OCA 2010

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaching his bail recognizance and probation orders by indirectly communicating a threat to his former probation officer.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended his evidence and erroneously based a finding of wilful blindness on a concession made in hindsight.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly concluded the appellant had actual knowledge that the threat would inevitably be conveyed to its intended target.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

The trial judge had found that the accused's threat to 'assault' his former probation officer did not necessarily include bodily harm.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by failing to consider the surrounding circumstances, which included the accused's violent history, mental instability, and anger towards the victim.

A reasonable person would conclude the threat was to cause bodily harm.

The acquittal was set aside, a conviction entered, and a concurrent sentence of 349 days was imposed.

The appellant appealed his convictions arising from an armed robbery, arguing the trial judge erred by using his pre-trial silence upon arrest to reject his exculpatory testimony.

The Court of Appeal agreed that using the appellant's constitutionally protected silence to assess credibility was a serious error in law.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown's circumstantial case was overwhelming and the appellant's testimony was entirely implausible, such that no reasonable trier of fact could have reached a different verdict.

The appellant, a Canadian resident, was sought for extradition to the United States on charges of failing to remit state sales tax collected at two New York car dealerships.

At the extradition hearing, the appellant sought disclosure of thousands of vehicle sales forms to challenge the investigator's claim that he had signed them.

The extradition judge refused disclosure and ordered committal, and the Minister of Justice subsequently ordered surrender.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the committal, finding that the extradition judge correctly applied the law on disclosure and reasonably concluded that the presumptive reliability of the Record of the Case had not been rebutted.

The application for judicial review of the Minister's surrender decision was also dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of a police officer.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding expert psychiatric evidence and that the Crown engaged in illegal jury vetting by seeking police officers' opinions on potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions correctly explained how to weigh expert opinions based on hearsay without shifting the burden of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not give the Crown an unfair advantage or create an appearance of bias, as the police opinions were not drawn from databases and the Crown had no obligation to disclose them.

The appellant was convicted of fraud and appealed on two grounds: the trial judge's refusal to allow him to testify about conversations with a business associate regarding NSF cheques, and the Crown's undisclosed jury vetting process using police databases.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence as hearsay, the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the jury had sufficient other evidence to assess the appellant's state of mind.

Regarding the jury vetting, the Court held that while the Crown breached its disclosure obligations and the police misused databases, the non-disclosure did not impact the reliability of the verdict or the overall fairness of the trial process.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown's cross-examination was improper and that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that aspects of the cross-examination were improper but concluded they did not create a miscarriage of justice in the totality of the circumstances.

The court also found the Vetrovec warning adequate, noting that while additional points could have been included, they were not essential.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering him to pay a mortgage debt and give up possession of his property.

He argued that he had paid condominium fees, that the respondents wrongly discharged a lien against the property, and that he received no notice of non-renewal of the mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge, noting the mortgage had matured and the respondents properly paid the condominium corporation to satisfy the lien.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to stay the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice, which struck down several prostitution-related provisions of the Criminal Code as unconstitutional, pending appeal.

The moving party argued that the judgment created a legislative void with profound implications for the public interest.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that there was a serious issue to be tried, the government would suffer irreparable harm to the public interest without a stay, and the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion was granted and the judgment was stayed for a limited period to permit appellate review.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and arson following the strangulation of his common-law partner and subsequent burning of their home.

He appealed his 10-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing it was too high given the mitigating factors, including a successful provocation defence.

He also appealed the calculation of his pre-sentence custody credit.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 10-year sentence, finding it was not clearly unreasonable given the aggravating factors of domestic violence and extreme violence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part to correct an error in the pre-sentence custody credit, reducing the net sentence to 6 years and 3 months.

The appellant brought an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the right of appeal lay to the Divisional Court under section 19(1.2).

The appeal was quashed and the matter was transferred to the Divisional Court in Welland, with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of a mental disorder, appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board detaining him at a mental health facility.

The Review Board had concluded that the appellant posed a significant threat to the safety of the public, largely based on his history of medication non-compliance and marijuana use leading to mental deterioration.

The Court of Appeal found that the Review Board's conclusion was unreasonable, as the attending psychiatrist's opinion was uncertain and the appellant's history did not demonstrate a significant likelihood of physical violence.

The appeal was allowed and an absolute discharge was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for fraud related to shareholder loans.

He argued the trial judge provided inadequate reasons by failing to explain why his testimony was disbelieved and failing to identify confirmatory evidence for Vetrovec witnesses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant knew of his company's dire financial condition implicitly rejected his denials, which was supported by forensic and witness evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence was not manifestly unfit.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the strangulation and drowning of his former partner.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a phone call where the deceased stated she was with the appellant shortly before her death.

He also argued the Crown engaged in improper cross-examination of defence witnesses and that the trial judge failed to give a limiting instruction regarding a police officer's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statement was reliable, the improper cross-examination did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the lack of a limiting instruction was the result of a deliberate tactical decision by the defence.

The appellant appealed his manslaughter conviction arising from the shooting death of his friend.

The Crown's case at trial relied heavily on expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and bullet trajectory to prove the appellant, rather than the deceased, fired the handgun.

On appeal, the Court found that the expert opinions were significantly undermined during cross-examination, leaving no reliable evidence to exclude the reasonable possibility of a self-inflicted injury.

The Court of Appeal concluded the jury's verdict was unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for fraud and sexual assault-related offences, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to sever the counts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly balanced the risk of prejudice against the public interest in a single trial, as the evidence for both sets of charges was inextricably intertwined and demonstrated a similar modus operandi.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court upholding the 15-year global sentence due to the cruelty and torture involved in the offences.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement to discontinue his action against the respondent.

The appellant argued the offer to settle had expired and the release was not an agreed-upon part of the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's counsel had expressly extended the time for acceptance, and the appellant's counsel accepted the offer with the draft release in hand.

The motion judge's discretion to enforce the settlement was upheld.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year parole ineligibility period following a fatal shooting in a park.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a correcting instruction regarding unproven suggestions made during cross-examination and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the cross-examination instruction and applying the curative proviso to the post-offence conduct instruction error, given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge and community living privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant risk to public safety was reasonable based on unchallenged evidence.

The Court also found the Board's assessment regarding community living privileges was reasonable, though it directed that future reviews include more information regarding the appellant's aboriginal status and a future-looking treatment plan.