extortion letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the evidence, sufficiently explained her credibility findings, and had already concluded the appellant was not believable before addressing the extortion letter.

The appellants were convicted of aggravated assault following a jury trial.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in dismissing a motion for a stay based on unreasonable delay, allowing the preliminary hearing testimony of a key witness who was out of the country to be read in under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and providing incomplete written instructions to the jury during deliberations.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the delay analysis but held the trial judge erred in admitting the preliminary hearing evidence without considering technological alternatives like videoconferencing.

The Court also found the trial judge's written jury instructions were unbalanced and compromised trial fairness.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's decision to reject a joint submission for a 60-day conditional sentence and instead grant an absolute discharge to a first-time offender who pleaded guilty to importing khat.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to apply the proper standard for rejecting a joint submission, which requires finding that the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contrary to the public interest.

This standard applies equally whether the judge intends to impose a harsher or more lenient sentence.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the absolute discharge was ultimately a fit sentence given the lack of evidence regarding the harm of khat, the offender's lack of knowledge of its illegality, and her personal circumstances.

The Crown appealed the sentence of two years less a day plus probation imposed on the respondent for serious offences committed while in a position of trust.

The sentencing judge recognized that the primary sentencing goals were denunciation and general deterrence, and that the usual range was a penitentiary term in the mid to upper single digits, but identified particular circumstances justifying the lower sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or improper weighing of factors and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to marihuana production and was sentenced to 12 months in prison, along with a forfeiture order for his 122-acre farm property.

He appealed the forfeiture order.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by adopting an overly strict test for relief from forfeiture under s. 19.1(3) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's framework from R. v. Craig, the Court held that a forfeiture order would have a disproportionate impact given the appellant's minor role, lack of property modifications, and the fact that the property was primarily used as a legitimate farm and residence.

The appeal was allowed and the forfeiture order was set aside.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing its certiorari application.

The application sought to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondent on a charge of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no jurisdictional error and agreeing that a reasonable jury properly instructed could not draw a reasonable inference that the respondent committed the offence.

The Crown appealed a suspended sentence and three years' probation imposed on an aboriginal offender who pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after striking the victim with a broken beer bottle.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12 to 18 months, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to denunciation and deterrence.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly applied the Gladue principles and committed no error in principle, concluding the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal and imposed a 12-month custodial sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for domestic assault and his designation as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding ample evidence to support them.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in concluding there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the appellant in the community.

The trial judge based this on the appellant's lack of motivation to change, directly contradicting unanimous expert psychiatric evidence that strict external controls would be effective regardless of motivation.

The dangerous offender designation was set aside and a new hearing ordered.

The appellant appealed a committal order and sought judicial review of a surrender order to the United States.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Minister's surrender order, noting that even if the appellant's affidavit was accepted as fresh evidence, it did not afford a basis to remit the issue of surrender to the Minister.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appeal from the committal order was dismissed as abandoned.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The respondent abandoned his conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, finding no basis for a conditional sentence to be added to a penitentiary term.

The sentence was varied to two years' incarceration to be served concurrently with the larger sentence.

The appellant appealed a decision of a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal found that the Justice of the Peace misapprehended the evidence, which materially influenced the decision to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.