OCA 2013

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The Crown alleged the appellant was the supplier to a co-conspirator who dealt directly with an undercover officer.

The trial judge found the appellant and the co-conspirator were engaged in a conspiracy to traffic cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge and concluding that the conviction for possession of proceeds of crime flowed directly from the trafficking conviction.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy appealed a decision allowing 407 ETR to enforce pre-bankruptcy toll debts against a discharged bankrupt by directing the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to refuse to renew the bankrupt's vehicle permit under s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act.

The Court of Appeal found no operational conflict between the provincial legislation and s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as dual compliance was possible.

However, the Court held that s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act frustrated the federal legislative purpose of providing a discharged bankrupt with a financial 'fresh start'.

Consequently, the doctrine of federal paramountcy applied, rendering s. 22(4) inoperative to the extent that it thwarted the fresh start purpose of the BIA.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to examine a non-party treating physician.

The respondents raised a preliminary issue regarding whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal held that because discoveries were not yet complete and the information might still be obtained from the parties, the order was interlocutory.

Consequently, the appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction, with leave granted to seek an appeal at the Divisional Court.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable either as guarantors or on a promise to purchase promissory notes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement based on the context and intention of the parties.

The court also refused to interfere with the trial judge's costs order and awarded costs of the appeal to the respondents.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The second offence was committed while he was on release awaiting trial for the first offence.

He was sentenced to consecutive terms of 18 months and 30 months imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the sentence, emphasizing that general deterrence and denunciation must be given more significance when an accused re-offends while on release.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant co-signed a vehicle lease as a principal debtor.

At the end of the lease term, the lessor and the lessee entered into two extension agreements without the appellant's knowledge or consent.

The vehicle was subsequently stolen and not returned.

The lessor sued the appellant for the vehicle's residual value.

The Court of Appeal held that the extension agreements constituted material alterations to the lease that increased the appellant's financial burden and risk.

Because the appellant did not consent to these material alterations, he was released from his obligations under the lease.

The appellant appealed orders declaring her a vexatious litigant, arguing she was denied natural justice because the motion judge concluded the hearing in the morning despite a full day being scheduled.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge provided the appellant ample opportunity to present her case, including adjourning to read her 94-page written submissions and allowing her to answer questions and make further submissions.

The court noted the appellant never indicated what further submissions she wished to make.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application for mandamus requiring Hydro One to deliver his hydro bills by courier.

The respondent raised a preliminary issue regarding the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the decision was made under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act and therefore required leave to appeal under s. 6(4).

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that because the appellant had not obtained leave, the appeal was not properly before the court and must be quashed.

The appellant corporation appealed an order requiring moneys to be paid into court in the context of matrimonial proceedings.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, finding the order was interlocutory because it did not finally determine the appellant's interest in the funds.

The appellant was granted an extension of time to seek leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding aiding and abetting, the mens rea for murder, and manslaughter.

The appellant also challenged the exclusion of hearsay statements by a co-accused and the admission of intercepted conversations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, adequately conveyed the essential issues and that any errors were harmless.

The court also upheld the evidentiary rulings, concluding that the hearsay statements lacked reliability and necessity, and the intercepted conversations were relevant to the Crown's theory without being unduly prejudicial.

The appellant was convicted of two provincial offences after failing to appear at his trial dates.

Under s. 9.1(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, he was deemed not to dispute the charges.

He appealed, arguing that s. 9.1 violates s. 11(d) of the Charter by denying him a fair hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 9.1 does not violate the Charter, as the notices provided clear warnings of the consequences of failing to appear, allowing the court to infer a valid waiver of s. 11(d) rights.

However, the appeal was allowed and new trials ordered because the City of Toronto conceded the appellant did not receive a fair hearing on his initial appeals.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing her application for a declaration that she was the sole owner of a boundary tree.

She sought to cut down the tree without her neighbours' consent, arguing that under previous jurisprudence, the trunk at ground level was entirely on her property.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation of section 10(2) of the Forestry Act, finding that 'trunk' should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, encompassing the part of the tree from its roots to where it branches out, not just at ground level.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, indigenous Ecuadorian villagers, obtained a multi-billion dollar judgment in Ecuador against the respondent corporation for environmental pollution.

They brought an action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the judgment against the corporation and its Canadian subsidiary.

The motion judge found that Ontario had jurisdiction but stayed the action on his own initiative, finding the corporation had no assets in Ontario and the corporate veil of the subsidiary could not be pierced.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the motion judge erred in granting an unrequested discretionary stay and prematurely deciding the merits of the enforcement action.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, confirming that a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of the litigation and Ontario is not required to establish jurisdiction for an action to enforce a foreign judgment.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and aggravated assault following an altercation where he slashed the victim with a knife.

He raised four grounds of appeal, including fresh evidence of interpreter deficiencies, misapprehension of evidence, improper admission of bad character evidence, and erroneous inferences of credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the fresh evidence immaterial, the trial judge's conclusions reasonable, the bad character evidence properly contextualized as part of the defence theory, and the credibility inferences appropriate.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for certiorari, which sought to quash his committal for trial on four firearms offences.

The central issue was whether there was sufficient evidence at the preliminary inquiry to support the conclusion that the appellant had possession of a shotgun found in his bedroom shortly after it was fired outside his residence.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error, as there was circumstantial evidence—including the size of the gun, the apartment's configuration, and the appellant's control over his bedroom—from which a jury could reasonably infer his knowledge, consent, and control over the firearm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 90 days' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by refusing to allow the sentence to be served intermittently.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by characterizing the appellant's pre-sentence efforts to secure employment and start a business as a ruse to manipulate the court.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was permitted to serve the remainder of his sentence on an intermittent basis.

The appellant, a private school, expelled a student for smoking marijuana in the school residence.

The student and his parents successfully applied to the Divisional Court for judicial review of the expulsion decision under the Judicial Review Procedure Act (JRPA).

The school appealed, arguing the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the expulsion decision was governed by the private contract between the parents and the school, not public law.

The decision lacked a sufficient public dimension to be subject to public law remedies under the JRPA.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision denying her claim against her group disability insurer for benefits.

She argued the insurer had a common law duty to inform her directly of a potential claim, and that the limitation period should not run until they did so.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no such common law duty exists for group disability insurers in these circumstances, and noting the insurer had complied with the statutory notification obligations under the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, which were based on constructive possession of items found in a locked closet at a stash house.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, rejecting the defence argument that it was reasonable to infer the appellant lacked knowledge or control of the closet's contents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and directed an acquittal.

The Court found, with the Crown's concession, that it was reasonably inferable the appellant went to the house to clear it after his associates' arrests but left the closet because he lacked access or knowledge of its contents, meaning constructive possession was not the only reasonable inference.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and unlawful confinement.

During the investigation, police officers subjected the appellant and his co-accused to deliberate, prolonged, and violent beatings to extract confessions.

The trial judge found egregious Charter breaches but refused to grant a stay of proceedings, opting instead to reduce the appellant's sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider the systemic ramifications of the police misconduct and its impact on the integrity of the justice system.

The Court concluded that the state misconduct was so egregious that carrying the prosecution forward would be offensive to society, warranting a stay of proceedings under the residual category.