Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and released on bail pending appeal.

He subsequently absconded, failing to reside with his surety or surrender into custody as required by his release order.

His counsel brought a motion to be removed as solicitor of record due to a breakdown in communications, which was granted.

The Crown brought a motion to dismiss the appeal as abandoned.

The Court of Appeal granted the Crown's motion, dismissing the appeal as abandoned and issuing a warrant for the appellant's arrest.

The appellant, an inmate, appealed from an order refusing to quash his committal to stand trial for second degree murder.

The Crown alleged that after the appellant and others assaulted the deceased, the appellant provided a rope which the deceased used to hang himself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge properly engaged in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence and that there was a sufficient evidentiary foundation upon which a reasonable jury could infer guilt.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal and allowed the appeal, reducing the sentence to two years less a day.

The appellant appealed a restitution order imposed as part of his sentence.

Fresh evidence demonstrated that the appellant's criminal record prevented him from obtaining employment in his trained field, which in turn prevented him from paying the large restitution amount and obtaining a pardon.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the restitution order undermined rather than assisted his rehabilitation.

The restitution order was reduced to $40,000, distributed pro rata among the five victims.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, appealed his conviction for fraud.

At trial, he called the investigating officer as his own witness and elicited prejudicial opinion and investigative hearsay evidence.

The trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction on the use of this evidence and instead invited the jury to use it to support the Crown's case.

The Court of Appeal held that the evidence was admissible only for a limited purpose and required a clear limiting instruction.

The curative proviso could not be applied, as the evidence provided a clear route to conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and firearms offences and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the trial judge overemphasized community impact, took improper judicial notice, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's consideration of the premeditated nature of the offence, the use of a prohibited handgun, and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for second-degree murder and firearms offences, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on post-offence conduct, the mental elements for murder and manslaughter, and failed to accurately summarize defence evidence or leave the defence of accident.

The central issue at trial was whether the appellant or his neighbour fired the fatal shots.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions.

The court held that the post-offence conduct evidence did not require a special warning, the summary of evidence was fair, and there was no air of reality to the defence of accident.

The appellant, a first offender, appealed a custodial sentence imposed for a non-violent offence.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons for imposing jail were completely inadequate.

The Crown conceded that the objective of general deterrence could be met with a non-custodial sentence.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to a suspended sentence with two years of probation.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder based in part on DNA evidence and a statement he made to police.

On appeal, he argued his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was breached when police questioned him before he had a reasonable opportunity to consult his counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the police failed to hold off questioning after the appellant indicated he was still trying to reach his lawyer.

The court concluded the statement was conscriptive evidence that should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial where the cause of death and similar fact evidence were central issues.

The Crown alleged the appellant killed his partner during a contraband liquor deal, while the defence argued the death was accidental due to commotio cordis.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge misdirected the jury by misstating expert evidence regarding carbon monoxide and confusing medical diagnosis with legal causation.

The trial judge also erred in admitting the entirety of a fictitious 'Mr. Big' murder plot as similar fact evidence, as it lacked sufficient distinctiveness and was highly prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision ordering his extradition to the United States.

The applicant argued that his extradition would be unjust or oppressive under s. 44(1)(a) of the Extradition Act and would shock the conscience under s. 7 of the Charter, primarily because his elderly parents relied on him for care.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the Minister fully considered the relevant circumstances, applied the correct test, and made no reversible error.

The court noted that the need for the applicant's parents to make other care arrangements did not render the extradition unjust or oppressive.

The appellant appealed his 18-month sentence for retrieving, loading, and firing a rifle in close proximity to his wife during a domestic dispute.

He sought a reduction to time served (four months) followed by probation, noting he had been released on the Temporary Absence Program.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the offence very serious and holding that the trial judge did not err in concluding that denunciation required incarceration.

The defendant reported a spill of cooling tower water to the Ministry of the Environment.

A provincial officer telephoned the defendant to demand a written report about the spill.

The defendant refused, arguing that such a demand must be made in writing by a Director under the Environmental Protection Act.

The defendant was charged and initially convicted of obstructing a provincial officer, but was acquitted on appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a provincial officer does not have the statutory authority to demand additional information by telephone, as such powers are reserved for the Director or must be exercised during a physical inspection.

The appellant appealed convictions for multiple sexual assaults committed against boys in his foster care and appealed a global ten-year penitentiary sentence.

The court upheld the admission of each complainant’s evidence as similar fact evidence, finding a high degree of connectedness arising from exploitation of vulnerable boys under the appellant’s care and no material risk of misuse by the jury given the charge as delivered.

The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on similar fact evidence, good character evidence, and delayed reporting.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed because the sentencing judge placed the case in too high a range when compared with the governing authority, given the absence of physical violence, threats, or extortion and the presence of substantial mitigating factors.

The global sentence was reduced from ten years to seven and a half years.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to impose house arrest as a term of the conditional sentence order.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conditional sentence but varied the order to include house arrest, noting that the respondent's counsel conceded the error.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud and possession of stolen property.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by rejecting uncontradicted information in the pre-sentence report based on its sources.

Considering fresh evidence, including reasons from the Immigration and Refugee Board confirming the appellant's good prospects for rehabilitation, the Court allowed the appeal and replaced the remaining sentence with a 10-month conditional sentence.

The Crown appealed the nine-month sentences imposed on the respondents, who pled guilty to forcible confinement, assault with a weapon, and failing to provide the necessaries of life in relation to their two adopted sons.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the respondents' prolonged breaches of trust as an aggravating factor and that the sentences were demonstrably unfit given the horrific and prolonged cycle of abuse.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentences were increased to five years for the mother and four years for the father.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentence of 8 months, combined with credit for pre-trial custody and pre-trial bail equivalent to house arrest, amounted to the equivalent of a penitentiary term.

Although the sentence was lenient and at the low end of the range, the Court admitted fresh evidence showing the offender had resumed caring for his son and found employment.

The Court concluded the sentence was not so inadequate as to warrant interference and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant sought to appeal a decision on an interlocutory application in a criminal proceeding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there is no provision in the Criminal Code that permits appellate review of such a decision.

The appellant appealed his conviction for selling cocaine to an undercover officer, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to frailties in the identification evidence.

The officer identified the appellant from a photo array eight months after the transaction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was alive to the frailties of identification evidence and reasonably concluded the photo array was fair and the officer's identification was reliable.