Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether to grant Diana and Michael Hordo an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision.

The Hordos failed to comply with procedural rules and repeatedly submitted deficient materials.

The court applied the test for an extension of time, focusing on the merits of the proposed appeal, and found that the only potentially meritorious ground was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court granted the extension, referred the perfected motion for leave to a panel, and reserved costs.

The appellant, Shirmati Singh, appealed an order striking her pleadings for non-compliance with previous orders to pay occupation rent, which led to a default judgment for possession of a home.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in the motion judge's initial decision.

However, during the appeal hearing, the appellant's representative offered to pay the outstanding arrears.

The court made a conditional order, allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders striking pleadings and granting default judgment, provided the arrears were paid.

The payment was made, and the court determined that striking the pleadings was no longer a proportionate response given the removal of prejudice to the respondent.

The appellant sought to enforce letters of request from a Florida court to obtain documents from the former Ontario lawyers of his ex-wife and daughter for use in a Florida action for parental alienation.

The application judge dismissed the application on public policy grounds, finding it would interfere with solicitor-client privilege and client confidentiality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the hearing was procedurally fair and the application judge properly exercised his discretion in refusing to enforce the letters of request because they sought presumptively privileged documents.

Self-represented appellants appealed the dismissal of their application in which they claimed a right under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to choose their relationship with Canada and to be exempt from federal and provincial laws without their consent.

The appellants argued they could distinguish between the geographic landmass of Canada and the "Juristic Federal Unit Canada" and that they were not bound by tax legislation or other laws of general application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that residents of Canada are subject to federal and provincial laws that apply to residents, and that the appellants' arguments were based on selective and improper interpretations of the Charter and international covenants.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing her action under Rule 2.1.01.

The motion judge found that the action met the test for dismissal on its face.

The appellant argued that the respondent, having been noted in default, was precluded from taking further steps without leave.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that even if leave was required, it would have been granted as this was a clear case for application of Rule 2.1.01.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The appellants wrongfully repudiated an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property in Burlington.

The vendor resold the property approximately two months after relisting it through the same agent.

The motion judge granted summary judgment ordering the appellants to pay the difference in purchase price and related expenses, finding the vendor acted reasonably in mitigating damages.

The appellants appealed, arguing the resale steps were unreasonable and challenging the price differential.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidentiary basis to interfere with the motion judge's decision.

The appellants acknowledged they added the broker and agent as parties solely to obtain disclosure of their file and market data, providing no legitimate basis to maintain the action against them.

Following a successful appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario determined the quantum of costs.

The appellant was awarded agreed-upon costs of $12,860.70 for the original motion and $20,000 for the appeal, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellant law firm previously represented the plaintiffs in a personal injury action and obtained a judgment for $206,000 in unpaid legal fees.

A subsequent settlement approval judge, reviewing the settlement for a plaintiff under disability, reduced the appellant's fees to $102,500 in a partial judgment.

The appellant moved under Rule 59.06(2)(c) to vary the partial judgment to accord with the earlier $206,000 judgment.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding Rule 59.06(2)(c) does not authorize a judge to choose between conflicting Superior Court orders.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal and declined to allow the appellant to amend its motion to seek relief under Rule 37.14 due to unexplained delay and an inadequate evidentiary record.

The appellant was fraudulently induced by a group of individuals to obtain a bank draft for $90,190 payable to the Bank of Montreal (BMO).

The fraudsters gave the draft to a third party unknown to the appellant, who then instructed BMO to deposit the funds into her line of credit.

BMO accepted the draft and subsequently allowed the third party to withdraw the funds.

The appellant sued BMO for conversion.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that BMO committed the tort of conversion by dealing with the bank draft under the direction of an unauthorized person and making the proceeds available to someone not rightfully entitled to possession.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment finding them jointly and severally liable for commissions owing to the respondent under two financing engagement agreements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's interpretation that the appellants' longtime lender, RBC, was a 'lender disclosed' by the respondent, entitling the respondent to commissions.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred by double-counting $20,000 in commissions, improperly imposing joint and several liability across separate agreements, and awarding costs higher than claimed.

The respondent's cross-appeal was also allowed in part to set aside the dismissal of the action against the personal defendants, as they were not part of the summary judgment motion.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent tenant for breach of a commercial lease.

The motion judge had found that the parties made an oral agreement to extend the lease commencement date and that the appellants terminated the lease in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal set aside the summary judgment, finding that the motion judge's factual conclusions regarding the oral agreement were not supported by the evidence, and that he erred by relying on the unpleaded doctrine of part performance.

The Court deferred deciding whether to remit the matter or determine the issues itself, requesting further written submissions from the parties.

The appellant municipality appealed an application judge's interpretation of a development agreement regarding the costs of operating a pumping station.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the costs of operation, as distinct from maintenance and repair, are to be borne by the municipality and not the developer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants failed to appear for the hearing of their appeal.

The respondents' counsel advised that the appellants had indicated they would be filing a Notice of Abandonment.

Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The applicant's appeal was dismissed by the Registrar for delay.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal granted an extension of time, but the applicant failed to perfect the appeal, resulting in a second dismissal.

The applicant then brought a motion for a further extension of time, which was dismissed by another single judge due to delay and lack of discernable merit.

On a motion to review that decision, a panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no overriding error or application of a wrong principle in the single judge's discretionary decision.

The appellant challenged a motion judge’s ruling that Ontario courts had jurisdiction over an action alleging conspiracy to commit fraud.

The Court of Appeal held that the record disclosed tortious conduct with an essential part occurring in Toronto, including a renegotiation agreement and losses arising from it, thereby engaging the presumptive connecting factors that the tort was committed in Ontario and that a contract connected with the dispute was made in Ontario.

The court also accepted evidence linking the appellant to the movement of the respondent’s funds through a company partly owned by the appellant and into the appellant’s personal account.

The appeal was dismissed and costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.

The appellant was injured in a car accident and received income replacement benefits (IRBs) from the respondent insurer.

Years later, an accountant discovered the insurer had underpaid the IRBs by failing to apply the statutory minimum.

The appellant amended his claim to seek the shortfall, but the trial judge found the claim was statute-barred, holding that the insurer's Statement of Defence constituted a refusal to pay.

The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that since neither party was aware of the calculation error, the pleading could not constitute a clear refusal to pay under the SABS.

The Court also held that the mandatory interest rate under s. 68 of the SABS applies to post-judgment interest, ousting the Courts of Justice Act rate.

The appeal was allowed and the insurer's cross-appeal regarding the loss of earning capacity benefits claim was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order made by the Superior Court of Justice relating to discipline proceedings.

The respondents conceded that they never sought an order relating to proceedings other than the discipline proceedings and related matters.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the order to include a notice requirement for proposed witnesses and striking out one paragraph, but otherwise upholding the order.

Costs of $4,000 were awarded to the appellant, to be set off against outstanding costs orders.

The appellant insurer appealed a decision finding it had a duty to defend the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statement of claim did not allege an intent to injure, meaning the intentional act exclusion clause did not apply.

Furthermore, the respondent met the definition of an employee under the policy as he was engaged in cleaning the premises on behalf of the insured at the time of the incident.

The respondents sued the appellant hospital and several doctors for medical malpractice following the birth of their daughter, who suffered severe brain damage due to asphyxia during labour.

The trial judge dismissed the claims against the doctors but found the hospital vicariously liable for its nurses' failure to properly monitor the fetal heart rate between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m.

The trial judge inferred that proper monitoring would have detected the asphyxia, leading to an expedited delivery that would have spared the child's injuries.

The Court of Appeal allowed the hospital's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge misapplied the law of causation by using a 'robust and pragmatic approach' to infer causation without reviewing and making necessary findings on conflicting expert evidence regarding whether the earlier period of asphyxia was actually detectable by intermittent auscultation.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found oppressive conduct in the management of a family holding company and ordered the corporation to purchase the respondents' shares for cancellation.

The trial judge devised a valuation formula that included an unequal distribution of the corporation's capital dividend account to compensate the respondents for their share of the refundable dividend tax on hand.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the main appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's findings of oppression or his general valuation approach.

However, the Court allowed the respondents' cross-appeal in part, correcting a mathematical error in the trial judge's tax account formula to ensure the respondents were fully compensated for their pro rata share of the refundable dividend tax on hand.