OCA 2010

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 15-year sentence, finding it fit for a brutal aggravated homicide and noting the sentencing judge made no errors regarding parity or the appellant's role.

However, the Court found the sentencing judge erred in granting only 1.22 days of credit for pre-trial custody based on a lack of pre-charge programming.

The Court increased the pre-trial custody credit to the standard 2-for-1 ratio, reducing the remaining sentence to eight years and six months.

The appellant appealed a decision declining to quash a municipal by-law.

The municipality had failed to provide proper notification to the appellant that the by-law had been passed.

The application judge found no bad faith on the part of the municipality and no prejudice to the appellant, and thus declined to exercise his discretion under s. 273(1) of the Municipal Act to quash the by-law.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application from a forfeiture order.

The Crown conceded that the application judge erred in failing to address the matter on the merits and agreed not to argue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court of Justice to be dealt with on the merits.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after biting off part of the victim's finger during a fight.

The trial judge, upon learning a conditional sentence was unavailable for a serious personal injury offence, imposed a probation order with six months of house arrest.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by imposing a disguised conditional sentence that circumvented Parliament's intent.

Taking into account the respondent's status as a youthful first offender and the house arrest already served, the Court varied the sentence to 21 days of intermittent custody.

The appellant appealed his conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle while over the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to put him to his election under s. 536(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that while the formal election was never put to the appellant, his counsel's statements and subsequent actions in proceeding to a provincial court trial constituted a clear and unequivocal waiver of the procedural safeguard.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, residents of a social housing complex, were arrested by security guards for trespass after refusing to answer questions and acting belligerently.

At trial, the jury returned inconsistent answers, and the trial judge dismissed the action, finding the guards had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by engaging in fact-finding to fill gaps in the jury's answers.

The Court found that the guards lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the appellants were trespassing, as residents have no legal obligation to answer security guards' questions.

Judgment was entered for the appellants for false arrest and assault.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for handgun possession.

They argued that their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights were breached during a police search following a taxi stop and their subsequent flight, and that the trial judge should have recused himself for reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the police had grounds for an investigative detention and the searches were valid protective pat-downs.

Even if the searches exceeded permissible limits, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2).

The bias claim was also rejected.

The sentence appeals were dismissed, as the sentences of 8 years and 5.5 years, while at the high end, revealed no error in principle given the appellants' prior records and the context of the offences.

The appellant appealed a decision refusing to extend the time to appeal an order that set aside a previous order and transferred the family law proceeding to London, Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no merit to the proposed appeal.

The court held that the original judge had jurisdiction to set aside her own order under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the doctrine of functus officio inapplicable, and properly transferred the venue under the Family Law Rules.

The appellants appealed an order finding that a letter sent by the respondent prior to litigation was protected by absolute privilege.

The appellants argued that the prospect of litigation was too remote at the time the letter was sent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the letter was a preparatory step taken with a view to judicial proceedings and therefore fell within the confines of absolute privilege.

The appellant transferred property to her brother in 1990 and later brought an action claiming its return.

The trial judge rejected her claim of a resulting trust.

On appeal, the appellant abandoned the resulting trust claim and instead argued the existence of an intervening oral agreement reduced to writing in 2002.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support the new argument and holding that it could not be raised for the first time on appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of a Quit Claim deed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Quit Claim deed was clear, unambiguous, and determinative, rejecting the argument that its meaning required reference to other documents.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the substantial costs order was denied.

The appellant subcontractor appealed a decision allowing the respondent's insurer to bring a subrogated claim against it for damages caused by the appellant's employee's negligence at a work site.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the contract between the parties clearly placed the risk of loss on the appellant and that the appellant was not an insured under the respondent's insurance policy.

The appellant insurer appealed a judgment based on a jury verdict granting the respondent insured's claim for coverage under an automobile insurance policy.

The insurer argued there was no evidence to support the jury's finding that the insured satisfied her obligation to notify the insurer of a material change in risk when her son obtained his G2 licence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the jury to conclude that a reasonable person in the insured's circumstances would not have known the insurer would regard the licence change as a material change requiring notification to maintain coverage.

The court also rejected the insurer's argument that the trial judge unduly intervened in the examination-in-chief of a witness.

The appellant appealed a decision finding it liable for tax under s. 189(1)(e) of the Mining Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the appellant's acquisition of mineral rights fell within the statutory definition of 'mining rights'.

The court held that the industry distinction between surface rights and surface access rights does not apply for the purpose of tax liability under the Act.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the appellants' counsel of choice on appeal.

The counsel had briefly met with and advised the respondent on the same dispute 11 years prior, before litigation commenced.

Although the counsel had no recollection of the meeting and argued there was no risk of misusing confidential information, the Court of Appeal granted the motion.

The court held that a lawyer owes a broader duty of loyalty to a former client, beyond just confidentiality, which precludes acting against that former client in the same matter to preserve public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant, a roofing contractor, appealed a trial judgment ordering it to pay over $900,000 to the respondent condominium corporation in a third-party action.

The main action involved a unit owner who successfully sued the condominium corporation for continuous roof leaks.

The Court of Appeal found that while the contractor was liable for breach of contract, it was not liable for negligent misstatement because the condominium corporation had unreasonably ignored expert reports in favour of the contractor's cheaper solution.

The Court of Appeal reassessed damages, finding the condominium corporation primarily responsible for the delay in fixing the roof, and reduced the damages awarded against the contractor to $50,913.97.

The appellant, a fugitive from justice convicted of securities offences in absentia, appealed orders refusing to set aside a noting in default and granting default judgment against her for over $770,000.

The respondents had sued for breach of contract and fraud related to unfulfilled share agreements.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's refusal to set aside the noting in default, finding the appellant's delay was tactical and her explanation for failing to defend lacked credibility.

The court also upheld the default judgment, finding no material inconsistencies in the evidence, but reduced the prejudgment interest rate on concession.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding the Ontario Municipal Board's finding that an amendment to the City of London's Official Plan (OPA 403) was valid.

The appellants argued that OPA 403 impermissibly delegated authority by making a separate guideline determinative in designating woodlands as significant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the respondents that the Official Plan remains paramount and the City's discretion is not fettered by the guideline.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the analysis and disposition of the motions judge.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents in the amount of $5,000.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding it had no jurisdiction to hear the matter pursuant to section 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act.