Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellants appealed a summary judgment declaring them in breach of the trust provisions of the Construction Lien Act and ordering them to pay $216,662.84 to Airex Inc. Ben Air System Inc. had entered into a subcontract with Omico Mechanical Ltd. to perform HVAC work on a TTC facility and ordered equipment from Airex.

The appellants argued that Ben Air had paid out more money on the project than it received, and therefore had not breached the trust provisions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellants failed to file evidence of sufficient weight to support their position.

The evidence was contradictory, lacked documentary support, and was delivered late.

The court found that once Airex established it was a subcontractor owed money and that Ben Air had received trust funds, it was Ben Air's burden to show the trust monies had been properly applied.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the amount in issue was less than $50,000.

The court transferred the appeal to the Divisional Court and noted that a related default judgment against the appellant had been vacated by the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

The appellant appealed a judgment declaring him to be a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's thorough reasons explaining the factual and legal grounds for the declaration.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the action was essentially about a promissory note to which the respondent was not a party, as the loan was made to a company and her husband.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,000.

The self-represented appellant appealed a decision of the motion judge striking out his claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The appellant relied on his written factum and made no oral submissions.

The Court of Appeal found no error by the motion judge and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $1,800 to the respondent.

The respondent commenced an action in Georgia, which was stayed on consent due to an arbitration clause specifying the Arbitration Act (Ontario).

The respondent then applied to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator.

The appellant argued the Georgia court had jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Ontario court had jurisdiction under sections 9 and 10 of the Arbitration Act, as agreed by the parties.

The order was varied to name a specific arbitrator.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a promissory note, arguing statutory defences under the Bills of Exchange Act for failure to present the note and notify the guarantor of dishonour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants failed to plead these statutory defences at trial and did not seek leave to amend their pleadings upon discovering the relevant evidence.

The court noted that the appellants' prior conduct of making payments on the note could infer a waiver of presentment, and without amended pleadings, the respondent had no need to reopen the case.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their medical malpractice action on a motion for summary judgment because it was commenced outside the one-year limitation period under the Health Professions Procedure Code.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by refusing to consider medical evidence acquired after the action was commenced.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the relevant period for the discoverability doctrine is before the action is commenced, and the appellants knew or should have known the material facts to base their claim prior to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, arguing the motion judge erred in ordering a $725,000 payment in cash and seeking to rescind the agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge failed to consider evidence that the parties intended the sum to be paid via security, such as a promissory note or guarantee, rather than cash.

The judgment was amended accordingly, but the appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the request to rescind the settlement agreement was rejected.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that fees paid to the respondent bank were non-refundable valuation and processing fees, rather than refundable commitment fees.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's interpretation of the commitment letters, noting the appellants accepted the terms and paid the fees without reservation before refusing to proceed with the financing.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision of the commercial list judge, who concluded that the relief sought related to the internal governance of a Utah corporation.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that principles of comity dictate that Ontario courts will not issue orders regulating the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.

The appeal was dismissed, and the motion judge's costs award was upheld.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the cause of a fire was directly related to the use of a motor vehicle and therefore fell within the exclusion clause of the insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge, rejecting the appellant's argument that there was an independent non-automobile related cause.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment in the appeal, the parties were unable to agree on the quantum of costs.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the written submissions and fixed the respondents' costs of the appeal at $50,000 for fees, plus disbursements and GST.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that he was not deceived and understood the terms of an agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellant had abided by the agreement's terms for fourteen years before asserting his current position, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when her bicycle collided with a tow truck driven by an employee in the course of his employment.

The tow truck was owned by the employer.

The employer claimed 'protected defendant' status under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act, which limits the liability of motor vehicle owners.

The Court of Appeal held that while the employer was protected in its capacity as the vehicle's owner, it was not protected from vicarious liability in its capacity as the driver's employer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision regarding entitlement to a deposit for a condominium unit.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motions judge that the appellant's interpretation of the agreement, which would make the purchaser of an individual unit liable for the purchase price of the entire building or damages flowing from breaches between the developer and Skyline, made no commercial sense.

The court found no genuine issue for trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs of $15,000 to the respondents.

The appellant occupied public lands under a land use permit that expired in 1997.

After his claim for an interest in the lands was dismissed in separate proceedings, the Crown applied for vacant possession.

The motion judge granted the application pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Public Lands Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had no authorization to occupy the lands and that his various grounds of appeal were irrelevant to the Crown's entitlement to possession.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment which found that money received from the deceased was not a gift and that the storage of property at an abandoned school did not constitute a bailment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-supported by the record, and awarded costs of $7,000 to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her action for delay.

The Court of Appeal found the motions judge erred in principle, as the delay was neither inordinate nor inexcusable.

The appellant had made efforts to move the matter along, and the failure to schedule discoveries was partly due to the respondents.

Furthermore, any presumption of prejudice was rebutted because the deceased witness died within the limitation period, evidence of faded memories was tenuous, and witness statements were available to refresh memories.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an assessment of a party-and-party bill of costs for a motion for leave to appeal and a one-day appeal.

The Assessment Officer had assessed the successful respondent's counsel fee at $35,000.

The Court of Appeal found the assessed counsel fee to be unreasonably high, noting that the appeal involved a single question of law on uncontested facts that had already been argued in the Divisional Court.

The appeal was allowed and the counsel fee was reduced to $17,500.