OCA 2010

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible, appealed a decision of the Ontario Review Board that continued his detention at a mental health facility.

The hospital had significantly increased restrictions on his liberty after he tested positive for illicit drugs and exhibited deteriorating mental health.

The Board conducted a combined restrictions review and annual review, concluding that the appellant posed a significant threat to public safety and that his ongoing detention was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal standards and that its conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed the long term supervision order imposed by the sentencing judge.

The trial judge had found that the appellant was not a dangerous offender, but still imposed a long term supervision order.

Based on R. v. Johnson, both parties agreed the long term offender designation could only stand if the appellant met the dangerous offender criteria.

The Crown argued the trial judge's finding that the appellant was not a dangerous offender was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting the trial judge reasonably relied on the Crown's expert, Dr. Woodside, whose opinion supported the finding.

The appeal was allowed, the long term offender designation was set aside, and a three-year probation order was imposed.

The appellants appealed a decision granting a bar order in a class proceeding.

They argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction under ss. 12 and 13 of the Class Proceedings Act to make the order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the bar order appropriately limited the plaintiff's claim against non-settling defendants to their proportionate liability, in accordance with established principles.

The appellant brought a motion to interfere with the lower court's costs order and the date on which pre-judgment interest should commence to run.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the orders below and dismissed the motion.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claims against her former solicitor and a charitable foundation regarding the transfer of her home with a retained life estate.

At trial, she argued non est factum and breach of fiduciary duty, both of which were dismissed based on credibility findings.

On appeal, she raised a new argument of solicitor negligence regarding ongoing property expenses, which the court declined to hear as it was not pleaded at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings and the award of substantial indemnity costs, dismissing the appeal.

The plaintiff school board sued multiple defendants, including the appellant engineering firm, for damages arising from a collapsed gymnasium wall.

The plaintiff's claim against the appellant was statute-barred under the Professional Engineering Act.

However, the other defendants brought cross-claims for contribution and indemnity against the appellant within the two-year limitation period under the new Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the cross-claims, arguing they could not survive if the main claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002 preserves the right to claim contribution and indemnity even if the plaintiff's direct claim against the concurrent tortfeasor is statute-barred.

The appellant appealed a judgment determining title to certain former railway lands.

The application judge found the respondent had fee simple title to Part 1 and title to Part 15 subject to the appellant's possessory claim, directing a trial on whether the possessory claim was statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's decision to require a trial for the limitation issue due to credibility concerns regarding discoverability, nor in her conclusion that the railway acquired title to Part 1 through legislated powers.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the respondents for defamation over a newspaper article reporting on a costs award against him and fraud charges against his former client.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim regarding the costs award report based on common law privilege, but allowed the claim regarding the remaining words to proceed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in bifurcating the claim, but agreed that the report of the costs award was protected by privilege.

The Court further held that coupling the report of the costs award with the report of the client's fraud charges was not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning linking the appellant to the fraud.

The appeal was allowed to set aside the motion judge's order, and the action was dismissed in its entirety.

The appellant appealed a decision, arguing a trial was required for its claim that the respondent intentionally interfered with its economic relations with a tenant through the tort of nuisance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that the appellant suffered damages as a result of the respondent's conduct, particularly regarding lease renewals.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's interpretation of section 22(i) read in conjunction with section 23.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 on consent.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the grounds of appeal were weak and had no significance beyond the immediate case.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the federal Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and the provincial Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's reasons and interpretation of the statutes.

The appeal was dismissed with no costs.

The accused was charged with concealing the dead body of a child.

The trial judge found that the words 'died before . . . birth' in the Criminal Code were unconstitutionally vague and severed the word 'before', leading to the accused's acquittal.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provision is not unconstitutionally vague when interpreted using the common law 'chance of life' standard, which provides fair notice and limits law enforcement discretion.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent for delivered goods.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no trial was required as the appellants acknowledged they had no evidence the goods were not delivered.

The court also found no basis to reduce the agreed-upon interest rate or to stay the judgment pending the trial of the appellants' counterclaim.

The appellant appealed his convictions for public mischief and theft over, as well as his total sentence of nine months' imprisonment.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework and failed to apply a Vetrovec caution to the accomplice's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant sought a conditional sentence or a reduced custodial term, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the parity principle given the accomplice's six-month conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, noting the appellant was in a position of trust, whereas the accomplice pleaded guilty early, showed remorse, and assisted police.

The mother appealed an order under the Hague Convention requiring the return of her daughter to the United Kingdom.

The application judge found that the child's habitual residence was the U.K., as the parents had not given up their residence there when they travelled to Canada.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings regarding habitual residence or his decision not to require oral testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his custodial sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

He submitted the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the fact he drove to flee an attacker, the victim's prognosis, and his compliance with stringent bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge thoroughly balanced the mitigating factors against the catastrophic injuries caused to the child victim and the appellant's choice to continue driving when he could have stopped.

The parties were bound by a shareholders agreement containing a shotgun buy-sell clause.

The respondents triggered the clause, offering to buy the appellants' shares or sell their own, demanding 100% of the purchase price on closing.

The appellants accepted the offer to sell but provided for payment of 50% on closing and a promissory note for the balance, relying on a 'Minimum Terms' provision in the agreement.

The application judge found the appellants' acceptance invalid as a counter-offer.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the agreement's language deemed the 50% payment term to be included in any offer, making the appellants' acceptance valid.

The appellants appealed an order requiring them to execute a specific release and indemnity in favour of the respondent bare trustees before the trustees would convey certain lands.

The Court of Appeal found that the release requested by the respondents was broader in scope than the release provided for in the underlying trust agreement.

The appeal was allowed, and the order was varied to require the appellants to execute a release only in the terms set out in the trust agreement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order, arguing the motion judge lacked jurisdiction due to the absence of pleadings in the motion record and issues with the style of cause.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the pleadings were before the motion judge and the style of cause challenge could not be raised for the first time on appeal.